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CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW
I.1. WORLD ECONOMIC RECOVERY
During 1999 the Spanish economy contin-
ued to perform strongly against a foreign back-
ground marked by the start of Monetary Union
and increasingly firmer worldwide economic
conditions. Both aspects have shaped the key
features of Spain’s recent performance.
Developments in 1999 gradually put behind
the bout of low growth and instability on interna-
tional financial markets that had originated in
the emerging south-east Asian economies two
years back, and whose effects had spread and
been subsequently exacerbated by the Russian
debt crisis and the vulnerability of other regions
such as Latin America. The expansion of the
world economy in 1999 was led by the United
States, where growth was robust and the de-
mand for imports strong. And it was seconded
by the south-east Asian economies, which re-
covered forcefully as a result of the gains in
competitiveness arising from the devaluation of
their currencies and the rapid decline in em-
ployment and the restructuring measures
adopted. The stabilisation of financial conditions
in Latin America also contributed to improving
worldwide economic conditions. That said, re-
covery in this region was slower and less in-
tense than in the Asian countries, although it
gained momentum in the final months of the
year once the reaction by Brazil and other
countries in the area was felt on financial mar-
kets.
The euro-area economies and other Euro-
pean countries, such as the United Kingdom,
progressively participated in the climate of eco-
nomic recovery, boosted by the growing buoy-
ancy of foreign demand. The recessionary
trends that had emerged in certain countries in
late 1998 and early 1999 were thus overcome.
Conversely, in the Japanese economy, the
signs of recovery in the first half of the year
weakened as the fiscal impulse induced by the
economic policy measures adopted in recent
years petered out.
The economic expansion has been accom-
panied by a sudden rise in oil prices that has
lasted longer than initially thought, owing to the
ability of the producer-country cartel to adhere
very strictly to the quotas set in the face of
growing demand for energy, in the wake of the
world recovery. The persistence in the rise in
the price of oil products on international mar-
kets became a major factor of risk for the world
economy and it has been a decisive element in
the deterioration of the inflation outlook over the
course of the year. The intensity of the rises
was further fuelled at the beginning of the year
2000 and the effects continued to pass through,
against a backdrop of high growth in global ac-
tivity, to other price indicators. In late March the
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) reached an agreement to raise crude
oil production. This should stabilise oil prices in
the coming months, although the effects of the
lagged feed-through of the rises accumulated in
the past will continue to be felt.
Higher growth expectations and the emer-
gence of inflationary risks have been reflected
in a gradual rise in long-term interest rates.
They have also led the monetary authorities
gradually to tighten the stance of their monetary
policies, thereby winding up the phase of
greater monetary easiness with which it had
been sought to counter the financial instability
of the preceding years. Given the improved in-
ternational environment, world growth projec-
tions for the coming years have been succes-
sively revised upwards. The latest forecasts
point to a rate of expansion in the year 2000 ex-
ceeding 3% for the OECD countries and signal
a notable reduction in the cyclical differences
between the United States and the European
Union (EU).
In 1999 the US economy once more per-
formed exceptionally. Output growth was high
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at around 4 % and there was a lack of inflation-
ary pressures, despite full employment having
virtually been achieved (with an unemployment
rate of 4 %). The situation has remained un-
changed in the opening months of 2000, giving
rise to one of the lengthiest expansions in US
economic history. The salient feature of this sur-
prisingly long phase of prosperity is the acceler-
ation in apparent labour productivity growth
(which is running at over 3 %). This has helped
restrain price rises even in the presence of clear
signs of demand pressures, largely fuelled by
the gains in wealth generated by the strong rise
in stock market prices in recent years.
This pattern of growth, however, cannot be
said to be proving fully balanced or risk-free in
terms of its sustainability. Strong consumption
growth is outstripping the expansion in house-
hold disposable income, as it is essentially
based on the stimulating effects of high asset
prices. As a result, it is prompting an ongoing
decline in the private-sector saving ratio, which
reached a low of 1.4 % of GDP in 1999. Hence,
spurred by the opportunities offered by the new
information and telecommunications technolo-
gies, continuing investor buoyancy is, by run-
ning counter to a declining trend in domestic
saving, leading to an increase in the borrowing
requirements of an economy which had tradi-
tionally been the world’s main creditor. The US
current-account deficit rose to 3.6 % of GDP.
This but reflects the deterioration in the US
trade deficit, which has been acting as a safety
valve for domestic demand pressures and pre-
venting inflationary pressures from emerging.
This greatly prolonged phase of growth with
price stability in the US economy, which pre-
sides over the new global economic scenario,
and the behaviour of international financial mar-
kets, is due to the combined action of a broad
range of factors. Some of these have had a
conjunctural influence. Such is the case with
the decline in commodity prices, which had
prompted a significant reduction in import prices
in the preceding years (accentuated by the ap-
preciation of the dollar), but which turned
sharply round in 1999. Notable among the fac-
tors of a more structural or long-term nature
have been the reforms undertaken in recent
decades to add greater flexibility to product and
service markets. Particularly relevant here are
the gains in efficiency brought about by the
deregulation of the economy and the favourable
effects on wages and employment that have
arisen from a more flexible labour market. Like-
wise, the presence of deep and highly devel-
oped financial markets in the United States has
played a very important role in the expansion of
new-technology industries, by providing the ap-
propriate means for the financing (mainly
through venture capital) of the new firms active
in these industries. These structural changes
have, moreover, been made against a back-
ground of economic globalisation and world-
wide financial liberalisation, which has provided
for a better allocation of resources. Further, the
macroeconomic policies implemented in the
most recent past have contributed to shaping
t is scenario. This has been thanks to the appli-
cation of a strict fiscal policy allowing fiscal sur-
pluses to be attained and a monetary policy
which has proven capable of blending buoyant
economic activity with continuing price stability.
However, the most striking features of the
recent US economic performance have been
the acceleration in productivity, business prof-
itability and the extraordinary surge in stock
market prices. These are the factors that have
led some analysts to believe that the boom in
information and communications technology
has engineered a structural change in the
growth rate of aggregate supply. This change
would warrant talk of the advent of a “new
economy” in which the thresholds for non-infla-
tionary growth would be significantly higher
than in the past, with all the ensuing economic
policy implications.
Advocates of this standpoint consider that
the beneficial effects of the new technologies
spread to the economy as a whole mainly
through two channels. The first, which is more
direct and immediate in nature, runs via the
growing weight of the high productivity indus-
tries in overall output. The second, which is
more indirect but has greater medium- and
long-run potential, is based on the widespread
reduction of production and distribution costs
and on the greater availability of information re-
sulting from the intensive use of increasingly
more sophisticated IT processes and from the
possibilities Internet access offers. It is the sec-
ond channel which would lead to an overall im-
provement in efficiency in the economy and to a
higher rate of expansion of productive potential,
which would ultimately be reflected in a sus-
tained increase in the growth rate of productivi-
ty. The intensity of the spread of productivity
gains to the economy as a whole is, therefore,
the crucial link for justifying a permanent in-
crease in potential growth capacity, as asserted
by the advocates of the “new economy”.
On the evidence available, the pace of ap-
parent labour productivity growth has quickened
in recent years, although a small portion of this
is due to a more accurate measurement of out-
put growth further to the revision of the GDP
deflators. Moreover, these increases in produc-
tivity appear to have been concentrated in in-
dustries producing IT goods. By contrast, evi-
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dence of the spread of new technology to tradi-
tional productive processes is weak and incipi-
ent, although the difficulty of capturing this type
of phenomenon drawing on National Accounts
information should be mentioned. Undeniably,
then, the process of technological innovation
has accelerated substantially in recent years.
But, on the figures known to date, it is risky to
assume that the indirect effects of new informa-
tion technology on productive industry as a
whole will bring about a permanent increase in
the growth rate of productivity.
One aspect closely linked to this develop-
ment has been the strong rise in US stock mar-
ket prices, especially since 1995. Measured by
the Standard and Poor’s 500 index, the cumula-
tive increase in equity prices since then has
been almost 200 %. The intensity and duration
of this bull market is one of the main sources of
uncertainty over the sustainability of the US
economy’s current buoyancy. In principle, low
real interest rates and the favourable outlook for
business profitability might warrant, at least in
part, the rises seen on the general indices.
However, their sectoral composition reveals a
heavy bias indicating that the rise in prices in
recent years has been essentially due to the ex-
traordinary surge in technological and telecom-
munications stocks. This appears to indicate
that the yields implicit in high stock market
prices are discounting a future scenario in
which the extensive use of information technol-
ogy will trigger a fundamental change in pro-
ductive processes, the advantages of which
would infuse all sectors of the economy.
If the current uncertainty over this scenario
materialising were well-founded, it would be
wise not to rule out the possibility of a signifi-
cant decline in stock market prices, as a result
of profits not living up to expectations, or the
need to resort to more energetic financial poli-
cies to counter inflationary pressures greater
than those being anticipated at present. Such
an outcome would bear most significantly on
the buoyancy of the US economy, and would
spread rapidly to the rest of the world. Indeed,
concern has begun to be voiced in early 2000
about the level reached by certain prices and
there has been an increase in the volatility of
technological stocks and a significant fall in
their prices which has spread to other markets.
The innovative features marking recent de-
velopments in the US economy and expecta-
tions that these will gradually spread to other
regions are the main basis of the favourable
world economic outlook. Indeed, on the latest
IMF forecasts, world growth could be running at
around 4 % in the coming years. These trends
appear to be beginning to take root in Europe.
With the weaker growth brought on by the ef-
fects of international financial crises behind, a
fr sh phase of recovery has been set in motion
more rapidly than expected in the second half
of 1999. However, although this may lead to
less of a cyclical discrepancy with the United
States, the structural characteristics of the situ-
ation in Europe are different. It is thus not possi-
ble mechanically to extrapolate the effect of the
factors underpinning US buoyancy.
Average GDP growth in the EU has scarcely
exceeded 2.5 % since 1994, a figure very close
to the available estimates of the trend growth
rate. Meantime, employment creation has been
subdued, with unemployment, which has a sig-
nificant structural component, holding at very
high levels above 9 % of the labour force. Al-
though the pattern of development of the Euro-
pean economy over the past decade embodies
high average growth in productivity (around
2 %), over the past two years there has been a
marked decline in this variable which only ap-
pears to have turned around as from 1999 Q3
(see Box I.1). In 1997, the latest year for which
comparable data are available, the share of the
IT and telecommunications industry in GDP
was two points lower in Europe than in the Unit-
ed States (5.8 % against 7.9 %). And there are
signs that, over the past two years, this differ-
ence has tended to widen. More worrying, in
any case, is the considerable distance separat-
ing the United States from Europe, according to
all surveys, as regards the proportion of the
population with access to Internet and the de-
velopment of e-commerce. This is in the light of
the impact the Web is apparently having on
improving business organisation, productive
processes and commercial relations in the US
economy.
In turn, despite the changes wrought by the
development of the single market and the intro-
duction of the euro, the European institutional
framework continues to be afflicted by serious
rigidities in certain markets or industries that are
inhibiting or checking the introduction of new
technologies and the diffusion of their effects. If
this delay persists, it could have adverse, long-
lasting effects on the competitiveness of the Eu-
ropean economy in the medium term and,
therefore, on its potential growth. Accordingly, it
is essential that the reforms needed to reap the
benefits of the new wave of innovation and
technological change driving world growth
should be undertaken.
At the recent extraordinary European Coun-
cil in Lisbon, significant efforts were made along
these lines. A series of measures were agreed
upon by the national and Community authorities
for application in the near future. One field of
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action is to be the liberalisation and integration
of product and factor markets, as rigidities in
their workings and the lack of competition at the
national and EU level are hampering and dis-
couraging innovation and the adoption of new
technology. In parallel, administrative formali-
ties for the creation of new companies are to be
simplified and the appropriate amendments
made for the organisation of a truly integrated
market for venture capital, to facilitate the fund-
ing of the most innovative business plans. It is
also necessary to lower the legal barriers to the
development of e-commerce, provide for
widespread access to the Internet in schools
and, generally, to adapt education and training
to the new technological environment.
The US experience shows that if it is wished
to harness the growth potential of new tech-
nologies, what is needed are sufficiently com-
petitive and flexible factor, product and service
markets and efficient financial markets to
smooth the dissemination of technological inno-
vation and the adjustments in productive factor
allocation that the process entails. This is the
major challenge facing Europe further to the
successful culmination of the launching of the
euro and the start-up of the single monetary
policy.
I.2. THE LAUNCH OF THE EURO,
THE SINGLE MONETARY POLICY
AND THE SPANISH ECONOMY
The key feature in Europe has been the
start-up of the common monetary policy in an
economic situation in which the outlook has
changed in step with the increasingly firm
course of the world economy. The establish-
ment and thrust of the new single monetary pol-
icy have been determining factors of the be-
haviour of the Spanish economy and of the
challenges faced by domestic economic policy
in the recent period.
The launch of the euro at the outset of 1999
was against a backdrop of moderate expecta-
tions of economic growth, following the pause in
activity in 1998 Q4 which prompted the deterio-
ration of the external environment and a weak-
ening of euro-area exports. The outlook for
prices was, at the start of the third stage of
EMU, very favourable; throughout 1998, the
harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP)
had posted ever lower rates, ending that year
with a 12-month growth rate slightly lower than
1 %.
Against this background, the benchmark in-
terest rate that would set the tone for the single
monetary policy in its initial stage was fixed at
3 %, following concerted action on 3rd Decem-
ber 1998 by the central banks that were to
make up the Eurosystem. After 1st January
1999 this would be the level for the ECB’s main
refinancing operations, and it was to prove con-
sistent with the medium-term price stability out-
look derived from the analysis of economic and
financial conditions in the euro area. In present-
ing the elements of the more active policy strat-
egy that it was going to use, the ECB specified
the definition of price stability as a situation in
which the 12-month growth rate of the HICP for
the euro area was, in the medium run, below
2 %.
The prospect of slowing growth in the euro
area and of an absence of inflationary risks
firmed during the opening months of 1999 and
gave rise to an additional cut of half a point in
intervention rates. But both these facets of the
macroeconomic picture in the euro area were
revised upwards as the year unfolded, albeit
more slowly so in the case of the inflation out-
look, once the firming of the rise in oil prices
became clear. Economic activity in the euro
area began to pick up after the spring, in the
light of the gradual improvement in the area’s
main export markets and the increase in inter-
nal demand. The take-off in exports firmed in
the final months of the year, helped by the pro-
gressive buoyancy of the emerging economies
and by the gains in competitiveness arising
from the depreciation of the euro. Exports duly
became the main engine of growth for the
a r e a .
From mid-1999 onwards, the single mone-
tary policy was conditioned by this change in
the price outlook, against a background of im-
proving growth expectations. Thus, in the
closing months of 1999, the ECB reviewed its
relatively relaxed single monetary policy
stance, which had been manifest in an inter-
vention rate level of 3 % to April and 2.5 % to
November. The ECB has since raised its offi-
cial rate on four occasions, the last of which
on 27th April this year, taking it to 3.75 %
(see ChartI . 1 ) .
From the start of EMU the growth of the M3
monetary aggregate in the euro area stood
above its reference value of 4.5 %. This was
not initially considered worrying for the future
course of prices, however, since it proved diffi-
cult in the opening months of 1999 to interpret
correctly the movements in public portfolios in-
duced by the transition to the Third Stage.
Long-term interest rates, for their part, held vir-
tually stable to May at a level close to 4 % for
the 10-year maturity, and the euro exchange
rate moved on a depreciating trend as from the
s art of the year.
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BOX I.1
Growth, productivity and information and communciations technology in the United States and Europe
The current strong expansion of the US economy
without excessive inflationary pressures is in contrast to
developments in the European economy. The latter is
characterised by more moderate growth rates that are
not sufficient to generate employment at a pace allow-
ing Europe’s high structural unemployment rates to be
substantially reduced. A comparative analysis of both
economies in terms of productivity in recent years may
be of use for assessing the challenges facing the Euro-
pean economy.
As can be seen in the accompanying chart, the
growth of apparent labour productivity (measured as
the difference between the growth of GDP and of em-
ployment) ran at a higher rate in the European econo-
my in the period 1988-1997 than in the United States.
In the first period studied (1988-1994), average GDP
growth was similar in both economies, entailing greater
job creation in the case of the US economy. In the
years 1994-1997, however, economic buoyancy was
greater in the United States than in Europe, although
this translated into a smaller increase in apparent
labour productivity owing to the favourable trend of em-
ployment. In the last two years (1998-1999), productivi-
ty in Europe has slowed significantly, accompanied by
a slight increase in job creation which, in any event, is
still not on a par with US rates. The US economy, by
contrast, has shown a simultaneous strong increase in
both employment and productivity during this period of
expansion.
The pattern of growth of the US economy over the
past two years has consisted of a sizeable increase in
productivity in the absence of inflationary pressures,
despite a situation of close to full employment. This pat-
tern has led some to posit the hypothesis that the de-
velopment and ubiquitousness of information and com-
munications technology (ICT) is radically changing how
the economy works and is providing for gains in effi-
ciency, the reflection of which is a sustained increase in
the growth rate of productivity and a reduction in costs,
thereby avoiding the emergence of inflationary pres-
sures.
The performance of the ICT industries (computers, components and communications) has been exceptionally dy-
namic in the United States in recent years, with productivity growth of close to 10%. Indeed, as the chart shows, the
contribution of these industries (which represented scarcely 8 % of GDP in 1997) helps account for more than two-
thirds of productivity growth in the United States between 1994 and 1997(1). This result implies that the potential ben-
efits of ICT had not so far made for a substantial increase in the productivity of other industries in the economy.
Nonetheless, in the past two years quickening productivity has coincided with incipient signs that that other industries
might finally be benefiting from the changes wrought by ICT on productive processes. That should add credence to the
viability of the observed pattern of high productivity and output growth in the coming years.
In Europe’s case, the contribution of the above-mentioned industries to productivity growth was only 15 % in the
period in question, despite the fact the relative size of these industries in Europe (around 6 % of GDP) is only slightly
less than the related US figure. Although this figure might be biased owing to data inaccuracy, the comparison with the
United States highlights the limited significance of the technologically most advanced industries in explaining productiv-
ity growth in Europe.
These results, combined with Europe’s relative technological lag in these industries, suggests it is unlikely that the
contribution of ICT to economic growth through this direct channel will swiftly acquire the importance it has in the United
States in recent years. However, the EU may feasibly benefit from the spread of ICT to the rest of industry although, as
stressed, the scale of these indirect effects is uncertain. In any event, the difference in growth pattern between both ar-
eas is largely based on the greater flexibility and competition prevailing in US markets. This not only allows greater em-
ployment generation but also appears conducive to innovation, to the dissemination of new technology and, therefore,
to a more immediate harnessing of the potential benefits.
(1) To calculate the contribution of the ICT industry to productivity growth, a wider-than-usual definition of this industry is taken, owing to data
availability restrictions. In particular, the sub-categories of capital goods, office equipment, data processing, optics and precision engineering, elec-
tric and electronic products and communications (branches D.29-33, I.64, NACE Rev.1 nomenclature) are included.
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However, a somewhat swifter deterioration
was seen in the monetary and financial indica-
tors after the summer months. The growth rate
of M3 accelerated and ended the year running
at over 6 %. Combined with the expansionary
behaviour of credit to the private sector, which
posted rates of over 10 %, this appeared to in-
dicate a situation of ample liquidity in the area.
As from June, long-term interest rates moved
onto an upward course, in parallel with US bond
yields, and the euro exchange rate continued to
fall, having depreciated by May 2000 by 22.2 %
against the dollar compared with its level at the
start of 1999. The moderately rising trend of the
HICP after June quickened as from 1999 Q3
owing to the recurrent rises in oil prices and the
impact of the depreciation of the euro exchange
rate. The HICP thus posted a 12-month growth
rate of 1.7 % in December 1999, double the eu-
ro-area inflation rate at the start at the third
stage of EMU, and stood in April 2000 at 1.9 %.
All these factors, combined with improved
expectations about demand growth in the euro
area, made for a deterioration in the medium-
term inflation outlook, the final scale of which
could be influenced by the impact of the depre-
ciation of the euro on final prices and by wage
bargaining in the year 2000. In response to this
bleaker inflation outlook, the ECB altered the
single monetary policy stance as from Novem-
ber by means of the above-mentioned increas-
es in its intervention rates. Notwithstanding, real
short-term interest rates continued falling owing
to the increase in the growth rate of prices dur-
ing 1999. As a result of this and the deprecia-
tion of the euro exchange rate, the indicators of
monetary and financial conditions in the area
stood in spring 2000 at lower levels than those
prevailing in the first half of 1999.
The decline in real interest rates was partic-
ularly marked in those euro-area members with
higher inflation rates during the year. Moreover,
it is these same countries which exhibited
growth rates in activity higher than the average
for the euro area. The Spanish economy is a
case in point. The decline in real interest rates,
combined with the depreciation of the euro ex-
change rate, gave rise to particularly generous
monetary and financial conditions in Spain dur-
ing 1999 (see Box I.2), the expansionary effect
of which on aggregate demand compounded
those derived from the fall in interest rates dur-
ing the convergence process. The high growth
of credit to the private sector, which climbed to
17 % in 1999, was the clearest exponent of this
situation.
Against the above-mentioned background of
recovering foreign markets, the generous mon-
etary conditions prevailing and agents’ opti-
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CHART I.1
Consumer price indices, interest rates
and exchange rates in the euro area
   Sources: Eurostat, ECB and Banco de España.
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DEMAND AND OUTPUT AT CONSTANT PRICES (a):
Private consumption 1.5 2.0 2.9 4.1 4.4
Government consumption 3.4 1.3 2.7 2.0 1.8
Gross capital formation 0.4 1.7 4.6 9.6 8.4
Exports of goods and services 9.0 10.3 15.1 7.1 8.5
Imports of goods and services 6.8 8.1 12.8 11.1 12.6
Gross domestic product 1.7 2.3 3.8 4.0 3.7
EMPLOYMENT, WAGES, COSTS AND PRICES (a):
Total employment 0.2 1.2 2.7 3.7 3.4
Compensation per employee 7.0 4.0 2.8 2.8 2.4
Unit labour costs 5.4 2.9 1.8 2.8 2.6
GDP deflator 5.7 3.4 2.1 2.3 3.1
Consumer price index (annual average) 5.4 3.6 2.0 1.8 2.3
Consumer price index (end-year twelve-month rate) 5.1 3.2 2.0 1.4 2.9
SAVING, INVESTMENT AND FINANCIAL BALANCE (b):
Resident sectors: saving (c) 20.6 23.1 23.7 23.8 23.7
General government (c) –1.2 –1.8 0.0 0.8 2.3
Resident sectors: investment 22.3 21.9 22.1 23.1 24.2
General government 4.4 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.4
Resident sectors: national net lending (+) or borrowing (–)–1.6 1.2 1.6 0.8 –0.6
General government –5.6 –5.0 –3.2 –2.6 –1.1
Gross general government debt 53.3 68.0 66.7 64.9 63.5
MONETARY AND FINANCIAL INDICATORS (d):
ECB weekly intervention rate — — — — 2.7
Banco de España intervention rate 11.4 7.5 5.4 4.2 —
10-year government bond yield 10.8 8.7 6.4 4.8 4.7
Synthetic bank lending rate 14.3 9.7 7.2 5.9 4.9
Madrid Stock Exchange General Index
(Dec. 1985= 100) 272.8 367.3 556.0 817.7 894.4
Dollar/euro exchange rate (e) 1.247 1.270 1.134 1.120 1.067
Index of Spain’s competitiveness against
the developed countries (nominal) (1990 = 100) 91.0 80.9 77.2 76.9 75.7
Index of Spain’s competitiveness against
the developed countries (real) (1990 = 100) 94.5 89.2 85.2 85.2 84.8
Liquid financial assets (f) 9.3 9.2 8.7 6.0 4.5
Broad liquid assets (g) 10.0 9.3 10.7 9.4 9.6
Total financing of households 8.2 9.1 11.7 16.8 17.7
Total financing of non-financial corporations 6.4 1.4 8.6 12.8 17.4
Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Intervención General de la Administración del Estado and Banco de España.
(a) Rate of change.
(b) As a percentage of GDP. The saving and investment figures for 1999 are estimates of the Banco de España.
(c) Includes net capital transfers received.
(d) Average annual levels for interest rates and exchange rates and rates of change for financial assets and liabilities.
(e) Prior to 1999: dollar/ecu exchange rate.
(f) For years 1990-1995: ALP2.
(g) For years 1990-1995: ALPF.
TABLE I.1
Main indicators of the Spanish economy
ESA 79
Average
90-95 1996 1997 1998 1999
ESA 95
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mistic expectations, the growth rate of the
Spanish economy throughout 1999 was sus-
tained and significantly higher than the Euro-
pean average. The macroeconomic picture at
the outset of Spanish participation in EMU thus
depicts the entrenchment of the achievements
secured via the convergence and economic lib-
eralisation policies pursued in recent years.
Such policies have allowed sustained macroe-
conomic stability to be reconciled with highly
buoyant output and employment.
Real GDP ran at 3.7 % on average in 1999,
only three-tenths of a point less than a year ear-
lier. It was on a slightly accelerating path
throughout the year, pointing to a somewhat
higher growth rate for the year 2000. All the do-
mestic demand components contributed to
maintaining a high growth rate in 1999, and the
demand for exports progressively recovered as
the year advanced. Consumer spending, the re-
al growth rate of which was higher than in 1998,
was boosted by the growth of real disposable
income, low real interest rates and the increase
in wealth. Investment in construction held at
high rates of expansion, despite the slowdown
in civil engineering works, and investment in
capital goods performed favourably, though
somewhat down on 1998. Throughout the year
the negative contribution of net external de-
mand moderated as exports gradually picked
up, in line with the recovery in world demand,
although imports remained considerably buoy-
ant. In this way the external component more
than offset the marginal slowdown in what was
nonetheless highly buoyant domestic demand.
Employment was very robust for the third
year running. Its annual average rate of change
was, on QNA figures and in terms of equivalent
jobs, 3.4 %. Complementing these data is the
information provided by the official Labour
Force Survey (EPA), according to which almost
two million jobs have been created over the
past four years and the unemployment rate has
fallen 7.4 percentage points to 15.4 % of the
labour force. Although the 1999 EPA data are
affected by the compilation changes to the Sur-
vey at the beginning of the year, the volume of
estimated flows leaves no doubt as to the inten-
sity of the employment generation process. De-
pendent employment was particularly dynamic,
growing at 6.7 % in 1999, as was permanent-
contract employment (25.5 %), although the
proportion of temporary to permanent employ-
ees remained high (32.8 %) on average in
1999. The data obtained from companies show,
moreover, that medium-sized and small firms
have generated most of the employment creat-
ed, since many large corporations are still ad-
justing staff numbers as part of restructuring
processes. These results reflect the favourable
ffects on job creation of the liberalising mea-
sures adopted and the reforms implemented to
improve labour market workings and wage bar-
gaining arrangements, under which price ex-
pectations have been adapted to the Monetary
Union scenario.
Wage rises trended moderately in 1999, in
keeping with price stability requirements. How-
ever, this containment of unit labour costs was
dampened by the low increase in apparent
labour productivity. Further, the behaviour of
wage increases was very uniform, belying the
diversity of situations seen at the industry or
firm level. Corporate profitability levels contin-
ued to improve. According to the Central Bal-
ance Sheet Office Quarterly Survey, profits
reached an all-time high in 1999 due above all
to the combination of wage restraint, against a
background of buoyant activity, with the ongo-
ing reduction in borrowing costs, since the
turnaround in interest rates on financial markets
as from mid-1999 has not yet made itself felt in
the overall financial burden. The leverage ratio
of companies, which measures the difference
between the return on assets and the cost of
borrowed funds, continued to rise, providing
fresh investment incentives.
Among the benefits accruing to the Spanish
economy as a result of EMU membership is an
increase in the presence of Spanish firms in in-
ternational markets, channelled through a spec-
tacular increase in direct investment abroad,
especially in Latin America. This phenomenon,
which has been partly driven by the speedier
privatisation of certain large public-sector cor-
porations and by the consolidation of the finan-
cial system, attests to growing Spanish partici-
pation in the dynamics of economic globalisa-
tion. This could hardly have taken place had the
decision to target EMU membership as the
guiding principle and anchor of economic policy
in recent years not been successfully seen
through.
High GDP growth in real terms, its forceful
capacity to generate employment and a low in-
flation rate have made for progress in fiscal
consolidation at a higher than envisaged rate.
Tax receipts grew more than forecast in 1999
and this meant that, although the increase in
public spending was higher than initially budget-
d, the reduction in the deficit was greater than
stipulated in the Stability and Growth Pro-
gramme. The deficit stood at 1.1 % of GDP at
end-1999 compared with 2.6 % in 1998.
The decline in the budget deficit is particular-
ly significant since it came about in a year in
which personal income tax was reformed, a re-
form entailing a reduction in the household tax
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BOX I.2
Monetary and financial conditions in Spain
The analysis of monetary and financial conditions
has traditionally been a cornerstone of the diagnosis of
the economic situation and the inflation outlook. How-
ever, given the absence of a single variable capable of
reflecting such conditions in an overall fashion, one re-
cent proposal has been to construct indices in which
different monetary and financial variables are weighted
in accordance with the estimated effect that the
changes in each of them have on expenditure or infla-
tion.
On analysing these indices several considerations
relating to their construction and interpretation must be
borne in mind(1). Firstly, these indices measure only
changes in relation to a base period, whereby the level
of the index per se is not interpretable. Secondly, any
mechanical interpretation of changes in the index in
terms of monetary policy decisions should be avoided,
since both real interest rates and exchange rates are
strongly endogenous variables and, although monetary
policy may exert great influence on them, this is not the only determining factor. Finally, it should not be forgotten that
the monetary conditions index, since it is a weighted sum, is highly dependent on the value of the weights used in its
construction.
Bearing these caveats in mind, it may be useful to analyse the recent changes in monetary and financial conditions
in the Spanish economy as reflected in (i) a monetary conditions index (MCI), which tracks real short-term interest rates
and real exchange rates; and (ii) a financial conditions index (FCI), which reflects, moreover, real long-term interest
rates and the real growth of listed share prices. Both indices take into account the change entailed by EMU, insofar as
they reflect the effect on the Spanish economy both of changes in the monetary and financial variables of the Spanish
economy itself and of changes in the monetary and financial variables of the eleven euro-area countries as a whole.
The accompanying chart depicts both indices in the period from January 1987 to March 2000. For much of this pe-
riod monetary and financial conditions were influenced by the need to guide the Spanish inflation rate towards a level
compatible with price stability. Subsequently, the attainment of the inflation targets set and progressive convergence to-
wards a single monetary policy for all the EMU member countries led the indices to move onto a declining trend. As a
result, the Spanish economy moved into the third stage of EMU with monetary and financial conditions that could, com-
pared with the recent past, be qualified as generous.
Throughout 1999 and in the opening months of 2000, monetary and financial conditions in Spain have continued to
ease. That said, a distinction should be drawn between an initial period (to April 1999) in which the declines in both the
MCI and the FCI were most substantial, and a subsequent period in which they were considerably more restrained. The
break coincided with the end of the process of reductions in official interest rates in the euro area, which fed through al-
so to market interest rates. Long-term interest rates began to rise already in the second quarter of the year, while short
rates did so as from the summer, partly in anticipation of the rises in official interest rates that would subsequently take
place. Nonetheless, the rises in nominal interest rates have not translated clearly into a tightening of monetary condi-
tions in Spain due, in part, to the counteracting effect of the increase in the inflation rate and, in part, to the ongoing de-
preciation of the effective exchange rate of the euro throughout the period. The effect of the stock market was also ex-
pansionary in view of the strong growth of Spanish stock market prices in the final months of 1999, though it was of lit-
tle significance owing to the limited weight of the change in this variable on the FCI.
In sum, according to these indices the most generous monetary and financial conditions seen in the Spanish econ-
omy since 1987 took hold during the course of 1999. However, as earlier indicated, this should be interpreted with cau-
tion, in particular because the equilibrium value of these indices consistent with neutral monetary conditions may have
altered substantially over this period of time. This is particularly true in the light of the structural change that EMU has
entailed for the Spanish economy and the changes in fiscal policy and the degree of market flexibility.
(1) The indices presented in this box are constructed by weighting the different variables according to the estimated elasticities of ex-
penditure to changes in the monetary and financial variables making up each of the indices. A more detailed discussion of the construc-
tion and interpretation of these indices in general, and of the specific indices shown in the accompanying chart, can be found in the arti-
cle “Una evaluación de la situación monetaria y financiera en España a partir de un índice de condiciones monetarias”, published in the
February 2000 edition of the Boletín Económico.
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burden. However, although the breakdown of
tax receipts is not yet available, the positive ef-
fects of this reform on activity and employment
in the short term, via the increase in disposable
income and, by extension, in household con-
sumption and saving, are likely to have further
boosted receipts from other taxes more related
to economic activity, thereby offsetting – at
least partly – the initial loss of takings. In the
medium and long run, further positive effects
may be expected. These will come about for
two reasons. First, the stimulating effect on job
supply and demand generated by the reduction
in the tax gap, i.e. in the difference between re-
al gross wages paid by employers and the real
net wages received by employees. And second,
improved efficiency in the allocation of saving,
given the more favourable and uniform treat-
ment for tax purposes of returns on the main fi-
nancial and property assets in which house-
holds invest.
The progress made in public finances has
translated into a reduction in the public
debt/GDP ratio, which stood at 63.5 % in 1999.
As a result, a balanced budget position can now
be viewed as an attainable goal over a relative-
ly immediate horizon.
The buoyant health of firms, the reduction of
the budget deficit and the decline in interest
rates have been instrumental in Spanish securi-
ties markets’ participation in the general up-
swing witnessed internationally in recent years,
with a decisive contribution also of technologi-
cal and telecommunications stocks. This has
led to an increase in Spanish households’ equi-
ty holdings, equating their financial habits to
those prevailing in the more advanced
economies and contributing to the enlargement
and maturity of capital markets.
The foregoing results are favourable in
terms of growth, job creation and macroeco-
nomic stability. Moreover, they are a reward for
the effort expended during the convergence
process and they confirm that Spain is at a
good starting point to reap the potential benefits
of EMU membership in terms of growth poten-
tial and of drawing levels of income and well-
being closer to those prevailing in the rest of the
area. However, being in a comfortable starting
position should not mean forgetting that signifi-
cant challenges may arise at a given time within
EMU. Accordingly, any signs of potential future
problems should be carefully monitored. Signifi-
cant in this connection is the fact that, during
1999, the buoyancy of final demand (which in-
creased at a rate of over 5.5 % for the third year
running), in the presence of strong rises in oil
prices, has led to a sizeable increase in the
trade deficit and a change in the course of con-
sumer prices. The trade deficit rose to 4.6 % of
GDP while consumer prices ended the year at a
12-month growth rate of 2.9 %, thereby widen-
ing slightly its differential with the euro area.
These difficulties have a transitory compo-
nent which, in principle, should be corrected
over time. The growth of the trade deficit will
tend to slow as oil prices stabilise and the pick-
up in exports takes root. As to prices, available
forecasts of the CPI point to a reduction in its
12-month growth rate in the second half of the
year 2000. That said, assessment of these fac-
tors requires caution, as they may constitute
signs of a situation of excessive demand pres-
sure in relation to the short-term responsive-
ness of supply (given potential GDP growth and
he degree of flexibility in the product and ser-
vice markets), spurred largely by the relative
laxity of the monetary conditions prevailing in
the euro area as a whole. Should these signs
become clearer, they could have adverse impli-
cations for the medium-term competitiveness of
the Spanish economy. Fortunately, the
turnaround in interest rates since the second
half of 1999 and the reduction of cyclical diver-
gence with other euro-area countries, which will
likewise be manifest in greater co-ordination be-
tween the single monetary policy stance and
the degree of monetary restrictiveness required
by the Spanish economy, will tend to mitigate
these risks.
It should be borne in mind that EMU mem-
bership substantially modifies the economy’s
traditional adjustment mechanisms in the face
of potential situations of excess demand. The ir-
revocability of the exchange rate means that
losses in competitiveness built up in relation to
EMU members might only be corrected through
the adjustment of domestic relative prices.
Hence, were rigidities to hinder this, competi-
tiveness could only be sustained through a
slowdown in activity and employment. These
new conditioning factors mean, in sum, that
sustaining the growth of the Spanish economy
in Monetary Union hinges more directly on the
ultimate determinants of relative costs. That
obliges domestic economic policy, whose lee-
way to tackle divergences has been substantial-
ly cut, to monitor with caution any symptom of
erosion of the Spanish economy’s competitive
position.
I.3. FROM STABILITY TO
COMPETITIVENESS
The macroeconomic data for recent years
reveal that the policies pursued to join EMU
have enabled Spain to experience a phase of
strong GDP and employment growth against a
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background of notable headway in macroeco-
nomic stability. As mentioned, the progress in
real convergence resides particularly on the
economy’s competitiveness. The determining
factors of competitiveness may be macroeco-
nomic, as is the case of relative costs and their
determinants (labour costs, productivity and the
exchange rate), or structural. The latter factors
are becoming more relevant given the interna-
tional environment of growing globalisation and
interdependence and in view of the more promi-
nent role played by new technology. Notable
among the structural determinants of competi-
tiveness is, first, the functioning of factor and
product markets. Conditional upon this aspect
are the efficiency of productive processes and
resource allocation and the existence of incen-
tives for technological innovation and for the
creation of new products. The second element
is related to firms’ ability to adapt to and com-
pete in this situation, which in turn depends on
factors such as the quality of training and edu-
cation, the capacity to improve productive pro-
cesses, the intensity of investment in research
and development, the provision of infrastructure
and the efficiency of industrial organisation.
This long-term relationship between compet-
itiveness and growth means it is vital to monitor
closely those symptoms which, in the general
climate of stability and soundness of growth
and employment creation, might pose certain
risks for the future of the competitive position. A
thoroughgoing analysis of the factors underlying
the price differential with the euro area and the
recent widening of the trade deficit would thus
be advisable.
During 1999 the CPI quickened from a rate
of 1.4 % in December 1998 to 3 % in February
2000, an acceleration largely induced by the
higher growth rate of its more variable compo-
nents. As in other European economies, the
rise was mainly due to the increase in the price
of energy, although there were increases in the
prices of other commodities which were passed
through by import prices. The fact that energy
prices are normally more erratic should not de-
tract from the significance of the increase in the
growth rate of prices. The intensity and persis-
tence of the changes recorded in the price of
energy and the lag with which the effects
spread to other prices (as a result of the impor-
tant role of energy as an input in the productive
apparatus as a whole), combined with the pos-
sibility that transitory increases in consumer
prices may feed through to wage and other in-
come negotiations, may hamper the resumption
of moderate inflation rates, even after the
episode of dearer oil is behind. Moreover, it
should be borne in mind that the persistence of
higher inflation in the service sector (once the
effect of the price rises in the more erratic prod-
ucts is discounted), the limited headway in re-
ducing underlying inflation and the acceleration
of other price indicators, such as wholesale in-
dustrial prices and import unit value indices,
may heighten the risks arising from dearer en-
ergy.
Although the oil price shock affects all coun-
tries, Spain’s consumer price differential with
the euro area widened in 1999 and, at the same
time, wholesale prices also grew more, follow-
ing several years of negligible differences. How-
ever, the scale of the differentials in the case of
non-energy industrial goods prices (both the
wholesale and retail segments) is limited as a
result of the greater competition these products
face. Nonetheless, unit labour costs continue to
grow more in Spain than in the euro area (de-
spite wage moderation in recent years), where-
by operating margins in manufacturing industry
have narrowed. The deterioration in competi-
tiveness in the euro area arising from the be-
aviour of unit labour costs is not, however, oc-
curring in relation to the developed countries,
owing to the depreciation of the euro against
the dollar.
The widening of the trade imbalance is
largely in response to the Spanish economy be-
ing further along the cycle than the core euro-
area countries and to the effect of dearer oil on
the cost of imports. But the intensity of the pro-
cess may point to the continuation of some of
the comparative disadvantages of the Spanish
productive structure. Thus, the merchandise
foreign trade figures in 1999 reflect, first, high
import dependency on those goods whose pro-
duction requires more advanced technology;
and second, a relatively high degree of concen-
tration of Spanish exports in specific products,
especially the more unskilled-labour-intensive
goods, where competitive pressures from the
newly industrialised countries are greater. The
industries producing these goods were those
which underwent the most marked slowdown in
sales abroad in the wake of the 1997 interna-
tional crisis. Their performance in 1999 re-
mained very depressed, owing mainly to the im-
provements in competitiveness via prices in the
emerging countries as a result of the devalua-
tion of their currencies. In turn, imports by the
most capital- and technology-intensive (car
manufacturing and industrial machinery) indus-
tries exhibited high growth, reflecting the contin-
uing technological gap afflicting Spanish indus-
try, despite the investment drive in recent years
and the ongoing incorporation of new technolo-
gy into Spanish companies.
One essential factor for gauging the impor-
tance of these events on competitiveness is the
behaviour of productivity. If the growth rate of
productivity in Spain were sufficiently high in re-
lation to the euro area countries, inflation differ-
entials with the euro zone need not entail loss-
es in competitiveness but could be the mere re-
flection of a process of real convergence under-
pinned by a high productivity growth rate in
manufacturing industry exposed to foreign com-
petition. Under certain circumstances, that
might justify continuing modest inflation differ-
entials which would progressively diminish as
the differences in levels of per capita income
were cut, without jeopardising either competi-
tiveness or potential growth.
In parallel, if the buoyancy of productivity
were – as occurs in normal circumstances– to
translate into increases in productive capacity,
the trade deficit could be interpreted as a transi-
tory imbalance, enabling surplus demand to be
absorbed in the short term without placing pres-
sure on domestic supply. This imbalance would
tend to be corrected as rises in productivity
were progressively reflected in greater aggre-
gate supply and in the reduction of final prices
and, therefore, in an improvement in the com-
petitive position and an increase in exports.
Analysis of the behaviour of productivity and
its determinants is thus very important in order
to assess the potential problems that might lie
behind the continuing inflation differential and
the trend of the trade deficit. However, this is a
complex issue. Productivity is difficult to mea-
sure and interpret, especially when structural
changes are taking place due to the adoption of
the new macroeconomic regime in the euro
area, the opening up and liberalisation of the
economy, labour market reforms and wage
moderation. All these factors have been con-
ducive to a strong increase in employment that
has induced a slowdown in apparent labour
productivity. Moreover, there are statistical
problems arising from the lack of uniformity of
the indicators used to estimate the growth of
value added and of employment, which Nation-
al Accounts methodology cannot always fully
strip out.
Unsurprisingly, then, the growth rate of ap-
parent labour productivity, defined by the rela-
tionship between value added and employment,
has been appreciably lower in Spain than in the
EU in recent years (see Charts I.2 and I.4). The
same occurs when the analysis is at a more de-
tailed level: the moderate growth rate of produc-
tivity extends in Spain to the various productive
branches, including manufacturing, where ap-
parent labour productivity has traditionally been
higher than in services owing to technological
innovation prompted by higher exposure to for-
eign competition and to greater capital endow-
ment. Behind this generalised behaviour of pro-
ductivity lies the intensity of employment cre-
ation in the various productive branches, partic-
ularly so in manufacturing. Since the Spanish
conomy is characterised by a higher unem-
ployment rate and a proportion of people in
work that is lower than the European average, it
is not only logical but also desirable that output
growth should be intensive in terms of employ-
ment generation. Only thus could real conver-
gence lead to the twin achievement of raising
per capita income levels and the rate of em-
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CHART I.2
GDP per capita, productivity and employment
as a proportion of total population: growth
differentials between Spain and EU15
-1.5
-0.5
0.5
1.5
2.5
3.5
87 89 91 93 95 97 99
-1.5
-0.5
0.5
1.5
2.5
3.5
PER CAPITA GDP
% %
-1.5
-0.5
0.5
1.5
2.5
3.5
87 89 91 93 95 97 99
-1.5
-0.5
0.5
1.5
2.5
3.5
GDP PER PERSON EMPLOYED
-1.5
-0.5
0.5
1.5
2.5
3.5
87 89 91 93 95 97 99
-1.5
-0.5
0.5
1.5
2.5
3.5
PROPORTION OF POPULATION IN EMPLOYMENT
   Source: AMECO (DG. ECFIN).
23
ployment closer to the European average. And
this is what has been happening in recent
years. As can be seen in Chart I.2, the higher
growth rate of per capita GDP in Spain com-
pared with the EU average is the outcome of
economic growth that is more intensive in terms
of employment generation and of a faster in-
crease in the proportion of the employed to the
total population. In any event, it should be
borne in mind that the moderate increase in
productivity, whatever its cause, limits the
scope for maintaining inflation differentials with
the euro area that are not harmful to competi-
tiveness.
Despite the soundness of the foregoing ar-
gument, it would nevertheless be risky fully to
attribute the low growth of apparent labour pro-
ductivity in Spain to the factors that have been
conducive in recent years to stepping up em-
ployment creation. Accordingly, it cannot be
ruled out that this low growth may also reflect
less buoyant capital accumulation or the incor-
poration of technological progress into produc-
tive processes at a slacker pace than that of the
most advanced areas of the world economy.
Advisably then, the information on the trend of
apparent labour productivity (which is an imper-
fect measure of overall productive efficiency)
should be supplemented with some estimates
of total factor productivity (which attempts to ap-
proximate to technological progress) and of
changes in the capital/labour ratio.
Analysis of these variables proves complex,
since somewhat controversial estimations are
involved. Chart I.3 shows the estimations made
for the whole of the Spanish economy’s non-fi-
nancial private sector for the period 1986-1999.
According to these results (which should be in-
terpreted with the caution befitting the difficul-
ties inherent to the estimation procedure), be-
hind the slowdown in apparent labour productiv-
ity there may also be some moderation in the
growth rate of total factor productivity and a sta-
bilisation of the capital/labour ratio. That follows
the strong labour adjustment and the substitu-
tion of capital for labour in the early nineties,
when the Spanish economy was last in reces-
sion.
It may be deduced from consideration of all
the foregoing that recent productivity develop-
ments in Spain mirror, in part, the factors that
have generated a particularly intensive pattern
of growth in employment creation. But they are
also indicative of the existence of certain condi-
tioning factors that continue to hold back the in-
corporation of technological progress and
greater capital efficiency. At the same time,
continuing obstacles to genuine increases in
productivity, which are at the root of the current
upswing in the world economy, could lead to
demand pressures –such as those the Spanish
economy has experienced following EMU mem-
bership– prompting a deterioration in competi-
tiveness.
The effects of the modest growth of appar-
ent productivity in Spain compared with the EU
are beginning to become discernible in certain
indicators of external competitiveness, such as
unit labour costs in manufacturing industry.
Chart I.4 shows that the slowdown in the growth
rate of productivity in Spain has led to higher
growth of Spanish unit labour costs, and this
despite restraint in real wages. Naturally, were
such a situation to persist in a setting where for-
eign competition is tending to level out the rate
f increase of tradable-goods final prices, that
would ultimately affect operating margins.
To prevent the risk of losses in competitive-
ness and to ensure continuation of the eco-
nomic expansion and the forceful job creation
marking Spain’s initial participation in EMU, it is
of paramount importance to sustain and build
on domestic policies aimed at making the
economy perform in line with the requirements
arising from EMU membership. Monetary and
financial conditions, dictated by the needs of
the area as a whole, will probably continue to
be relatively generous in the near future from
the standpoint of domestic requirements. Con-
sequently, it is essential that a tight fiscal policy
be implemented so as to lessen the pressure of
domestic demand. Fiscal policy should likewise
be closely tailored to compliance with the un-
dertaking to cut spending, both in the short and
long run, and surplus revenue (if this persists in
the immediate future) should be used to im-
prove the sustainability of public finances in the
medium term. A tighter fiscal policy would en-
able the pressures in final demand in recent
years to be tempered, via the related impact on
household disposable income and consump-
ion. The prompt attainment of budgetary equi-
librium across all government levels would
have beneficial effects both in terms of
macroeconomic stability and of sustainably
high growth rates.
Likewise, continuing wage restraint and the
appropriateness of pay to the economic and
roductivity conditions prevailing at the level of
industries or individual firms, in tune with the
price stability target set pursuant to the single
monetary policy and with EU economic policy
guidelines, should help provide for the harmoni-
sation of the Spanish economy with the mone-
tary conditions across the euro area as a whole.
Pay restraint is a vital prerequisite if the buoy-
ancy of activity is to generate sufficient employ-
ment to continue absorbing what is still the
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highest unemployment in the area and raising
the proportion of people in work.
Managing the instruments at hand for influ-
encing domestic demand will be all the less
complicated the more quickly progress is made
in equipping the supply side of the economy
with flexibility and the ability to respond to in-
creases in demand without stoking price pres-
sures or worsening the trade balance. The
Spanish economy has significant headroom to
raise potential output if the appropriate condi-
tions are in place to increase human, physical
and technological capital, incorporating it effi-
ciently into the productive process. Making use
of such room by deepening and extending the
structural reforms of recent years (see Box I.3)
would allow a high rate of growth and employ-
ment generation to be sustained. And that with-
out needing to confront the dilemma of having
to adopt measures restricting domestic demand
(with the scant economic policy instruments
CHART I.3
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CHART I.4
International comparison of prices and
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BOX I.3
Structural and liberalising measures in product and service markets in 1999
The programme of liberalising reforms was furthered in 1999, in keeping with the schedule laid down or, in certain
cases, in advance of the dates required in the Community directives. The progress made in opening up competition was
substantial in telecommunications (as befits the situation of full liberalisation of the supply of telephony services in force
since December 1998), and somewhat less impressive, though significant, in electricity (which has been immersed in a
process of gradual liberalisation since late 1996) and in natural gas (following the adoption of the associated Communi-
ty directive in 1998). Steps have also been taken to increase competition in the liquid hydrocarbons (petrol, diesel and
heating oil) and butane gas retail distribution industry and, elsewhere, to rationalise public spending on pharmaceutical
products. It is necessary, however, to build on and extend the measures undertaken in other areas, such as the regula-
tion of land use, wholesale and retail trade and transport in general. Here, differing degrees of co-operation from re-
gional and local government are required, only modest progress having been made in recent years. This box discusses,
non-exhaustively, the measures taken in 1999 to speed through the liberalisation of product and service markets(1).
In the telecommunications industry the number of national operators offering fixed telephony services increased
from three in 1998 to eight in 1999, there was a most significant increase in fixed telephony licences granted to opera-
tors capable of offering services at the local level, or specialising in corporate services, and the third mobile telephony
operator commenced providing services. Further, several competitive “beauty contests” were organised to award multi-
media (third-generation) mobile telephony and local radio telephony licences, which have been resolved in March this
year. Despite this considerable headway, entry barriers restricting competition remain in place, especially in local-call
fixed telephony services, and prices and costs are insufficiently aligned in certain services. The increase in the number
of operators prompted invoicing innovations and a generalised reduction in telephony prices, including those of the in-
cumbent operator. As a result, the growth rate of the CPI sub-class of telephony and telegraphy(2) fell from 5.3% at
end-1998 to 3.3 % twelve months later. Despite this favourable trend, the decline in telephony prices has been less
than in other Community countries. Indeed, in the EU as a whole, the 12-month growth rate of the equivalent HICP
component was negative (–5.7%) at the end of the year.
In the electricity industry during 1999, and in accordance with the schedule set in 1998, there was a notable widen-
ing of the qualifying criteria for users deemed to be big electricity consumers, i.e. those who can choose a supplier and
negotiate prices. This was complemented by a lowering of prices for domestic consumers. As a result, the decline in the
electricity CPI sub-class intensified (moving from a year-on-year rate of –2.7 % in 1998 to –3.9 % in 1999). In Spain,
however, electricity prices remain comparatively higher according to OECD estimates, due to the particularities of Span-
ish resources and to the very structure of the electricity bill, which reflects a series of costs unrelated to electricity gen-
eration: nuclear moratorium, coal subsidies, etc. Against this background, the timetable for acquiring big-consumer sta-
tus was brought forward, and it was approved that by July 2000 an opening up of the market of the order of close to
50 % of final demand would occur. Similar measures were taken in the gas industry, reducing the minimum consump-
tion required to qualify for big-consumer status by half and bringing forward to 2008 (five years earlier than initially
scheduled) freedom of choice as regards suppliers. A similar reduction (from fifteen years to ten) was applied to the pe-
riod during which gas distributors may have an exclusive concession on a given geographical zone, whereby competi-
tion in distribution is brought forward to 2008.
In the area of fuel distribution, the government undertook to promote competition between service stations, an-
nouncing an increase in the number to be authorised, a change in the system under which new petrol service stations
are adjudicated (giving priority to the diversification of ownership into adjacent areas) and greater transparency in price-
setting, publicising going prices on motorways. None of these measures have been implemented yet. Accordingly, it will
be necessary to wait until they are in place to assess their impact on the degree of concentration in the industry. Clear-
ance for the commercialisation of butane gas canisters was given (with a small discount) to commercial establishments
and service stations, thereby eliminating obligatory house-to-house distribution, and individuals were authorised to
transport butane gas containers. These measures, along with the launch of a new, lighter canister, have opened up
competition in distribution.
Competition policy was also reinforced in 1999. Greater control was established over mergers and corporate con-
centration, and the time required for rulings on infringements or breaches of rules was shortened. It is hoped hereby to
prevent abuse of market power. Steps were also taken to promote research and development and to reduce the tech-
nological gap with the EU (investment in research and development totalled 0.9 % of GDP in Spain in 1998 compared
with 1.9 % of GDP in the EU that same year). Specifically, a more favourable tax treatment for this type of investment
was introduced in corporate income tax and a national plan for scientific research, development and technological inno-
vation spanning the period 2000-2003 was approved, targeting a volume of investment in R+D equivalent to 1.2 % of
GDP by 2003. Lastly, with the establishment of the pilot “one-stop shop” for processing administrative formalities in cer-
tain regions, some headway has been made in simplifying obstacles to creating new small and medium-sized compa-
nies.
(1) Some of these measures were implemented in Royal Decree-Law 6/1999, addressing urgent liberalisation and competition-in-
creasing measures, and Royal Decree-Law 15/1999, addressing liberalisation, structural reform and competition-increasing measures in
the hydrocarbons industry.
(2) Note that the CPI does not include offers which are not across the board and which are not maintained for several months at
least. At the same time, new service-suppliers need to have been up and running for at least a year to be included.
available) or assume considerable risks for fu-
ture competitiveness.
The new rules governing the macroeconom-
ic functioning of the euro area and the need to
incorporate new technology mean supply-side
policies and economic liberalisation must be
brought to the fore. Structural reforms aimed at
making factor, product and service markets
more competitive are essential not only to
achieve better allocation of resources but also
to promote high-productivity industries and the
diffusion of their advantages to industry and to
the public at large. This facet of economy policy
must, therefore, play a special and prominent
role. The rise in productivity occurring at the
world level may thus be taken on board by the
Spanish economy, and real convergence may
then be furthered, harnessing all the potential
advantages stemming from EMU membership.
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CHAPTER II
THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT,
THE EURO AREA AND THE COMMON
MONETARY POLICY
II.1. INTRODUCTION
The world economy trended more
favourably in 1999 than in the preceding year.
The improvement affected most geographical
areas and was particularly patent in the emerg-
ing economies and in Japan, although this
latter country has yet to show signs of a clear
recovery. In the United States, activity was
markedly buoyant as in prior years. Meanwhile,
the European economy, following the prolonga-
tion in the first half of the year of the slowdown
begun at the end of 1998, began to pick up
firmly in the second half of 1999. This recovery
has run into the opening months of the current
y e a r .
The progress of the world economy in 1999
was largely determined by the crisis of the
emerging market countries being put behind. In
the two preceding years, this crisis caused seri-
ous turbulence on international financial mar-
kets, prompting recession in a large number of
south-east Asian and Latin American
economies, which in turn shrank the exports of
the developed countries. The countries most di-
rectly affected by the crisis adopted, in the sum-
mer of 1997, more flexible exchange rate
regimes. And this, along with the implementa-
tion of moderately expansionary monetary and
fiscal policies and with progress, in certain cas-
es, in the restructuring of the financial sector,
was conducive to their recovery and to the re-
sumption of normal conditions on international
goods and capital markets.
The pick-up in the developed Western
economies last year did not prompt a sizeable
increase in prices. Inflation held at low or mod-
erate levels, despite the marked rise in oil
prices following the reduction in production quo-
tas agreed upon by the oil exporting countries
in March 1999. Both the favourable behaviour
of wages, assisted by the counter-inflationary
credibility of the monetary authorities, and the
auspicious course – until recently – of commod-
ity prices were propitious to the containment of
inflation on both sides of the Atlantic.
Nonetheless, the combination in the United
States of high growth and relatively low inflation
to date, and the strong increase in employment
and in labour productivity, point (as discussed
in Chapter I) to the existence of changes in the
tructure of the economy that may be bearing
positively on its potential growth. The diffusion
of progress in information and communications
technology, against an economic background
characterised by the flexible functioning of fac-
tor and product markets and by the implemen-
tation of policies clearly geared to macroeco-
nomic stability, appears to have increased the
headroom for sustainable growth in the US
economy.
The pattern of growth in the United States
has, however, generated some worrying imbal-
ances, which worsened in 1999. The boom in
technological stocks raised stock market in-
dices to levels whose sustainability over time
required expectations of the long-term growth of
listed companies’ profits to remain highly opti-
mistic. In turn, the surge on equity markets fu-
elled very high increases in private consump-
tion, to the point of placing the household sav-
ing ratio at an historical low. Lastly, the short-
age of domestic saving, along with the attrac-
tiveness of US financial assets for international
investors, made for the appreciation of the dol-
lar and the worsening of the external deficit.
The vulnerability of the US economy reflected in
these imbalances, together with the uncertainty
over oil prices and the hesitant performance of
the Japanese economy, are the key factors of
risk at present for the continuation of the world-
wide economic expansion.
In the euro area, the improved economic sit-
uation during 1999 was primarily due to cyclical
factors. Exports were the most buoyant compo-
n nt of GDP in the second half of the year, and
it was the countries most affected by the finan-
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cial turbulence in south-east Asia which saw
their growth rates increase most once the crisis
was behind. The domestic demand-based pick-
up in activity and low interest rates enabled
most member states to improve their public fi-
nances, outperforming the budgetary commit-
ments into which they had entered. Nonethe-
less, the headway made in budgetary consoli-
dation, with regard to the adoption of measures
with permanent positive effects on the general
government balance and to the attainment of an
expenditure/revenue mix conducive to a better
use of resources, was generally limited. Turning
to structural policies, euro-area governments
made significant progress in liberalising certain
product and service markets. Yet the scope of
reforms to the labour market, where rigidities
hampering job creation and a higher participa-
tion rate persist, was more modest.
During its first 18 months as the monetary
authority for the euro area, the European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB) has adapted its monetary poli-
cy stance to a changing environment. This set-
ting was marked, in the opening months of
1999, by the signs of slowing activity then pre-
vailing and, as from Q3, by the increasingly un-
equivocal symptoms of latent inflationary pres-
sures. At all times, however, the euro area has
enjoyed monetary and financial conditions pro-
pitious to the sustaining of domestic demand.
Reflecting this have been the strong rates of in-
crease of the monetary and credit aggregates,
low interest rates, rising equity prices and the
depreciation of the euro.
II.2. THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
OF THE EURO AREA
II.2.1. The developed economies
In the United States,the prolonged expan-
sionary phase initiated eight years back was
sustained in 1999, while prices grew at moder-
ate rates. GDP expanded by 4.2%, the third
consecutive year of growth of over 4 % (see
Table II.1). The strong buoyancy of activity was
accompanied by high job creation, and the un-
employment rate fell during the year by 0.5 per-
centage points to 4 % in December.
As in the previous years, the increase in
GDP was essentially due to the expansion of
domestic demand and, in particular, of con-
sumption. The growth of employment, the his-
torically low level of real and nominal interest
rates and, especially, increased wealth all made
for an acceleration in private consumption,
which grew by 5.3 % in relation to the previous
year. The pick-up in exports became manifest
in the second half of 1999 although, in the year
as a whole, export growth was a modest 3.8 %.
This was far below the related increase in im-
ports, which ran at a high rate in line with the
firmness of final demand and the appreciation
of the dollar.
Prices grew throughout the year at moderate
rates, attesting to which was the 1.5 % increase
in the GDP deflator, while the consumer prices
deflator scarcely exceeded 2 %. This inflation
performance was compatible with a significant
increase in wages (hourly earnings rose by
4.7% in 1999), thanks to exceptional productiv-
ity gains which paved the way, despite strong
job creation and the ensuing tightness of the
labour market, for growth in unit labour costs of
1.7 %, down on the related 1998 rate (see
Chart II.1). However, the strong increase in oil
prices as from March entailed an appreciable
acceleration in the energy component of the
consumer price index (CPI), which translated
into a gradual increase in monthly inflation
rates, with figures above or equal to 3 % being
posted since February this year.
In principle, it seems likely that the monetary
and fiscal policy stance pursued in recent years
and the globalisation of the economy will have
favoured the stability of the business cycle and,
by this means, they will have provided for a
more efficient allocation of productive re-
sources. Likewise, the greater openness and
flexibility of national and international markets
has made it possible to harness economies of
scale in industries where the US economy is
highly competitive. Lastly, the flexibility added
to the labour market has contributed to reducing
the structural unemployment rate and, in this
way, it has broadened the boundaries of non-in-
flationary growth. Nonetheless, these factors,
though relevant, are insufficient to explain the
intense, simultaneous expansion in output, em-
ployment and productivity against a background
of low inflation. Apparently evidencing this is the
fact that other advanced countries – which are
equally exposed to globalisation, have pursued
disciplined macroeconomic policies and have
undertaken reforms enabling the relative rigidity
of their products and factor markets to be re-
duced – have not so far been capable of reap-
ing such favourable macroeconomic benefits.
As discussed in Chapter I, what is particularly
significant about the recent performance of the
US economy is that the acceleration in produc-
tivity has been closely linked to the boom in the
information and communications technology in-
dustry.
In any event, the pattern of economic growth
in the United States is also generating certain
major imbalances, which were exacerbated in
1999. Such imbalances cast doubt on the conti-
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nuity of the expansionary phase and apprecia-
bly hamper economic policy implementation.
Firstly, the boom in the information and commu-
nications technology industry has, despite the
correction in March to May this year, prompted
an enormous rise in the price of the stocks of
the companies in this industry (see Chart II.1),
which can only be explained by company profit
growth expectations far above historical levels.
In this respect, it should be borne in mind that
future dividends depend not only on the expan-
sion of the demand for high technology prod-
ucts but also on how the structure of the indus-
try changes and, in particular, on the degree of
competition that the companies currently mak-
ing up the industry will have to face. Conse-
quently, given that this is a relatively young in-
dustry, it is clear that both demand and, princi-
pally, supply are difficult to predict at present.
Accordingly, expectations about the profitability
of these companies and, therefore, their stock
market value are subject to enormous uncer-
tainty.
Secondly, the increase in the price of equity
instruments and, to a lesser extent, of real es-
tate assets has, by raising agents’ wealth, been
supportive of a substantial expansion of con-
sumption and private-sector indebtedness. The
outcome has been a reduction of more than five
percentage points in the household saving ratio
over the past five years. At the start of 2000 it
stood at under 1 %, suggesting high exposure
to the risk of a potential fall in asset prices.
Nonetheless, despite the strong expansion in
consumption, households have shown a degree
of prudence when translating the huge rise in
asset values into spending decisions. And, at
the same time, they have tended to reduce the
weight of equity in their portfolios, which has
helped sustain the soundness of their net
wealth (see Box II.1). In any event, a sharp fu-
ture correction in share prices greater than that
witnessed in the opening months of this year
could prompt a severe contraction by reversing
the effect of one of the factors that has most
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UNITED STATES:
GDP (a) 2.7 4.0 2.7 3.6 4.2 4.3 4.2
Domestic demand (a) 3.2 4.4 2.5 3.7 4.5 5.5 5.3
External demand (b) –0.6 –0.4 0.1 –0.1 –0.3 –1.3 –1.2
Public-sector balance (c) –5.1 –3.8 –3.3 –2.4 –1.2 –0.1 0.5
CPI (a) 3.0 2.6 2.8 2.9 2.3 1.6 2.2
Current-account balance (c) –1.3 –1.7 –1.5 –1.7 –1.7 –2.5 –3.7
Unemployment rate 6.9 6.1 5.6 5.4 4.9 4.5 4.2
ULCs (a) 1.7 0.8 1.1 0.5 1.9 2.4 1.7
JAPAN:
GDP (a) 0.4 0.7 1.4 5.2 1.6 –2.5 0.3
Domestic demand (a) 0.1 1.0 2.2 5.8 0.2 –3.2 0.7
External demand (b) 0.2 –0.3 –0.8 –0.6 1.4 0.6 –0.3
Public-sector balance (c) –1.6 –2.3 –3.6 –4.2 –3.4 –4.3 –7.1
CPI (a) 1.2 0.7 –0.1 0.1 1.7 0.7 –0.3
Current-account balance (c) 3.1 2.8 2.2 1.4 2.2 3.2 2.5
Unemployment rate 2.5 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.4 4.1 4.7
ULCs (a) 3.3 –0.7 –2.2 –1.9 –1.6 5.5 –3.5
UNITED KINGDOM:
GDP (a) 2.3 4.4 2.8 2.6 3.5 2.2 2.1
Domestic demand (a) 2.2 3.5 1.8 3.0 3.7 4.2 3.6
External demand (b) 0.1 0.9 1.0 –0.5 –0.3 –2.1 –1.7
Public-sector balance (c) –0.8 –6.8 –5.8 –4.4 –2.0 0.2 0.3
CPI (a) 1.6 2.5 3.4 2.5 3.1 3.4 1.6
Current-account balance (c) –1.7 –0.2 –0.5 –0.1 0.8 –0.1 –1.4
Unemployment rate 10.3 9.4 8.1 7.4 5.7 4.7 4.3
ULCs (a) 0.1 –0.5 1.4 1.7 2.9 3.4 4.0
Sources: IMF, OECD and national statistics.
(a) Rate of change. ULCs: non-farm sector for the United States; manufacturing for Japan; whole economy for the United Kingdom.
(b) Contribution to GDP growth.
(c) As a percentage of GDP.
TABLE II.1
United States, Japan and the United Kingdom: main macroeconomic indicators
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
contributed to the expansion of domestic de-
mand in recent years.
Thirdly, the strength of the US economy and
the shortage of domestic saving have contribut-
ed to a highly pronounced current-account
deficit, which rose to 3.6 % of GDP in 1999.
Most capital flows took the form of direct invest-
ment and equity holdings, while private debt se-
curities and the extension of loans to US com-
panies account for a limited proportion of non-
residents’ US asset holdings. Thus, although
high dependence on foreign saving is often
considered as a factor of instability, the degree
of vulnerability of the US economy resulting
from the increase in its liabilities to the rest of
the world should not be overstated. The very
course of the dollar during 1999, which has held
on an appreciating trend in nominal effective
terms (see Chart II.2) despite the growing trade
deficit, highlights the confidence that market
participants have in the US economy. That said,
if in the current situation US assets were sud-
denly to lose their attractiveness for internation-
al investors, it is highly likely this would prompt
financial turbulence and jeopardise the growth
prospects of the US economy.
Both the apparent positive implications of
the “new economy” for aggregate supply and
the imbalances mentioned directly influenced
the implementation of monetary policy by the
Federal Reserve throughout 1999. In the open-
ing months of the year, and despite the re-
silience of activity, the climate of international
financial instability, linked in part to the crisis of
the emerging economies, was propitious to the
maintenance of low interest rates. The federal
funds target rate duly stood at 4.75 % until late
June. Thereafter, the progressive resumption of
normal conditions on financial markets, the on-
going expansion of domestic demand against a
background of strongly rising share prices, the
rise in oil prices and the tightening of the labour
market led the Federal Reserve to raise its
main intervention rate, in successive steps, to
6.5 % in May 2000. These measures were ap-
plied very gradually (five consecutive increases
of 25 basis points to March this year) as a
result of the containment observed in the non-
energy components of the CPI and due to the
confidence of the monetary authority that
the increase in potential output would allow the
growing pressure of demand to be accommo-
dated, at least in part. Nonetheless, given the
absence of signs of a moderation in domestic
demand and the prospect that this variable
would continue growing above potential output,
the Federal Reserve decided to step up the
process of monetary tightening by raising the
federal funds target rate by 50 basis points on
16th May.
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CHART II.1
United States: private consumption
and determinants, productivity
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BOX II.1
The financial situation of US households
The buoyancy of the US economy in recent years has been accompanied by a considerable decline in the house-
hold saving ratio, which, in April 2000, stood at 0.7 % of disposable income. The outpacing of disposable income growth
by that of consumption has been prompted by gains in wealth generated by the strong rise in share prices. This has led
to fears that a change in the factors underpinning the level of stock market capitalisation (expectations of earnings, risk
premia or interest rates) may place households in a position of financial instability conducive to a greater slowdown in
activity in the United States than would arise from the direct dampening effect of the reduction in agents’ wealth on con-
sumption. However, a detailed analysis of households’ wealth allows us to qualify the vulnerability of their financial po-
sition apparently discernible from the ongoing decline in their saving.
As can be seen in the accompanying table, households, despite their low saving ratio, have built up increasing net
worth (total physical and financial assets less total liabilities). This stood in 1999 at 590.4 % of their disposable income,
compared with 437 % in 1994. On the liabilities side, these agents have increased their debt at an annual average rate
of 7.5 % of disposable income, whereby their total liabilities have risen from 89 % to 103 %. With these financial re-
sources added to their current income, they have acquired financial and real assets at an annual rate of 14.5 % of their
net income.
Total household assets have climbed from 526 % of disposable income to 693 % between 1994 and 1999, owing
to the increase in holdings of financial instruments and, specifically, of equity. As the table shows, the rise in equity
holdings is due almost in its entirety to the rise in stock market prices over the period since, during these years, there
has been a net disposal of shares at an average rate of 3.3 % of income, brought about by US companies’ habitual
practice of share buy-backs with the aim, among others, of providing an explicit remuneration to its shareholders. Like-
wise, during the period under study, there has been a net purchase by households or fixed-income securities and of in-
surance and pension reserves. Hence, the strong increase seen in recent years of the value of the shares held by
households has been accompanied by portfolio restructuring in favour of assets whose prices are much more stable.
Moreover, the moderate increase in real assets is mainly due to the volume of purchases, and not to a rise in prices po-
tentially indicative of sustained speculation on property markets. Logically, all the foregoing should contribute to soften-
ing the effect on household wealth of any future stock market correction.
In order to analyse the overall effect on household wealth of a hypothetical sharp reduction in stock market prices,
a simple simulation exercise has been performed using the information on stocks and flows provided by the financial
accounts. In columns 6 and 7 of the accompanying table, wealth in 1999 as a percentage of disposable income has
been simulated, after assuming downward corrections of 50 % and 100 %, respectively, of the rise in value since 1994
of the portfolios in which equities are included. As can be seen, a fall of up to 50 % in stock market prices (the value of
other assets and liabilities remaining unchanged) would place the net aggregate wealth position of households – mea-
sured by net assets as a proportion of disposable income – appreciably above the related 1994 position, at the start of
the stock market boom. An even greater revision of the gains in value recorded over the last six years by shares (as
can be seen in column 7) would thus be necessary for the sector’s net wealth to stand below the 1994 level. Naturally,
a reduction in prices on such a scale would give rise to a considerable direct contractionary effect on consumer de-
mand, in addition to prompting a crisis of confidence with a potentially very sizeable impact on activity. Nonetheless, the
calculations made (despite their simplicity) illustrate the overall solvency of the household sector, assuaging the risks
that the depressive effects indicated might combine with those of a widespread financial crisis.
Assets 526.3 693.4 62.8 14.5 48.3 590.7 487.1
Financial 371.1 526.9 52.6 7.1 45.5 423.7 320.9
Of which:
Deposits 61.1 65.3 3.9 3.9 0.0 65.3 65.3
Negotiable instruments 37.4 30.0 0.1 0.3 –0.2 30.0 30.0
Equities and shares in funds 79.8 167.4 29.0 –3.3 32.3 107.4 47.4
Other equity 84.8 91.7 5.7 –0.1 5.8 78.6 65.6
Insurance and pension reserves 108.0 172.5 19.6 6.2 13.4 142.3 112.0
Real estate 155.2 167.0 10.2 7.4 2.8 167.0 167.0
Liabilities 89.3 103.2 7.4 7.5 –0.1 103.2 103.2
Credit instruments 85.7 97.4 6.8 6.9 –0.1 97.4 97.4
Of which:
Mortgage loans 59.4 67.5 4.7 4.8 –0.1 67.5 67.5
Consumer credit 19.0 21.5 1.5 1.5 0.0 21.5 21.5
Other credit 7.3 8.4 0.6 0.6 0.0 8.4 8.4
Net worth 437.0 590.4 55.4 7.1 48.3 487.5 384.7
Source: Federal Reserve, Flows of Funds Accounts, fourth quarter 1999.
Note: The last two columns express what the asset and net worth figures would be in the hypothetical case of the assets in the equity portfolio losing
50% and 100% of their gain in value in the period 1994-1999.
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Fiscal policy retained a patently counter-
cyclical stance last year, with the general gov-
ernment balance posting a surplus of 0.5 % of
GDP. However, the strong growth of spending
during the year, though lower than that of re-
ceipts, points to some scope for increasing the
contribution of the general government budget
to restraining domestic demand and containing
the decline in national saving derived from the
high growth of private consumption.
The Japanese economymanaged in 1999 to
resume positive – albeit modest – growth rates
against a deflationary background which was
reflected in the fall both in consumer prices and
in the GDP deflator.
During the year Japanese GDP growth was
only 0.3 %, far lower than forecast. This was due
to the low rate of expansion of domestic demand
(which scarcely grew 0.7 %) and to the negative
contribution of the external sector (see Table
II.1). Despite the signs of recovery witnessed in
the first half of the year, largely linked to the fis-
cal stimulation package approved earlier, the
slowdown in domestic demand during the sec-
ond half of 1999 considerably checked the pace
of activity. Under domestic demand, private con-
sumption was a component that performed most
unfavourably. This was due in part to the high
rate of unemployment (4.7 %), by Japanese
standards, and the fall in nominal and real
wages, but it was mainly attributable to the per-
sistent deflationary expectations. Investment,
though it underwent negative growth in the year
as a whole, held on a rising profile which ap-
pears to have run into the months elapsed to
date in 2000. Finally, the external sector suffered
the consequences of the appreciation of the yen
(close to 17 % in nominal effective terms), de-
spite the pick-up in the economies of its south-
east Asian trading partners (see Chart II.2).
The main problem facing the Japanese au-
thorities is that, given the current flagging rate of
activity, the margin for manoeuvre of demand-
side policies appears to be almost exhausted.
Thus, fiscal policy, despite running a very high
budget deficit (7 % of GDP in 1999) and raising
debt to unprecedented levels in this country
( 1 2 5% of GDP), has shown itself capable of
achieving only temporary increases in the level
of activity. In turn, monetary policy, though it has
held the cost of banks’ liquid liabilities close to
zero, has not succeeded in curbing deflationary
expectations. Accordingly, real interest rates re-
main relatively high for kick-starting private
spending. Hence, the ability of traditional de-
mand-side expansionary policies to boost activity
in a durable manner in Japan is uncertain insofar
as the weakness of domestic demand is not the
result of the variables that make up the habitual
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Interest rates and exchange rates
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1997 1998 1999 2000
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
EURO
DOLLAR
YEN
STERLING
LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES (b)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1997 1998 1999 2000
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
EURO
YEN
STERLING
DOLLAR
SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES (a)
% %
70
80
90
100
110
120
1997 1998 1999 2000
70
80
90
100
110
120
EURO
YEN
STERLING
EXCHANGE RATES AGAINST THE DOLLAR (c)
75
85
95
105
115
125
135
1997 1998 1999 2000
75
85
95
105
115
125
135
EURO
YEN
STERLING
DOLLAR
NOMINAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES AGAINST THE
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (c)
  Sources: Banco de España and BIS.
   (a)   Three-month interbank market.
   (b)   Ten-year government bond yields.
   (c)   A fall in the index denotes a depreciation of the currency against
the dollar or the rest of the currencies making up the grouping, and
vice versa.
monetary and fiscal policy transmission mecha-
nism but is rather due to a deep-seated investor
and – above all – consumer confidence crisis.
Of much greater effectiveness are policies
aimed at restructuring the Japanese industrial
and, above all, financial fabric, even though
they take much longer to apply. In this connec-
tion, the bank restructuring plan approved in
March 1999 is a first step in the right direction.
Specifically, the plan establishes the contribu-
tion of public funds to the banking system, con-
ditional upon the submission and approval of
restructuring programmes by the country’s
biggest financial institutions. However, the initial
budget for the plan (JPY 7.5 trillion) may prove
insufficient in the light of the volume of non-per-
forming loans in the banking sector, estimated
officially at JPY 64.3 trillion in March 1999. Fur-
ther, there are doubts about the soundness of
the procedures established for monitoring the
rate at which the restructuring programmed by
financial institutions advances.
Moving closer to the euro area, the U n it e d
K i n g d o meconomy had slowed markedly in
1998 and during 1999 Q1 as a result of the
weakness of the external sector owing to the
Asian crisis and the strength of sterling. But it
picked up with growing intensity thereafter, ulti-
mately expanding by 2.1 % in 1999 as a whole
(see Table II.1). Throughout the year, domestic
demand was steady and relatively resilient, en-
abling the strong fluctuations in exports to be
partly offset. Job creation in the British economy
held on a sustained path, despite cyclical fluctu-
ations, and this provided for a one percentage
point reduction in the unemployment rate over
the course of 1999, placing it at 4 % in January
2000. The effectiveness of the measures adopt-
ed in recent years to make the labour market
more flexible was thus vindicated.
The firmness of domestic demand and the
gradual tightening of the labour market (in
which labour shortages in certain segments are
already evident) during 1999, along with dearer
energy products and the surge in the price of
real estate assets, caused signs of overheating
to appear in the economy. The Bank of England
responded with successive increases in its
main intervention rate, raising it to 6 % in
February 2000. Nonetheless, the inflation rate
(measured by the CPI excluding mortgage in-
terest payments) held at all times at around
2 %, thus meeting the inflation target set by the
British authorities.
II.2.2. The emerging economies
In step with the pick-up in activity in the de-
veloped economies last year, the emerging
market economies left behind the crisis which,
in the preceding years, had so seriously affect-
ed them. Nonetheless, there were significant
differences in the patterns of recovery of the
main areas, i.e. south-east Asia, Russia and
Latin America. This was due to the various ad-
justment and restructuring policies pursued and
to how these areas were affected by develop-
ments on world commodity markets and by the
expansion of world trade.
In contrast to the intense recession following
the financial crisis that began in the summer of
1997, the s o u t h - e a s tAsian economies experi-
enced a notable economic recovery in 1999 al-
beit without managing, in many cases, to re-
sume the high growth rates recorded prior to
the crisis. GDP in South Korea grew by 10 %
while the related figures in Malaysia, Singapore,
Thailand and the Philippines were between 3 %
and 5.5 % (see Table II.2). Hong Kong, which
retained its strict currency board during the cri-
sis and was beset by a strong recession in
1998, expanded by 2 % in 1999. Indonesia, be-
leaguered by political upheaval, was alone in
experiencing negative growth (–0.5 %) last
year.
The aforementioned recovery, which was
generally accompanied by low inflation rates,
was essentially due to three factors. First, the
sound performance of the external sector, as a
result – with the exception of Hong Kong – of
the sharp depreciation in currencies that took
place following the bouts of speculation during
the summer of 1997 (see Chart II.3). Next, the
moderately expansive stance of the fiscal poli-
cies implemented, which acted to contain the
decline in domestic demand at a time when de-
flationary pressures were becoming apparent in
certain countries. And finally, the return to nor-
mal conditions on financial markets, allowing
the reduction of interest rates on debt issues in
domestic and foreign currency (see Chart II.4),
which was conducive to the recovery in con-
sumption and investment. Nonetheless, net
flows of financing into the area remained nega-
tive in 1999, in circumstances in which there
was significant but uneven progress in the reor-
ganisation and restructuring of national financial
systems.
C h i n awas also favourably affected by the
return to normal economic and financial condi-
tions in south-east Asia. Chinese GDP expand-
ed by 7 % in 1998, chiefly as a result of the
pick-up in export markets, the gains in competi-
tiveness arising from the appreciation of the ex-
change rates of its main competitors in the sec-
ond half of the year, and continuing negative in-
flation rates. However, domestic demand con-
tinued to flag despite the expansive fiscal mea-
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GDP (a):
Asia
South Korea 5.5 8.3 8.9 6.8 5.0 –6.7 10.7
Thailand 8.4 9.0 8.9 5.9 –1.8 –10.4 4.2
Indonesia 7.3 7.5 8.2 8.0 4.5 –13.2 0.2
Malaysia 9.9 9.2 9.8 10.0 7.5 –7.5 5.4
Russia –10.4 –11.6 –4.2 –3.4 0.9 –4.5 3.2
Latin America 4.1 5.0 1.7 3.6 5.4 2.1 0.1
Argentina 6.3 5.8 –2.8 5.5 8.1 3.9 –3.0
Brazil 4.9 5.9 4.2 2.7 3.6 –0.1 0.8
Chile 7.0 5.7 10.6 7.4 7.6 3.4 –1.1
Mexico 2.0 4.5 –6.2 5.1 6.8 4.8 3.7
INFLATION:
Asia
South Korea 4.8 6.2 4.5 4.9 4.4 7.5 0.8
Thailand 3.4 5.1 5.8 5.9 5.6 8.1 0.3
Indonesia 9.7 8.5 9.4 7.9 6.6 58.4 20.5
Malaysia 3.5 3.7 3.4 3.5 2.7 5.3 2.7
Russia 874.7 307.4 197.4 47.6 14.7 27.7 85.9
Latin America 202.6 202.5 34.4 21.4 13.0 9.8 8.8
Argentina 10.6 4.2 3.4 0.2 0.8 0.9 –1.2
Brazil 2,103.3 2,123.7 60.3 15.8 6.9 3.2 4.9
Chile 12.7 11.4 8.2 7.4 6.1 5.1 3.3
Mexico 9.8 7.0 34.8 35.3 20.8 15.9 16.6
PUBLIC-SECTOR BALANCE (b):
Asia
South Korea 1.3 1.0 1.3 1.0 –0.9 –4.0 –2.9
Thailand 2.1 1.9 3.0 2.5 –0.9 –2.5 –3.0
Indonesia –0.7 0.0 0.8 1.2 –0.7 –1.9 –2.3
Malaysia –2.6 3.3 2.2 2.1 4.0 –1.0 –4.1
Russia –9.4 –10.4 –5.4 –7.0 –7.0 –5.0 –1.7
Latin America –0.2 –0.8 –1.9 –1.7 –1.6 –3.2 –4.1
Argentina –0.8 –1.8 –2.3 –3.2 –2.0 –2.1 –3.8
Brazil –58.1 –44.3 –7.1 –5.9 –6.3 –8.1 –10.0
Chile 1.8 2.5 3.9 3.1 2.5 0.1 –2.0
Mexico 0.7 –0.1 –0.9 –0.3 –1.4 –1.2 –1.6
CURRENT-ACCOUNT BALANCE (b):
Asia
South Korea 0.3 –1.0 –1.7 –4.4 –1.7 12.7 6.1
Thailand –5.1 –5.6 –8.1 –8.1 –0.9 12.7 9.1
Indonesia –1.3 –1.6 –3.2 –3.4 –2.3 4.2 3.6
Malaysia –4.5 –6.1 –9.5 –4.6 –4.8 12.9 18.4
Russia 3.4 3.2 2.2 2.8 0.9 0.9 10.8
Latin America
Argentina –3.4 –4.3 –1.9 –2.4 –4.1 –4.9 –4.3
Brazil –0.1 –0.3 –2.6 –3.0 –4.2 –4.3 –4.1
Chile –5.7 –3.1 –2.1 –5.1 –4.9 –5.7 –0.1
Mexico –5.8 –7.1 –0.6 –0.7 –1.9 –3.7 –2.9
EUROBOND SPREAD OVER
THE DOLLAR (basis points):
Asia
South Korea — 95 70 70 800 380 106
Indonesia — 511 506 335 575 1,022 534
Malaysia — — — — — — 152
Russia — — — — 498 5,525 1,739
Latin America
Argentina — — — 451 477 657 503
Brazil — — — — — 1,117 513
Mexico — — — 383 391 574 312
Sources: IMF and Russian European Centre for Economic Policy.
(a) Rate of change.
(b) As a percentage of GDP. Total general government.
TABLE II.2
Emerging-market economies: main macroeconomic indicators
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
sures adopted. The continuity of the current
growth phase appears largely to depend on
swifter privatisation, liberalisation and the open-
ing up of the economy, processes to which Chi-
na’s envisaged membership of the World Trade
Organisation should in principle contribute.
In Russia,economic developments were ap-
preciably better than expected. GDP increased
by 3.2 % in 1999 and price rises moderated
over the year as a whole, although the annual
rate of inflation was still 86 % (see Table II.2).
Nonetheless, the recovery appears to be the
circumstantial effect of the strong reduction in
imports, which is partly attributable to the deval-
uation of the rouble in 1998, and, above all, of
the increase in the value of Russian oil exports
further to the rise in international crude oil
prices. The extreme weakness of domestic de-
mand (particularly private consumption),
prompted by the decline in real wages and
higher unemployment, is currently the chief ob-
stacle to continuing expansion.
As a result of the recovery in activity, the
budget deficit fell substantially to 1.7 % of GDP
in 1999. Russia has likewise reached agree-
ment recently with private creditors belonging to
the London Club on the restructuring of a por-
tion of the high debt incurred by the Soviet
Union. And negotiations are also currently open
with the Paris Club, grouping government credi-
tors. However, serious structural shortcomings
persist in the Russian economy. These hamper
the enlargement of tax bases and lead sizeable
public funds to be earmarked to sustaining invi-
able companies, considerably hindering head-
way in fiscal consolidation.
In 1999 the Latin Americaneconomies felt
the contractionary effect of the financial and for-
eign exchange turbulence unleashed in the
wake of the problems beleaguering many
emerging economies in the two preceding
years. The financial crises in south-east Asia in
1997 and in Russia in 1998, against a back-
ground of deep-seated imbalances in certain
Latin American economies, caused a sharp and
generalised reduction in capital flows to this ge-
ographical area. In addition, the terms for the fi-
nancing of the region’s high foreign debts were
tightened, and there were speculative attacks
against the currencies of the countries that re-
tained fixed exchange rate regimes. Hence, the
Brazilian real crisis in January 1999 exacerbat-
ed financial tension in the area, while aggravat-
ing the chronic balance of payments difficulties
affecting Brazil’s main trading partners. Adding
to the general climate of financial instability in
the first half of the year was the continuing
downtrend of commodity prices, which reached
historical lows in certain cases in this period.
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CHART II.3
Emerging markets: exchange rates
and stock markets
   Sources: IMF and Reuters.
   (a)   A fall in the index denotes a depreciation of the currency against
the dollar, and vice versa.
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Lastly, the deterioration in competitiveness vis-
à-vis the south-east Asian countries, which
were heavy importers of Latin American com-
modities, and the scant buoyancy of activity in
these countries in the opening months of 1999
appreciably affected the region’s exports. The
outcome of all these factors was low or nega-
tive year-on-year growth rates in the first half of
the year in the biggest countries in the area,
with the exception of Mexico, which expanded
moderately throughout 1999 (see Table II.2).
As from the second half of 1999 there were
increasingly clearer signs of a pick-up in activity
in most of the countries. The interest rates on
private and public debt fell considerably (see
Chart II.4) as a result of the greater stability pre-
vailing on international financial markets, the
adoption of structural (in particular budgetary)
reforms and, in certain countries (Brazil, Chile
and Colombia), the greater flexibility of the ex-
change rate regime. This easing of financial
conditions was particularly favourable to private
investment, which appears to have regained
some momentum recently following its heavy
decline in the first half of 1999. Moreover, the
rise in commodity prices on international mar-
kets offered some relief to the exporting coun-
tries’ trade balances. With the exception of
Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, the forego-
ing factors allowed the rest of the biggest
economies in the area to post positive growth in
1999 Q4, ushering in an upturn which, on the
latest indicators, has gathered steam in the pe-
riod to date in 2000.
Nonetheless, the enormous dependency of
most of these economies on obtaining financing
on international markets, as a result of their
chronic budget and trade deficits, makes them
significantly vulnerable. To prevent this, ambi-
tious market reforms need to be adopted and
effective mechanisms introduced to contain
public spending and broaden tax bases. Fur-
ther, macroeconomic policies should be pur-
sued enabling the latent inflationary pressures
in most countries of the region to be curbed
now that flexible exchange rate regimes are
widely in place.
As regards the biggest economies in the
area, Brazil emerged from the 1998 recession
relatively swiftly (it grew 0.8 % in 1999), benefit-
ing from the gains in competitiveness arising
from the depreciation of its currency, which fell
by more than 30 % against the dollar last year.
In turn, it successfully and notably improved the
financing terms of its external debt, partly
thanks to the favourable reception by the mar-
kets of its efforts to cut the budget deficit and
contain the inflationary effects of the devalua-
tion through the adoption of a monetary policy
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CHART II.4
Emerging markets: interest rate differentials
vis-à-vis the dollar
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  Sources: IMF, Reuters, FinancialTimes and national statistics.
   (a)   Korea: 3-month certificates of deposit. Indonesia, Malaysia,
Thailand, Russia: onvernight interbank. National currency for all
countries.
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framework based on direct inflation targeting.
Conversely, in Argentina, the combination of
high interest rates (due largely to speculation
against the currency board regime) and losses
in competitiveness (associated with the devalu-
ation of the real) gave rise to a decline in GDP
of around 3 % and a fall in consumer prices.
Notably, however, as from the second half of
1999, the easing of trade problems with Brazil
in MERCOSUR, the recovery of its main trading
partner and the greater stability of international
financial markets all made for a pick-up in do-
mestic demand, particularly in investment and
in the external sector. The outlook for the cur-
rent year is thus more favourable. Finally, in
Mexico, and despite the crisis assailing the re-
gion in the first half of 1999, economic activity
was firm throughout the year, with GDP in-
creasing by 3.7 %. Mexico’s strength was con-
nected to the sustained and marked expansive
phase of the US economy, with which it has
close trade links under the Free Trade Treaty.
Like the rest of the area, Mexico also benefited
from the reduction of its external debt interest
burden. However, matters worsened somewhat
in 1999 in terms of inflation, although at the end
of the year price rises began to moderate, with
this trend running into the opening months of
2000.
Lastly, economic activity in A f r i c awas less
buoyant in 1999 than in other geographical ar-
eas. Aggregate GDP for the region expanded
by 2.5 %. This moderate growth figure was a
result, among other factors, of scant rainfall dur-
ing the year and low international prices for
many export products. Nonetheless, the recov-
ery in the price of metal and energy commodi-
ties, despite contained farm prices, will foresee-
ably provide for an acceleration in activity this
year, with many countries of the area having
made significant headway in terms of macroe-
conomic stability.
II.3. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
IN THE EURO AREA
On provisional data released by Eurostat,
GDP in the euro area grew at a rate of 2.4 % in
real terms in 1999, three-tenths of a point down
on the previous year. Despite the lower average
increase in GDP, economic activity was on a
clearly rising trend, and the signs of decelera-
tion manifest at the end of 1998 dissipated as
from Q2. The driving force of activity was exter-
nal demand. Domestic demand remained weak-
er as a result of lower stockbuilding and the
moderation of the pace of private consumption.
Employment increased by 1.6 %, enabling the
unemployment rate to fall, while inflation held at
low levels although it increased gradually fur-
ther to the rise in oil prices on international mar-
kets (see Box II.2), against the backdrop of the
weak euro exchange rate.
As regards demand components, the growth
rate of private consumption fell to 2.5 % from
3 % the previous year. On European Commis-
sion estimates, however, the increase in con-
sumption was greater than that in disposable in-
come. Consequently, the household saving ra-
tio deteriorated. The decline in this ratio was as-
sisted by the rise in the value of wealth stem-
ming from increases on stock market indices,
by the low real cost of consumer credit and by
the improvement in consumer expectations.
Gross fixed capital formation grew by 4.9 %,
four-tenths of a point above the related increase
in 1998, and somewhat over two points higher
than the average increase in the five preceding
years (see Table II.3). The buoyancy of invest-
ment in fixed capital is particularly notable given
the strong pro-cyclical nature of this variable in
respect of GDP, although its acceleration was
essentially due to the increase in public invest-
ment. By contrast, the expansion of private in-
vestment, despite the low real interest rates
prevailing and higher returns on capital in re-
cent years, moderated slightly in relation to
1998 as a result of the diminished momentum
of final demand. Finally, the change in stock-
building made a positive contribution of one-
tenth of a percentage point to GDP growth, ap-
preciably less than a year earlier.
Exports of goods and services in 1999 were
greatly influenced by the fall-out of and subse-
quent emergence from the recent international
financial crisis. Over the year as a whole they
grew by 4.4 %, compared with 6.9 % in 1998.
That said, they evidenced a clear line of im-
provement brought on by the brisk economic re-
covery in the rest of the world and by the gains
in competitiveness arising from the depreciation
of the euro against the currencies of the main
trading partners. Imports of goods and services
increased by 6 % in 1999, far down on the 1998
figure of 9.4 %. Throughout the year, imports
were on a rising trend – albeit one less pro-
ounced than that of exports –, in line with the
i crease in final demand, despite the accelera-
tion in import prices. This trend in trade flows,
along with the deterioration of the terms of
trade, contributed to reducing the current-ac-
count surplus from EUR 60.3 billion in 1998 to
EUR 43.2 billion in 1999.
Concerning the distribution of growth rates
among the countries making up the euro area,
1999 saw a moderate reduction in their disper-
sion (see Table II.4). In this respect, it should
be remembered that the existing divergence is
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the outcome of at least three factors: differing
trade exposure to the emerging economies af-
fected by the recent financial turbulence; the
lagged effects of the convergence of interest
rates and the fiscal policy adjustments made to
meet the Maastricht criteria; and different rates
of potential growth. The least economically
buoyant countries continued to be Italy and
Germany, whose external sector was signifi-
cantly impacted by the crisis. Moreover, the
slackness of activity in Italy may have reflected
the significant fiscal consolidation drive made in
the preceding period. Meanwhile, in Germany,
the relative lesser easing of monetary condi-
tions compared with the area as a whole may
have contributed to the scant growth of its do-
mestic demand. Conversely, countries such as
Ireland and, to a lesser extent, Spain, whose
GDP expanded far above the area average, felt
the effects of a very pronounced reduction in
nominal and real interest rates and enjoyed
higher potential growth than that of the euro
area as a whole. Lastly, the latest indicators
show an additional reduction in the dispersion
of the member countries’ economic growth
rates this year which is consistent with the ef-
fects stemming from convergence having run
their course and with the return to normality of
the economic and financial situation in the
emerging markets.
Despite the slowdown in GDP and the in-
crease in costs, the rate of job creation in the
euro area rose to 1.6 %, one-tenth of a point
more than in 1998. Consequently, apparent
labour productivity growth was notably stalled,
posting an average increase of 0.9 %, although
it progressively rose as the year unfolded. This
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DEMAND AND OUTPUT:
Gross domestic product 2.4 2.2 1.4 2.3 2.7 2.4 1.9 2.0 2.5 3.1
Domestic demand 2.2 2.0 1.0 1.7 3.4 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.0 2.6
Private consumption 1.3 1.8 1.5 1.5 3.0 2.5 2.8 2.4 2.4 2.5
Government consumption 1.2 0.6 1.8 0.8 0.9 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.6 1.4
Gross fixed-capital formation 2.6 2.5 1.1 2.1 4.5 4.9 4.0 5.5 5.1 4.9
Exports 8.6 7.8 4.3 10.3 6.9 4.4 0.6 2.3 5.5 9.1
Imports 8.0 7.4 3.2 8.8 9.4 6.0 3.8 5.2 7.0 8.0
Contributions to GDP growth (a):
Domestic demand 2.1 2.0 1.0 1.6 3.3 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.6
Change in stocks 0.6 0.3 –0.5 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 –0.2
External demand 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.6 –0.6 –0.4 –1.0 –0.9 –0.4 0.5
PRICES AND COSTS:
Consumer prices (annual average) 2.7 2.5 2.2 1.6 1.1 1.1 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.5
Consumer prices
(end-year twelve-month rate) 2.6 2.5 1.9 1.5 0.8 1.7 — — — —
Unit labour costs 0.1 1.5 2.0 0.7 0.0 1.1 1.6 1.6 0.8 0.4
Compensation per employee 2.8 3.4 3.1 2.4 1.4 1.9 1.7 2.1 2.0 2.1
GENERAL GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTS (c):
Total expenditure — 50.9 51.0 49.6 48.6 48.4 – — — —
Current expenditure — 46.5 47.1 46.1 45.0 44.7 — — — —
Interest charges — 5.5 5.6 5.1 4.7 4.3 — — — —
Public investment — 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.5 — — — —
Total receipts — 45.9 46.7 47.1 46.6 47.2 — — — —
Primary deficit (–)/surplus (+) — 0.6 1.4 2.5 2.7 3.1 — — — —
Deficit (–)/surplus (+) — –5.0 –4.3 –2.6 –2.0 –1.2 — — — —
LABOUR MARKET:
Total employment (b) –0.5 0.5 0.4 0.7 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.6 —
Unemployment (d) 11.6 11.3 11.6 11.6 10.9 10.0 10.3 10.0 9.9 9.7
Sources: European Central Bank and European Commission.
(a) Rate of change of GDP in percentage points.
(b) Estimate for 1999.
(c) As a percentage of GDP.
(d) As a percentage of labour force.
TABLE II.3
Euro area: main macroeconomic indicators
(annual percentage change)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
1999
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
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BOX II.2
Recent oil price developments
From late 1998 to March 2000, oil prices in
US$/barrel terms soared to levels not seen since mid-
1985, excepting the rebound in late 1990 as a result of
the Gulf war. This was in contrast to the two previous
years, when oil prices were on a downward trend,
falling by 50 % from December 1996 to December
1998. The recent increase in prices on the market for
crude was a consequence of the reaction of the major
world exporters to the significant slide in their main
source of income owing to weak international demand.
Between March 1998 and March 1999 they rationed
production, lowering it to 4.5 million barrels per day
(6 % of 1998 average worldwide daily production) start-
ing in March 1999.
At end-March 2000, the OPEC countries decided
to raise their production by 7 % in order to stabilise
crude prices – the so-called OPEC basket – within a
range of US$22-28 per barrel. However, although oil
prices fell after this agreement to nearly US$22 per bar-
rel in mid-April, in the following weeks they picked up to
a level of almost US$30 by end-May. It appears the in-
crease in production by OPEC, against a background
of stronger than expected demand, did not suffice to
stabilise oil prices around the mid-point of the reference
range during Q2. As for developments in Q3, the possi-
bility of a fresh increase in crude prices due to stronger
seasonal demand cannot be dismissed, unless supply
is revised upwards to the extent necessary, both by
OPEC and non-OPEC producers (OPEC has sched-
uled a meeting for June 21s t to assess market condi-
tions and take a decision).
So far, the increase in oil prices has had no major
contractionary impact on Western economies. Indeed,
as can be seen in the Chart, crude prices in real terms,
despite increasing in 1999, have been on a gradual
downtrend since the mid-eighties, reaching levels in the
euro area and Japan comparable with those prevailing
before the 1973 oil shock. Additionally, the major non-
producer countries’ dependence on oil (measured by oil
imports relative to GDP) has declined by almost 50 %
since 1970. However, the dependence on imported oil
has increased by almost 25 % over the same period in
the United States, which is a producer though not a net
exporter.
The increase in crude prices has prompted a sig-
nificant rise in the inflation rate. Thus, in the euro area,
the energy component of the HICP has grown more
than 15 % between March 1999 and March 2000, this
having principally determined the increase by more
than one percentage point in inflation over the same
period. Notwithstanding, the feed-through of the in-
crease in oil prices to the HICP has so far been less
acute than in the recent past. Hence, as the chart re-
veals, the continuous rise in oil prices between 1994
and 1997 had, in proportional terms, an overall impact
on the energy sub-index that was stronger than that ob-
served in recent months. This lesser influence not only
reflects the slight fall in the weight of liquid fuels in the
HICP in recent years, but might also point to time-lags
in some country’s between the increase in oil prices
and the pass-through to the prices of oil products
charged to consumers. Moreover, it is likely that the in-
direct impact of higher oil prices on inflation rates, via
increases in production costs, has not yet become fully
manifest (as the positive differential between the rise in
producer prices and the HICP would appear to indi-
cate). Nonetheless, wage restraint, if maintained, would
help reduce the quantitative significance of these ef-
fects.
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Belgium 3.0 2.5 1.0 3.5 2.7 2.5
Germany 2.3 1.7 0.8 1.5 2.2 1.5
Spain (a) 2.3 2.7 2.3 3.8 4.0 3.7
France 1.8 1.8 1.2 2.0 3.4 2.7
Ireland 5.8 9.5 7.7 10.7 8.9 8.3
Italy 2.2 2.9 1.1 1.8 1.5 1.4
Luxembourg (a) 4.2 3.8 2.9 7.3 5.0 5.0
Netherlands 3.2 2.3 3.0 3.8 3.7 3.5
Austria (a) 2.4 1.7 2.0 1.2 2.9 2.1
Portugal 2.5 2.9 3.2 3.5 3.5 3.1
Finland 4.0 3.8 4.0 6.3 5.0 3.5
Euro area 2.4 2.2 1.4 2.3 2.7 2.4
Sources: Eurostat, European Commission and national statistics.
(a) 1994 and 1995 data calculated on the basis of ESA 79.
TABLE II.4
Euro-area countries: annual GDP growth
199919981997199619951994
pattern of growth, which is more labour-inten-
sive than is usual in Europe, may be related to
the moderation of nominal and real wage costs
in recent years (see Chart II.5); to the growth of
the service sector, which is more labour-inten-
sive; and, to a lesser extent, to the introduction
of structural labour market reforms.
Job creation was concentrated in the service
sector, where already more than 65 % of the
euro-area work force is employed, while there
was a net destruction of jobs in manufacturing
industry. The expansion of employment and the
mild slowdown in the rate of increase of the
labour force were conducive to the decline in
the number of unemployed. Accordingly, the
unemployment rate stood on average for the
year at what is, at 10 %, still a very high rate,
evidencing that notorious structural flaws re-
main in place in the labour markets of the euro
area. By group, the highest unemployment was
among those aged under 25, the long-term un-
employed and the female population. Lastly, the
dispersion of the unemployment rate was once
more reduced in 1999, although it continued to
reflect the uneven progress made by member
countries in applying effective labour reforms.
According to most price indicators, the infla-
tionary situation in the euro area worsened rela-
tively in 1999. This was essentially due to the
rise in oil prices and to the depreciation of the
euro by approximately 8 % in nominal effective
terms during 1999. All the components of the fi-
nal demand deflator showed an accelerating
profile, this being more pronounced in the case
of the prices of imported factors than in that of
domestic costs. Among the latter, unit labour
costs rose last year by more than in 1998 since,
n one hand, compensation per employee in-
creased by four-tenths of a point more than the
previous year and, on the other, apparent pro-
ductivity slowed. In turn, the high increase in
net indirect tax led the growth rate of the gross
operating surplus per unit of output to moder-
ate, with margins being squeezed.
The average rate of change of the har-
monised index of consumer prices (HICP) was
1.1 % in 1999. Although this figure matches that
of the previous year, it nevertheless masks a
marked rise in the 12-month growth rate from
0.9 % in December 1998 to 1.7 % in December
1999. And this has continued so far in 2000, to
1.9 % in April. As Chart II.6 shows, the energy
consumer goods component alone increased,
on average, its contribution to the growth of the
area-wide HICP, while the index excluding sea-
sonal food and energy, which proxies underly-
ing inflation, clearly improved on the preceding
year, posting an increase of 1 % in 1999 com-
pared with 1.4 % in 1998. Nevertheless, this in-
dicator also deteriorated somewhat in the final
months of the year as a result of the higher cost
in national currency of imported goods and of
the pass-through of increases in production
costs (linked to commodity prices and to the ex-
change rate) to the price of consumer goods
produced in the euro area. Under the HICP,
goods prices grew by 0.8 %, two-tenths of a
point more than in 1998, and service prices by
1.5 %, four-tenths of a point down on the previ-
ous year. As a result, the inflation differential
narrowed by 0.6 percentage points. The decline
in prices triggered by the deregulation of certain
markets, particularly in telecommunications,
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contributed favourably to moderating the ser-
vice component of the HICP.
Along with the aforementioned aggregate
developments, the dispersion of national infla-
tion rates increased in 1999. Across the area, it
was generally the countries with the highest
GDP growth which had higher inflation rates
(see Chart II.6). This positive correlation be-
tween output and prices, though it might be re-
flecting real and productivity convergence by
the less developed countries towards the Euro-
pean average, is also likely to be the outcome
CHART II.5
Euro area: composition of growth, confidence
indicators and performance of employment, real
wages and productivity over the course of the cycle
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of excessive demand pressures in certain coun-
tries.
Looking ahead, inflation in the euro area
would be on a favourable course if the expecta-
tions of oil prices holding around a more moder-
ate level and of productivity picking up were to
be confirmed, and also if wage demands were
not to incorporate the transitory factors that
have most influenced price increases in recent
months. Nonetheless, if the depreciation of the
euro becomes embedded and the expected
greater buoyancy of activity is confirmed, the
possibility of the inflationary upsurge lasting
longer than expected cannot be ruled out.
II.4. ECONOMIC POLICIES IN THE EURO
AREA
Budgetary disequilibria continued to moder-
ate in the euro area countries in 1999. The gen-
eral government deficit stood at 1.2 % of GDP,
eight-tenths of a point less than a year earlier,
and the public debt/GDP ratio edged down from
73.1 % in 1998 to 72.3 % in 1999. Yet although
the reduction in the deficit was significant, the
composition of this adjustment did not prove so
favourable, since half of the improvement in the
budget balance was due to the reduction in in-
terest payments, whereby the primary balance
improved by only four-tenths of a point of GDP.
Moreover, in contrast to the previous year, the
contribution of primary spending to the adjust-
ment was negative in 1999, so it was the
growth of receipts in proportion to GDP which
made for the increase in the primary surplus
(see Chart II.7). The far better-than-expected
performance of receipts cannot be readily rec-
onciled with the slowdown in economic activity
in 1999 as a whole, nor with the adoption in nu-
merous countries of tax reforms aimed at less-
ening the tax burden. One possible explanation,
which is difficult to verify, would be the disclo-
sure of tax bases and an increase in the degree
of compliance with fiscal obligations, induced
perhaps by greater efficiency in tax manage-
ment. In any event, as it is difficult to discern to
what extent the favourable revenue-raising per-
formance may be temporary or more perma-
nent, it would be unwise to extrapolate mechan-
ically, in budgetary plans, the proportion of re-
ceipts per unit of output obtained in 1999 to fu-
ture years. Accordingly, it is highly likely that
continuing fiscal consolidation will require firmer
resolve to improve the primary balance through
the containment of current expenditure.
The primary aim of fiscal policy in recent
years has been to correct the sizeable bud-
getary disequilibria which arose early in the pre-
vious decade and which, by leading to heavy in-
creases in public debt, hindered the mainte-
nance of a stable macroeconomic environment.
However, despite the headway made, the pro-
cess of adjustment is far from having conclud-
ed, particularly as far as debt reduction is con-
cerned. This is especially so given the future
challenge to public finances that an ageing pop-
ulation may pose. In turn, as progress has been
made in fiscal consolidation, the focus has in-
creasingly been turned on the analysis of the
structure of public finances, in order to deter-
mine the composition which may best underpin
sustained growth and job creation.
Specifically, there seems to be broad con-
sensus on the need to contain current expendi-
ture and to promote higher public investment,
and also on the advisability of reducing, in most
countries (see Table II.5), the so-called “tax
wedge” or gap separating the cost of labour for
the employer from the net wage received by the
employee, so as to provide more readily for par-
ticipation and employment. Public investment in
the euro area in 1999 increased by somewhat
over 7 % in nominal terms, following two years
of very low growth. Further progress seems
necessary, particularly in those countries with
l wer stocks of infrastructure, provided it entails
a set-off against other expenditure headings. As
regards the “tax wedge”, most member states
have, under their stability programmes, adopted
or plan to adopt concessions on social security
contributions or tax cuts on wage income. Oc-
casionally, however, planned fiscal reforms are
not accompanied by compensatory budgetary
measures. Accordingly, at least in the short run,
they may lead the fiscal consolidation process
to slow, which is particularly inappropriate for
countries with high public debt or which are far
ahead in the business cycle.
Turning to structural policies, some progress
was made in 1999 in liberalising and promoting
the integration of product and factor markets,
which should contribute to increasing potential
output and employment. So far, the most signif-
icant headway has been in product and service
markets and in the capital markets. But the
adoption of measures allowing for a more effec-
tive functioning of the labour market is lagging
behind, despite the fact that the countries that
have most advanced in this area have reaped
most favourable benefits in terms of job cre-
ation.
In recent years the single market for goods
and services has been shored up by the reduc-
tion of state aid and the lowering of administra-
ive barriers to cross-border competition, and
there has been a gradual narrowing in the dis-
persion between national price levels. Liberalis-
ing measures have proven particularly effective
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in telecommunications (where they have led to
notably lower prices) and, to lesser extent, in
electricity and gas. As regards the water utili-
ties, rail transport, postal services and retail dis-
tribution, progress has been much more limited.
As a result of the introduction of the euro, the
degree of integration of European capital mar-
kets has increased appreciably thanks to the
elimination of exchange rate risk and the virtual
disappearance of transaction costs associated
with changing currency. However, obstacles re-
main that are preventing the full development of
the single market in the financial area. These
include the diversity of financial regulation sys-
tems, the tax treatment of saving and the legal
or administrative difficulties certain types of is-
suers or investors face in raising finance (the
former) or purchasing assets (the latter) outside
their countries.
The measures adopted aimed at reforming
and adding flexibility to labour markets have
tended to give priority to active or preventive
policies geared to raising the participation rate
and reducing unemployment among the young,
women and the long-term unemployed. In cer-
tain countries, this approach has been com-
bined with the review of traditional passive poli-
cies, particularly regarding the duration of un-
employment benefits and eligibility criteria. That
said, only a few countries have systematically
overhauled the arrangements for subsidies,
whether for unemployment and illness or for
early retirement, the spurious use of which as a
substitute for unemployment benefits is a disin-
centive to participation in the labour market.
Turning to the apportionment of working hours,
the policies applied have generally been aimed
at making part-time employment easier, the
progress has been slower in setting in place ar-
angements for the flexible distribution of annu-
al working hours. In certain cases, measures to
reduce the working day have recently been ap-
plied, the effects of which on employment,
wage costs and productivity are so far very un-
certain, although it cannot be ruled out that they
may ultimately affect these variables un-
favourably. Lastly, aspects of labour legislation
that significantly penalise stable as opposed to
temporary hiring persist in most countries.
One area where the European economy
lags the United States is in the development of
new information and communications technolo-
gy and its introduction into productive process-
s and trade transactions (see Table II.5). De-
spite the fact that all countries have, in recent
years, applied policies to promote R+D spend-
ing, such policies have proven insufficient to en-
sure the full incorporation of the European
economy into the new technological environ-
ment. Given the importance of the advances in
this field for economic development (drawing on
the US experience), the European Council sum-
mit meeting in Lisbon in March 2000 identified a
series of policies that should allow progress in
producing and disseminating the new technolo-
gy and the full integration of telecommunica-
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Dispersion in price level,
taxes excluded (a) 13.7 (1997) … … 11.0 15.0 (1997)15.0 (1998)
Labour productivity (change in) 1.4 0.9 2.2 2.4 1.3 0.9
R+D spending (% of GDP) … 1.8 2.8 … 1.8 1.8
Public investment (% of GDP) 2.4 2.5 2.7 3.2 2.2 2.3
Unemployment rate (%) 10.9 10.0 4.5 4.2 9.9 9.2
Long-term unemployment rate (b) … … 14.1 12.3 50.1 …
Participation rate
(labour force/population of working age)65.4 65.6 67.1 67.1 67.3 63.4
The employed as %
of population of working age 57.9 58.7 64.1 64.3 60.3 61.0
Change in employment (%) 1.5 1.6 2.1 1.5 1.5 1.5
General government balance (% of GDP)–2.0 –1.2 –0.1 0.5 –1.5 –0.7
Tax wedge (% of gross wage) … … … 26.1 … 37.2
Sources: European Commission, OECD and national statistics.
(a) Coefficient of variation of price level indices (EU = 100).
(b) For the EU: the unemployed for over twelve months as % of total unemployment. For the United States: the unemployed for over 27
weeks as % of total unemployment.
TABLE II.5
Indicators of structural aspects
Euro area United States EU-15
1998 1999 1998 1999 1998 1999
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tions markets by the end of 2001. These mea-
sures include most notably: the elimination of
economic and legal obstacles to heightened
use of the Internet; the adaptation of education
and training to advances in IT; and the reduc-
tion of administrative barriers hampering the
creation of innovative companies.
II.5. THE COMMON MONETARY POLICY
AND MONETARY AND FINANCIAL
CONDITIONS IN THE EURO AREA
AND IN SPAIN
II.5.1. The single monetary policy strategy
On 1st January 1999, the euro was estab-
lished as the single currency for 11 European
countries and the monetary policy of the Eu-
rosystem began operating. This saw the culmi-
nation of a process embarked on in 1989 with
the approval at the Madrid European Summit of
the Delors Report. In the run-up to 1999, inten-
sive preparations had to be made in order to
define the single monetary policy strategy and
the instruments needed to implement it effec-
tively.
The satisfactory preparatory work carried out
and the nominal convergence attained by the
countries making up the euro area did not pre-
vent the start-up of the single monetary policy
from having to face, in early 1999, the chal-
lenges stemming from the creation of the new
currency and its acceptance by the markets. A
further challenge involved setting up the opera-
tional framework which, from 1st January,
would govern the implementation of the single
monetary policy.
At the start of 1999, the monitoring by the
Eurosystem of the economic, monetary and fi-
nancial conditions in the euro area proved par-
ticularly complex because the construction of
indicators and compilation of time series of the
relevant aggregate variables for the area faced
considerable obstacles. In particular, although
in early 1999 considerable progress had been
made in homogenising the statistical sources of
the information from the member states, it was
vital to move ahead with the construction of da-
ta bases for the area and to improve the speed
and efficiency of the transmission of such data
within the Eurosystem. Likewise, the structural
changes that the creation of EMU would involve
could affect the relationships observed in the
past between the different macroeconomic vari-
ables. And this required particular caution in
analysing the results of the models estimated
for the area.
The elements of the single monetary policy
strategy took definitive shape in late 1998, as
detailed in last year’s Annual report.The target
of monetary policy, namely price stability, was
defined as a 12-month increase in the euro-
area HICP of less than 2 %. This definition
ruled out both inflation and deflation as equally
incompatible with the goal of stability. More-
over, the target was stated to have a medium-
term orientation, which involved acknowledging
that, in the short run, there are factors that may
cause erratic and temporary movements in
prices to which monetary policy should not re-
act. It was further acknowledged that, even
when monetary policy seeks to offset genuinely
inflationary disturbances, its effects are not im-
mediate but impact price developments with
some delay.
In accordance with the principles character-
ising the strategy selected, the ECB announced
that its monetary policy decisions would be tak-
en on the basis of an overall and ongoing as-
sessment of a broad set of economic, monetary
and financial indicators capable of providing in-
formation on future price developments. How-
ever, given the essentially monetary nature of
inflation in the medium and long term, a promi-
nent role was given to the monetary aggre-
gates.
Following in-house analysis at the ECB on
the relative properties of different monetary ag-
gregates, the monetary aggregate M3 was con-
sidered to be the variable with the best qualities
(for its definition, see the 1998 Banco de Es-
paña Annual report). Moreover, a reference val-
ue of 4.5 %, compatible with price stability, was
set for the medium-term growth of this aggre-
gate. At the end of 1999, this reference value
was reassessed and maintained at this level. It
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was further established that, thereafter, its level
would be examined annually. As became evi-
dent during the course of 1999, thereby con-
firming what was stated at the end of the previ-
ous year when the basic principles that were to
govern the single monetary policy were set out,
the reference value did not constitute a target
and nor did the deviations of monetary growth
therefrom, on their own, lead to an automatic
response by the monetary authority.
Along with the information on monetary
growth, the euro system uses an additional set
of indicators to evaluate inflationary risks at
each moment in time. Among these indicators
are financial variables (such as the exchange
rate, long-term interest rates, the yield curve or
stock market trends) and non-financial indica-
tors (information from various prices and costs,
fiscal policy variables, inflation expectations,
etc.) which, in general, help assess the various
factors influencing the foreseeable trend of
prices.
II.5.2. Monetary policy decisions in 1999
During 1999, the Eurosystem conducted the
single monetary policy in keeping with the strat-
egy adopted, taking into consideration the vari-
ous risks affecting price stability in the area.
The first steps of the single monetary policy
were thus taken against a background of decel-
erating economic activity in the industrialised
countries. Subsequently, the progressive im-
provement in the international economic situa-
tion bore significantly on the shifting balance of
risks for prices that the ECB considered during
the year. The ECB publicly explained the nature
of the policy applied via numerous communica-
tions and interventions by its governing bodies
and, periodically, it set out its assessment of the
economic, monetary and financial situation in
the area in relation to the goal of maintaining
price stability. The decisions adopted on the
stance of monetary policy translated into move-
ments in the rates on its main refinancing oper-
ations and on its standing marginal lending and
deposit facilities.
Although the new monetary control frame-
work came into force on 1st January 1999, the
interest rates on the first main refinancing oper-
ation, conducted on 4th January, and on the
standing marginal lending and deposit facilities
were announced the previous month. This was
done to make the transition to the single mone-
tary policy as smooth as possible and to dispel
any uncertainty in the euro’s early days. The in-
terest rate on the first main refinancing opera-
tion was set at 3 %, the level on which the inter-
vention rates applied by the national central
banks making up the Eurosystem had previous-
ly converged in late 1998.
At the outset of 1999 and in the period to
around May, most indicators of the international
environment and, in particular, of the common
monetary area progressively confirmed the per-
sistence of the slowdown in economic activity
perceptible since October the previous year.
Along with other factors, this situation helped
keep inflation expectations low, with the bal-
ance of risks for price stability leaning towards
the possibility of a deflationary process. Howev-
er, even at that time not all indicators were
pointing in the same direction. Indeed, certain
factors, such as the vigorous rate of expansion
f the monetary and credit aggregates, the rise
in oil prices and the onset of the depreciation of
the euro, were all subject to scrutiny thereafter
by the authorities. Nonetheless, given the pre-
dominantly downward pressures on prices and
the absence of clear signs of an improvement
on the international front, the Governing Council
of the ECB decided on 8th April to cut the rate
on its main refinancing operations by 0.5 per-
centage points to 2.5 %.
As from May, the indicators available on the
economic outlook began to show signs of re-
covery, while inflationary pressures became
more patent, in step with the progressive firm-
ing of the pick-up in the common monetary area
and the continuing high levels of oil prices.
Thereafter, the situation became more en-
trenched, and the periodic assessment of the
economic situation by the ECB Governing
Council pointed increasingly clearly towards
possible price pressures in the future.
At its meeting on 4th November 1999, the
ECB Governing Council decided to raise the
weekly tender rate by 50 basis points to 3 %.
This measure also contributed to easing the un-
certainty on financial markets over the course of
interest rates in the run-up to the year 2000.
Nonetheless, in the wake of this measure the
isks for price stability persisted and even
heightened. In particular, continuous upward
deviations by M3 from its medium-term refer-
ence value, the rising trend of oil prices, the
persistent weakening of the euro against the
dollar and higher-than-expected price rises in
the area alerted the monetary authority to the
dangers for price stability in the euro area. Con-
sequently, on 3rd February, 16th March and
27th April this year, the ECB governing council
once more raised its intervention rates by 25
basis points on each occasion, taking the rate
on its main refinancing operations to 3.75 % on
the latter date. The three-step rise in official
rates in recent months is part of a process of
gradual monetary policy tightening, though with
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a relatively accommodating stance, aimed at
ensuring the maintenance of price stability in
the new economic conditions.
II.5.3. Monetary and financial conditions
in the euro area and in Spain
Monetary and financial conditions in the euro
area in 1999 were relatively generous. Nominal
and real interest rates held at historically low
levels, the euro was on a depreciating trend in
effective terms, the monetary and credit aggre-
gates grew at high rates, and there were signifi-
cant increases in share prices. Broadly, this
pattern was common to all the countries making
up the area, due in part to the satisfactory pro-
cess of integration of money markets. However,
the differences in monetary transmission mech-
anisms (owing to structural factors proper to
each economy), inflation differentials and the
different cyclical positions of the EMU members
meant that the degree of monetary and financial
easiness varied from country to country. In
Spain’s case, in particular, real interest rates
(especially short rates) stood at lower levels
than the average for the area, and finance ex-
tended to the private sector ran at a rate of ex-
pansion far higher than in the euro zone.
Euro area money market interest rates in
1999 were generally marked by considerable
stability, with the exception of certain bouts
linked to the anticipation of changes in the
ECB’s intervention rates and greater uncertain-
ty associated with the Y2K effect (see Chart
II.8). Notably, too, national money market inter-
est rates were very similar, so that the euro,
from its inception, had a single Europe-wide
money market.
Long-term interest rates in the area, like
those for other industrialised countries, ceased
in 1999 to trend downwards as they had since
1996 (see Chart II.2). After bottoming out early
in 1999, they embarked on a rising trend that
took them to around 5.5 % in the opening
months of 2000. These movements responded
to a combination of domestic and external fac-
tors whose relative importance varied over the
course of the year. In effect, the movements in
long-term interest rates were largely influenced
by the prospect of growth in the world economy,
especially in the United States and in the euro
area countries. Thus, as growth expectations
were revised upwards, long-term rates also in-
creased (see Box II.3). In 1999 as a whole ten-
year interest rates increased by around 150 ba-
sis points in the area, while the related rise in
the United States was 180 basis points. As a
result, the US/euro area interest rate spread
widened – although movements in the opposite
direction were recorded during the year – in net
terms in relation to 1998 levels and stood at
around 100 basis points at the close of 1999.
The exchange rate of the euro depreciated
by 8 % in nominal effective terms between the
first and fourth quarters of 1999, entailing dear-
er import prices. The depreciation were sharper
in the first half of 1999, while in the following six
months the improved economic outlook in the
area contributed to stabilising the exchange
rate. However, in the opening months of 2000
the euro once more turned downwards, falling
to a level below $0.90, although it began to pick
up appreciably in late May.
Long-term interest rate movements in 1999
were fairly uniform across the various countries
in the area, although minor differentials persist-
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BOX II.3
Long-term interest rates in the euro area
During 1999, the nominal long-term interest rate in the euro area, measured by the yield on ten-year government bonds, was on a rising tra-
jectory (see accompanying chart). To understand this course, it is worth resorting to the approach that explains the nominal interest rate as the sum
of the real long-term interest rate and expected inflation (and a premium associated with different types of risk such as, for instance, that associat-
ed with error in inflation expectations). It is very important that the monetary authorities should know the contribution of these components since, if
the rising trajectory were attributable to greater inflation expectations, that would denote the possible presence of risks to price stability.
Often, the course of nominal long-term interest rates is explained in terms of changes in inflation expectations, it being understood that the re-
al interest rate (and the risk premia) is a more structural variable and, therefore, moves more steadily. Nonetheless, it does not seem reasonable to
rule out a priori that changes in the real long-term interest rate may also play a significant role.
The real long-term interest rate is determined on the basis of economic agents’ saving and investment decisions and reflects the cost of cap-
ital and the compensation for the deferral of consumption over time. There are several alternatives for estimating real interest rates. The first in-
volves observing the course of ex-post interest rates, which adjust the nominal rate for the average inflation outturn. This estimation cannot be
made for the year 1999, since it is not currently known what the long-term inflation outturn will be. The second alternative, which is frequently used,
is the calculation of the ex-ante interest rate, which is based on the estimation of expected inflation drawing on time series and econometric models
or surveys, and of the possible risk premia. However, if these methods approximated long-term inflation expectations closely, it would be possible
to ascertain directly their contribution to changes in nominal interest rates. Finally, the third option, which is the most appropriate in this case, is
based on the prices of index-linked bonds. The yield on these instruments is an approximation to the real interest rate, although it includes mea-
surement errors due to the existence of liquidity premia, the presence of lags between actual inflation and the adjusted payment on the bond, and
to the method of calculating the yield drawing on market prices. For the euro area, the only index-linked bonds available are French bonds(1).
The yield on French index-linked bonds (see adjoining chart) held stable during 1999 Q1 and, after a minor fall, continued on a rising trend.
Overall, the yield increased by around 50 basis points during the year.
Given the difficulties associated with the foregoing estimates of real interest rates, it is important they should be complemented by factors
which, according to economic theory, are their basic determinants. It should be noted firstly that these factors are manifold, especially in open
economies. And, secondly, that the current degree of integration on capital markets has led to the belief that there could be a single worldwide real
interest rate and that the differences between countries would be in response to country risk premia and to exchange rate expectations. That said,
the empirical evidence available(2) suggests that, although real interest rates are closely linked to international factors, the domestic economic sit-
uation is very important.
In the current economic setting, there are three key factors that could explain real long-term interest rate developments in the euro area. The
first factor, which is of a global nature, is the development and introduction of new technology, which is generating expectations of higher future
productivity. According to various empirical studies, this could give rise to an increase in real long-term interest rates as a result of the reduction in
present saving in response to expectations of greater future income and to the wish for a smooth consumption path. The second factor, and one of
growing relevance, is demographic developments. The gradual ageing of the population in the euro area reduces the proportion of the labour force,
which would lessen saving, thereby raising real long-term interest rates. The third and final relevant factor is the sustained reduction in the deficit
and public debt in the euro area which, other things being equal and unlike the previous factors, could give rise to a decline in real interest rates.
In any event, it is worth noting that, given the structural nature of these economic factors, real interest rates should follow a smooth course
over time. Such smoothness, however, is not seen in the course of index-linked bond yields and, therefore, some caution should be exercised in in-
terpreting short-term movements in the prices of these instruments, which may respond largely to the above-mentioned measurement errors.
In sum, these economic factors combined with the trend of French index-linked bonds appear to indicate that, although there has been a rise
in real interest rates in the euro area, greater inflation expectations (and risk premia) have also played a significant role in shaping nominal long-
term interest rates in the area. Changes in oil prices and in the euro exchange rate have probably contributed to the rise in inflation expectations.
(1) See Box 2 of the February 1999 edition of the ECB Monthly Bulletinfor more information on these instruments.
(2) F. Breedon, B. Henry and G. Williams, Oxford Review of Economic Policy,vol. 15, nº2.
Long-term interest rates in the euro area
   Sources: Banco de España and Reuters.
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.50
5.00
5.50
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.50
5.00
5.50
 NOMINALYIELD ON 10-YEAR GERMAN BUND
YIELD ON FRENCH 10-YEAR INDEX-LINKED BOND
1999
%%
ed without generally varying significantly. These
differentials may have been due both to the dif-
ferent credit rating of issuers and to aspects re-
lated to the workings and size of national public
debt markets. In Spain’s case, the 10-year rate
stood in December 1999 at 5.7 %, having main-
tained during the year a very stable average
spread over Germany of around 23 basis
points. 
The changes in interest rates at different
terms gave rise to changes in the slope and po-
sition of the area’s yield curve (see Chart II.9).
Hence, the slope of the zero-coupon curve,
measured via the difference between ten-year
debt yields and the interest rates on three-
month interbank deposits, increased in 1999,
which may be interpreted as the outcome of the
improved growth prospects and the upside risks
to prices which were simultaneously observed.
The movements in the yield curve passed
through to the other interest rates of relevance
for agents’ spending decisions, such as bank
rates. Generally, bank lending rates to non-fi-
nancial corporations and households in the eu-
ro area as a whole tended to fall in the first six
months of the year, rising subsequently in the
following six months when the increase in long-
term debt yields combined with expectations of
a rise in official interest rates. Nonetheless, at
the start of 2000 bank lending rates in the euro
area remained generally lower than those ob-
served in 1998. Lastly, although there is some
heterogeneity regarding the transactions to
which bank interest rates refer in each country,
it may be said that lending rates to non-financial
corporations and households in Spain tended to
be below the average for the area. Moreover,
since they depend less on the trend of long-
term rates, short term bank lending rates in
Spain diminished more than their European
counterparts in the first half of 1999.
As earlier indicated, the above-mentioned
course of nominal interest rates in the euro area
meant that real long-term interest rates held
during the first half of the year at below their re-
lated level in 1998, although they subsequently
increased as the economic outlook in the area
improved. Real short term interest rates fell in
relation to 1998 owing to the decline in nominal
short term rates and to the rise in inflation. In
Spain, the higher inflation rate meant that real
rates were lower than those in the euro area as
a whole. This contributed, along with the high
growth of finance granted to the private sector,
to shaping relatively easier monetary and finan-
cial conditions, in a setting in which economic
growth was also higher than that of the euro
area.
Stock market developments in the euro area
were relatively unrelated to the course of bond
market yields, and responded essentially to the
improvement in growth expectations and to
higher expected profits. Generally, European
stock markets followed the rising trend (not ex-
empt from some volatility) observed in the other
industrialised countries. This trend was particu-
larly marked in Europe (see Chart II.10). The
broad Dow Jones Euro Stoxx index, which lists
the main European stocks, stood in December
1999 at 40 % above its end-1998 level. This
rise was greater than that for the same period in
the US Standard and Poor’s index (19 %) and
similar to that for the Japanese Nikkei 225 in-
dex (37 %).
The stock market performance last year led
to an increase in household wealth in the area.
And as discussed earlier in this chapter, this
may have affected agents’ saving and invest-
ment decisions and, in all likelihood, the compo-
sition of their portfolios. However, as was to be
expected, these processes were not uniform in
all the countries of the area. In Spain, stock
market earnings were generally lower than
those in the other European markets; the
Madrid General Stock Market Index rose 16 %
during the year, down on both 1998 (37 %) and
on the common monetary area (40 %).
In the foregoing environment, the trend of
the monetary and credit aggregates in the euro
area observed during the previous year was ac-
centuated in 1999; monetary growth exceeded
5 % and financing extended to the private sec-
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tor of the economy accelerated strongly, grow-
ing at the year-on-year rate of over 10 % (see
Chart II.11). The relatively low opportunity cost
of holding liquid financial assets contributed to
increasing the rate of expansion of the narrower
monetary aggregates, especially in those Euro-
pean countries with higher rates of economic
activity. In turn, the improvement in economic
prospects during the year and low debt costs, in
nominal and real terms, were propitious, among
other factors, to the quickening in lending ex-
tended to non-financial corporations and house-
holds. Such lending was also fuelled by rising
real estate asset prices and by the intense ac-
tivity in corporate mergers and acquisitions.
Given the moderate and stable growth rate of fi-
nancing to general government, the situation
led to a forceful expansion of total financing to
residents sectors across the area.
Monetary growth in the euro area, defined
as the year-on-year rate of increase of the M3
aggregate, held in 1999 and during the first four
months of 2000 at above the reference value of
4.5 %. In early 1999, the strong rates of expan-
sion recorded were attributed in part to a tem-
porary step-up in liquidity associated with the
introduction of the euro and the start-up of the
new monetary policy framework, along with a
degree of asset switching due to structural fac-
t rs in certain countries in the area. Nonethe-
less, the deviations during the year from the ref-
erence monetary growth value not solely per-
sisted, but became more significant, against the
background of the clear improvement in the
economic outlook. The data on the monetary
aggregates for the first four months of 2000
have confirmed the high monetary growth rate
in the area, suggesting that the behaviour of M3
has been in response not so much to those
special factors but, above all, to a genuine and
more permanent process of liquidity expansion.
Turning to the counterparts of M3, the mone-
ary expansion was compatible with a high
growth rate of financing to non-financial corpo-
rations and households, which held at year-on-
year rates of around 11 %-12 %. Notably, de-
spite the increase in bank lending rates in the
second half of the year, the rate of expansion of
lending remained highly in that period. That
suggests that the restrictive impact of dearer
credit was offset by greater demand linked to
improved economic prospects in the euro area
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and, possibly, to the financing of a portion of
capital outflows.
The expansion of financing to general gov-
ernment in 1999 was low in year-on-year terms
and very stable at around 1.1 %, the result of
the reduction in the public sector borrowing re-
quirement in the area. Other long-term liabilities
of MFIs in the area, not included in M3, were
more buoyant. This was particularly so in the
second half of the year, owing probably to the
upward movement in longer-dated interest
rates. Finally, given that the increase in MFIs’
claims on residents in the area was greater
than that of their liabilities to this sector, MFIs
had to finance this shortfall through net indebt-
edness abroad. Consequently, the net external
position of MFIs in the area declined by EUR
166 billion in 1999.
The generous liquidity conditions in the area
were generally common to all the member
states, although they varied depending on the
economic growth rates of each country and on
the differences in their monetary transmission
mechanisms. In Spain, these conditions tended
to be relatively more expansive, as reflected in
rates of increase of liquidity and, above all, of fi-
nancing that were higher than in the area as a
whole. Nonetheless, the relevant definitions of
monetary and credit aggregates for the euro
area as a whole are not always the most appro-
priate ones for characterising the tone of the
monetary and financial conditions prevailing in
each country.
In Spain’s case, it is the so-called liquid fi-
nancial assets – which include cash and cash
quivalents (cash and sight deposits), other
deposits at any maturity, repos, bank securities
and shares in money market and equity funds
held by non-financial corporations and house-
holds – which appear to show a more stable re-
lationship to expenditure and which are a rep-
resentative measure of liquidity given the char-
acteristics of the economy. This aggregate dis-
played relatively moderate annual growth in
1999, although cash and cash equivalents
were very buoyant, growing at a year-on-year
growth rate of around 17 % for much of the
year. Moreover, there was a significant accel-
eration in financing obtained by non-financial
corporations and households resident in Spain,
with a year-on-year growth rate of close to
2 0 % in the second half of the year. In Spain,
then, whose expansive cyclical profile is more
marked than in other euro area countries and
whose inflation differential is positive in relation
to the average for the area, monetary and fi-
nancial conditions during 1999 were relatively
looser than in the EMU members as a whole,
with regard both to interest rate levels and to
the rate of expansion of liquidity and of financ-
ing extended to agents.
CHAPTER III
THE SPANISH ECONOMY
III.1. INTRODUCTION
The Spanish economy achieved excellent
results in terms of growth and job creation in its
first year of membership of the Monetary Union.
Drawing on the initial estimates published by
the INE (National Institute of Statistics), GDP
grew by 3.7% in 1999, only slightly down on
the estimate for 1998, despite the effect of the
international economic crisis on activity. This ef-
fect was particularly significant at the start of
the year, but was rapidly corrected as the euro
area’s external environment recovered and the
euro area economies themselves reacted to the
beneficial impact of that recovery. Domestic de-
mand was highly buoyant throughout the year
– with a slight moderation in this buoyancy in
the final quarter– growing by nearly 5 % for the
second year running.
The growth in domestic demand was under-
pinned by the strength of spending by house-
holds and firms, while general government final
demand moderated, in accordance with Gov-
ernment plans. Household consumption and in-
vestment spending tended to accelerate over
the year, based on easy monetary and financial
conditions, high rates of job creation and gains
in wealth, as well as on the impact of the reform
of direct taxation. On the available estimates,
productive investment by firms held steady at
high rates without any sign of acceleration,
against a background conducive to the execu-
tion of investment plans (buoyant demand and
low interest rates).
The strength of domestic spending and the
progressive recovery of exports made domestic
activity highly buoyant. However, these devel-
opments were also accompanied by a substan-
tial boost to imports and a significant widening
of the trade deficit. This led to net borrowing
– initially estimated at 0.6 % of GDP– by the
economy for the first time since 1994. The
Spanish economy has proved capable of bene-
fiting considerably from the pick-up in external
demand, but these results show that it is still
highly import-dependent and they signal the
need to maintain and improve its competitive
capacity.
In any event, the buoyancy of GDP in 1999
led to strong job growth and a notable reduction
in the unemployment rate. A basic factor behind
this result was, without doubt, the ongoing mod-
eration in wage settlements, which were basi-
cally held down by the expectations of stability
arising from membership of the Monetary
Union. The lower dismissal costs and reduc-
tions in social contributions introduced through
contracts for the promotion of stable employ-
ment enabled the costs of hiring certain types of
workers to be further reduced and also stimulat-
ed employment generation.
The behaviour of wage settlements was a
significant element in the containment of infla-
tion, in a year in which various factors exerted
upward pressure on prices. The most important
of these was the surge in the price of crude oil
and, to a lesser extent, in other imported com-
modities, which translated into strong growth in
import prices and a significant rise in production
costs. The growth in import prices was also bol-
stered by the depreciation of the euro. At the
ame time, the expansion of demand enabled
the rise in non-wage costs to be passed
through to final prices and operating margins to
widen. The result was a rise in inflation, with the
12-month growth rate of the CPI up from 1.8 %
in 1998 to 2.3 % in 1999, and the opening up of
an inflation differential with the euro area. That
said, the widening of the differential took place
mainly in the first quarter of the year, and there-
after the differential held steady.
In short, during its first year of membership
of the Monetary Union, the standards of
macroeconomic stability that enabled the Span-
ish economy to join were maintained, and some
of the imbalances that still remain, such as the
budget deficit, were further corrected. Also, the
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increase in inflation stemming from rising ener-
gy prices was kept under control. At the same
time, activity and employment displayed high
rates of growth, leading to further real conver-
gence with the euro area. However, the deterio-
ration in the trade deficit and the persistence of
the inflation differential show the need to moni-
tor the expansion of overall demand and to
make the supply side of the economy more flex-
ible, thereby removing obstacles of a structural
nature that are limiting potential growth.
III.2. DEMAND
As mentioned above, the high rate of growth
of GDP in 1999 was based, as in the two previ-
ous years, on the buoyancy of domestic de-
mand. According to provisional Quarterly Na-
tional Accounts (QNA) data, the latter grew by
4.9 % in real terms (see Table III.1). Amid the
favourable expectations prompted by the intro-
duction of the single currency, which also en-
tailed relatively easy financial conditions, the
strength of national demand was largely based
on the buoyancy of household final consump-
tion spending, which accelerated from a growth
rate of 4.1 % in 1998 to 4.4 %. By contrast,
gross fixed capital formation slowed. This re-
flected a certain restraint in capital goods in-
vestment following the notable expansion in the
preceding year, while construction investment
rose on average at a higher rate in 1999, al-
t ough with a profile showing a slowdown over
the year.
Net external demand became slightly more
contractionary, as a consequence of the weak-
ness of exports at the beginning of the year in
an adverse international environment, reducing
GDP growth by 1.2 percentage points. Howev-
er, both exports and imports accelerated in
1999, leading to a further increase in the de-
gree of openness of the Spanish economy,
which reached higher levels than in most of the
euro-area countries. The composition of de-
mand changed over the year. As the effects of
the international economic crisis were over-
come and the international environment be-
came more favourable, exports gathered mo-
mentum, leading to a reduction in the negative
contribution from external demand, which made
up for the moderate loss of strength of national
demand.
III.2.1. National demand
Table III.2 shows the main components of
national demand, classified in terms of the
agents responsible for spending. Their paths
have been estimated on the basis of National
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TABLE III.1
Main macroeconomic aggregates (a)
Real rate of change
Household final consumption
expenditure (b) 59.6 2.0 2.9 4.1 4.4 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.2
General government final consumption
expenditure 17.0 1.3 2.7 2.0 1.8 2.7 2.6 1.7 0.3
Gross fixed capital formation 24.3 2.0 5.0 9.2 8.3 9.5 8.8 8.0 7.0
Construction 15.2 –1.0 2.3 7.0 8.3 9.3 8.6 8.1 7.1
Capital goods and other 9.1 8.3 9.9 13.0 8.4 10.0 9.0 7.9 6.8
Change in stocks (c) 0.3 –0.1 –0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
National demand 101.2 1.8 3.2 5.0 4.9 5.3 5.2 4.9 4.2
Exports of goods and services 29.1 10.3 15.1 7.1 8.5 6.4 7.9 8.7 10.7
Final demand 130.3 3.4 5.6 5.4 5.7 5.6 5.8 5.7 5.7
Imports of goods and services 30.3 8.1 12.8 11.1 12.6 12.6 13.5 12.7 11.8
Gross domestic product 100.0 2.3 3.8 4.0 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Net external demand (c) –1.2 0.5 0.6 –1.0 –1.2 –1.6 –1.5 –1.1 –0.4
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística.
(a) Year-on-year rate of change based on trend-cycle series.
(b) Includes final consumption expenditure of non-profit institutions serving households.
(c) Contribution to GDP growth.
% GDP
1999 1996 1997 1998 1999
1999 (a)
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Accounts aggregates and certain supplemen-
tary information. The expansion of household
expenditure in 1999 can be seen in the table,
the growth rates of both the consumption and
residential-investment components accelerating
significantly. Spending by firms, estimated on
the basis of provisional INE data, continued to
grow at high rates, although they were some-
what lower than those in the preceding year,
due to a slowdown in capital-goods investment.
Finally, general government demand continued
to show the restraint that has characterised it in
recent years, with a slowdown in real public-
sector investment being detected. Overall, the
share of general government demand in GDP
edged down in 1999, while the relative impor-
tance of the spending of households and firms
continued to rise.
Household final consumption expenditure
grew by 4.4 % in real terms in 1999, as against
4.1 % in 1998. However, the gradual acceler-
ation by this component of spending since
the beginning of 1997 came to a halt during the
year, with a slight slowdown in the final quarter.
The high degree of confidence of Spanish
households during the year, the favourable fi-
nancial conditions and the effects of gains in
wealth in recent years help to explain the
strength of household consumption on average
during the year, despite the somewhat lower
rate of growth of real household disposable in-
come than in 1998.
In fact, household disposable income is esti-
mated to have grown by 3.1 %, in real terms, in
1999, as against 3.7 % in 1998. The slowdown
mainly reflected the increase in the rate of con-
sumer-price inflation, since the growth of dis-
posable income, in nominal terms, was even
higher than in the preceding year. The middle
panel of Chart III.1 shows the contributions of
some of the main components of disposable in-
come to its real rate of growth. The smaller con-
tribution of income from employment in 1999
was a consequence of wage moderation and
less buoyant employment, compared with 1998.
However, it is worth pointing out that the loss of
purchasing power of wages caused by prices
rising faster than forecast was partly temporary,
as a large percentage of employees were sub-
ject to collective agreements with inflation-ad-
justment clauses protecting them from devia-
tions from the reference inflation rate in the
agreement.
In this respect, although wage-earners re-
ceived the payments due under these clauses
at the beginning of 2000, some households
may have kept their consumption steady, in an-
ticipation of this income. As against the lower
buoyancy of wage income, the contribution of
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TABLE III.2
Consumption and gross fixed capital formation by institutional sector (a)
Households (b)
Final consumption expenditure 59.8 59.6 2.0 2.9 4.1 4.4
Gross fixed capital formation (c) 4.6 5.2 9.1 –0.7 8.0 11.0
Firms
Gross fixed capital formation (d) 13.7 15.8 3.9 7.5 9.4 8.1
Construction 7.3 7.5 –0.4 5.6 5.1 7.2
Equipment 6.4 8.3 8.7 9.5 13.6 9.0
General government
Final consumption expenditure 18.1 17.0 1.3 2.7 2.0 1.8
Gross fixed capital formation 3.7 3.3 –13.6 2.6 10.2 5.1
Of which:
Construction 3.0 2.5 –18.0 –1.0 11.0 6.0
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Gross fixed capital formation 22.0 24.3 2.0 5.0 9.2 8.3
Construction 14.8 15.2 –1.0 2.3 7.0 8.3
Equipment 7.2 9.1 8.3 9.9 13.0 8.4
S o u r c e s :Instituto Nacional de Estadística and Banco de España.
(a) Data in real terms.
(b) Includes expenditure by non-profit institutions serving households.
(c) Domestic residential investment.
(d) Private productive investment: includes investment by individual entrepreneurs.
% GDP
1995 1999 1996 1997 1998 1999
Real rate of change
general government to the growth in household
income became positive in 1999, as a conse-
quence of the impact of the reform of personal
income tax (see Box III.1). Also, income relating
to the own-account business activities of house-
holds was expansionary. Finally, the contribu-
tion of income relating to the remuneration of
savings continued to be negative, although to a
lesser degree than in 1998. The maintenance of
low interest rates resulted, on one hand, in low-
er income from holding financial assets and, on
the other, in a further increase in household in-
debtedness and related payments.
The strength of household consumption, de-
spite the slowdown in real disposable income,
led to a decline in the saving ratio to slightly
above 12 % of disposable income. The decline
in the household saving ratio in 1999, coming
on top of those of previous years, reflects the
impact on spending of other determinants of
consumption. The easing of monetary condi-
tions continued to exert an expansionary effect
on household demand, with real interest rates
falling further. Also, although the gains in finan-
cial wealth obtained by households in 1999 as a
consequence of rising stock markets were less
than in 1998, the cumulative effect of the gains
made in recent years was again significant. In
addition the increase in wealth stemming from
higher house prices, may also have boosted
spending. All these factors, as well as others,
tended to improve household expectations and,
following some hesitancy, the consumer confi-
dence index reached another historic high at
the end of the year, surpassing the levels
reached in the previous economic expansion.
The fact that the pattern of growth followed by
the Spanish economy in recent years has been
characterised by high employment generation
and by greater job stability among the youngest
sections of the population, helps to explain this
improvement in household confidence.
The effect of the decline in real interest rates
was particularly significant in the case of con-
sumer durables. Consumption of these goods
(particularly of cars) was extraordinarily buoyant
during the last four years, although at the end of
1999 signs of a slowdown began to be dis-
cerned. Meanwhile, services consumption was
expansionary in 1999, while spending on food
was subdued.
Residential investment, the other component
of household spending, strengthened further in
1999. It is estimated to have reached a real
growth rate of around 11 %, as against the 8 %
estimate for 1998. This buoyancy reflects the
notable expansion of purchases of new
dwellings, since spending on refurbishment and
alterations slowed, showing the counter-cyclical
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CHART III.1
Household final consumption
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BOX III.1
Reform of personal income tax
On 1 January 1999, Law 40/1998 of 9 December 1998 on personal income tax entered into force, introducing a
far-reaching reform of the structure and content of this tax. The main changes are detailed below and the initial data
available on the revenue raised in 1999 are described:
— The new tax is charged on the taxpayer’s income after deduction of the amount of a tax-free personal allowance,
set at the basic rate of ESP 550,000 per annum, which may be higher depending on the taxpayer’s personal and
family circumstances.
— The distinction between the regular and irregular tax base has been abolished, with both now incorporated in a gen-
eral tax base which includes income from short- and long-term capital and short-term capital gains and losses.
Long-term capital gains and losses (those generated over a period of more than two years) are set off against each
other and included in a single special base. The exempt amount is applied so as to reduce –in this order– the gen-
eral tax base and the special tax base, without it being possible to make either base negative. Furthermore, nega-
tive general and special tax bases can be set off against positive general and special tax bases, respectively, de-
clared in the following four years. Set-offs between the general and special tax bases are not permitted.
In relation to the general tax base, earned income is included after the deduction of amounts ranging from ESP
375,000 to 500,000 per annum. Short-term investment income is included in its entirety, and long-term investment
income after application of a reducing coefficient, which varies depending on the type of income. For short-term
capital losses, a limit is imposed on the extent to which they can be set off against income for the year (10 % of the
general tax base attributable to the latter).
— A new single tax rate schedule is established, applicable to the general tax base, which replaces the former individ-
ual and joint schedules. The lowest tax rate is reduced from 20 % to 18 % (with no exempt amount), and the high-
est from 56 % to 48 % (for income exceeding ESP 11,000,000). The number of rate bands is reduced from eight to
six. The special tax base is taxed at a single rate of 20 %.
— The Law maintains deductions for habitual dwellings, economic activities, donations and investment in objects of
cultural interest (subject to an overall limit of 10 % of the tax base), for income obtained in Ceuta and Melilla, for
amounts deposited in housing accounts and for double taxation of dividends and international double taxation. The
deduction for investment in habitual dwellings is set at 15 % of the amounts (up to a maximum of ESP 1,500,000)
paid in the period, and the imputed income from property is abolished, as is the deduction from the base for interest
on loans to finance such property. Taxpayers who have acquired an ordinary residence before 24 April 1998 shall
be compensated if the new regime proves unfavourable to them.
This reform of personal income tax involves a reduction in the average tax burden, which during the first year the
reform was in effect, affected revenue basically through the reduction in withholdings, since the previous rules still ap-
plied to the net tax payable and rebates in 1999. State revenue from personal income tax grew, in cash terms, by 2.1 %
in 1999, entailing a fall in proportion to GDP of 0.3 percentage points (see adjoining table). By component, withholdings
on earned income increased by 3.6 % despite the reduction in the rates of withholding deriving from the reform of the
tax. However, it should be taken into account that the withholding figures for 1998 and 1999 are not strictly comparable.
In 1999, around ESP 192 billion of revenue relating to the payment of amounts due from the Social Security System
and the regional (autonomous) governments were included in this item, as against somewhat more than ESP 30 billion
in 1998, and the reduction in withholding rates in 1999 was only applied to 11 months in the case of large firms and to
three quarters in the case of small and medium-sized firms and professionals. After adjusting for the first of these fac-
tors the rate remains positive, although it is reduced to 0.4 %, which could be mainly reflecting the growth in the number
of employees. For their part, withholdings on capital declined by 19.1 %, which may be explained by interest rate devel-
opments and the reduction in the withholding rate for returns on bank deposits, fixed income securities and promissory
notes from 25 % to 18 %. It should also be taken into account that the 1999 revenue was affected by the establishment
of withholdings on mutual fund capital gains, which raised ESP 90 billion. Finally, it should be noted that withholdings on
property rentals (included in the adjoining table under the heading “net tax payable and other”) came into force in March
1998. Accordingly, if the 1999 revenue is adjusted (for the purposes of a more homogeneous comparison with 1998) for
the amounts due from the Social Security System and the regional (autonomous) governments and for the withholdings
on property rentals and on mutual fund capital gains, then personal income tax revenue was down 3.6 % (0.6 percent-
age points of GDP). This figure should not be interpreted as the revenue cost of the reform, since among other factors
it is based exclusively on State data and does not include the revenue of the regional (autonomous) governments nor
take into account the increases in revenue from indirect taxes which have taken place as a consequence of the reform.
State personal income tax receipts (cash-basis)
Withholdings on earned income 4,956.3 5,136.0 3.6
Withholdings on investment income 611.4 494.7 –19.1
Withholdings on mutual funds — 90.2 —
Instalment payments 412.4 400.1 –3.0
Net tax payable and other –315.4 –220.9 32.2
Share of regional (autonomous) governments –672.7 –802.2 19.3
Personal income tax 4,992.0 5,097.9 2.1
Source: Secretaría de Estado de Presupuestos y Gastos, del Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda.
%19991998Item
behaviour of the latter in relation to new con-
struction. The strength of the demand for
dwellings in the last two years was based on
the high growth rates of real household dispos-
able income and on the decline in mortgage in-
terest rates. In 1999 as a whole, mortgage in-
terest rates dipped by around one percentage
point, despite embarking on an upward path in
the second half. The significant growth in the fi-
nancial wealth of households in recent years
may also have had a positive impact on the de-
mand for dwellings, along with demographic
factors. However, the latter must have had a
smaller impact in 1999 than in previous years,
as the growth rate of new household formation
weakened.
Overall, the above-mentioned factors helped
to maintain favourable terms for household ac-
cess to the purchase of dwellings in 1999, de-
spite the notable increase in their relative price
(see Chart III.2). In fact, the pressure exerted
by demand on the property market translated
into a strong increase in house prices in 1999,
despite the high volume of house starts (more
than 500,000), at a level not seen since the
seventies. However, determining the precise
impact on overall demand of the rise in the rela-
tive price of housing is not at all straightforward.
On the one hand, it curbs demand for housing
as a residence, while on the other, expectations
of capital gains stimulate the purchase of
dwellings as an alternative asset in which to
hold wealth. This latter component of demand
has also been driven by the decline in the yield
on financial assets (see the bottom panel of
Chart III.2). In any event, the pressure on prices
was passed through to the market for existing
houses. There, as from the second quarter, the
acceleration in prices was even sharper, reflect-
ing the inadequate supply of new housing rela-
tive to current demand. Moreover, price growth
was very uneven across geographic areas. In-
creases were higher than average in coastal ar-
eas, owing to the increase in the demand of
non-residents as well as the demand of resi-
dents for second homes.
In 1999, general government final demand
continued to be governed by the commitment to
control public spending. Once again the bulk of
the adjustment fell on consumption spending,
which continued to follow the path of modera-
tion established in previous years. The growth
rate of investment was higher, but significantly
down on 1998. On figures released by INE,
government consumption grew by 1.8 % in real
terms (against 2 % in 1998), while in nominal
terms it grew by 5.5 % (up from 4.7 % in 1998).
The divergence between growth in current pe-
setas and in real terms is associated with the
acceleration in compensation per employee, as
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CHART III.2
Residential investment
   Sources:  Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Ministerio de
Fomento and Banco de España.
   (a)   Real rates of change.
   (b)   Banco de España estimates.
   (c)   Price of new housing in relation to the private consumption
deflator.
   (d)   Nominal interest rates on mortgage loans.
   (e)   Difference between the rate of change of house prices and
the interest rate on the alternative asset (proxied by 10-year
government bond yields).
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well as a strong expansion of net purchases of
goods and services. The slowdown in public-
sector investment was particularly important in
local government, which had made a stronger
investment drive in 1998, while the regional (au-
tonomous) governments sustained the expan-
sionary momentum of their spending. By type of
investment, there was a slowdown in both capi-
tal goods and construction. The trend in the lat-
ter partly reflects the sharp fall in official tenders
in 1999, which was more important in civil engi-
neering than in building.
In 1999, gross fixed capital formation by
firms slowed slightly, in comparison with the
preceding year. However, its growth – estimat-
ed at 8.1 %, in real terms – ended up exceeding
the forecasts made by some employers at the
beginning of the year, which were strongly influ-
enced by the deterioration in demand expecta-
tions prompted by the international crisis. Pri-
vate productive investment in 1999 is explained
by the expansion of final demand, by firms’
healthy financial position and high profits, and
by the favourable behaviour of the relative cost
of capital. According to the Ministry of Industry
and Energy’s half-yearly survey of investment
by industrial firms, the first two factors had the
greatest impact on investment in 1999.
As seen in Chart III.3, the strength of the de-
mand for firms’ products –particularly of its do-
mestic component– was sustained in 1999,
while exports were less buoyant during the year
as a whole. Nonetheless, the profile of external
demand was one of recovery over the year,
which helped to increase the pressure exerted
by spending in the second half. This higher
pressure from demand eventually translated
into a significant increase in the degree of capac-
ity utilisation in industry in the final quarter. On
average, capacity utilisation was down slightly
in 1999. Yet by the end of the year it had
reached very high levels (81.2 %), increasing
the need to widen the stock of capital goods.
According to the survey mentioned above,
since 1997 capital widening has been the main
aim of industrial investment expenditure. Effi-
ciency improvements –a concept that covers
labour saving, the introduction of new technolo-
gies and the saving of raw materials– are also
a significant motivation for corporate investment
plans.
The decline in recent years in Spanish inter-
est rates largely explains the decline in real
terms in the user cost of capital since 1997. In
1999, the rise in the inflation rate also contribut-
ed to this decline. It is estimated that, in real
terms, the fall in the user cost of capital during
1999 was greater than the decline in the cost of
labour. This movement in relative factor prices
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CHART III.3
Private productive investment
 Sources:  Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Ministerio de Industria y
Energía and Banco de España.
   (a)   Real rates of change and differences for the degree of plant
capacity utilisation.
   (b)   Net turnover deflated by the final demand deflator. For the
domestic and external components the domestic demand and exports
deflators, respectively, have been used.
   (c)   Data obtained from the CBA annual survey until 1998 and from
the CBQ quarterly survey for 1999.
   (d)   Relative costs measure the user cost of capital divided by the
user cost of labour, proxied by compensation per employee.
   (e)   Ratio of the stock of private productive capital, obtained from an
initial condition estimated by Fundación BBV/IVIE, to the total number of
private-sector employees according to National Accounts.
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was conducive to a more intensive use of capi-
tal in productive processes. In fact, the
capital/labour ratio recorded a mild recovery in
1999, as seen in the middle panel of Chart III.3.
This recovery seems somewhat timid in the
light of the fall in the relative price of capital in
recent years. However, this fall may be overes-
timated by the indicator of relative prices shown
in the chart, since it does not incorporate some
of the measures taken in recent years to reduce
the cost of labour in order to promote the cre-
ation of employment.
Meanwhile, the financial environment in
which firms conducted their activities in 1999
continued to improve. This, together with the
high levels of profitability achieved, helps to ex-
plain the expansionary path of productive in-
vestment. According to Central Balance Sheet
Office Quarterly Survey (CBQ) data, the rise in
the rate of profitability in 1999 was a conse-
quence of the expansion of firms’ productive ac-
tivity, of the containment of operating costs (due
to the slowdown in personnel costs) and of the
lower growth of financial costs (despite the
strong increase in borrowing). The high rate of
return on assets and the low cost of borrowed
funds gave rise to a considerable increase in fi-
nancial leverage (the difference between the
two rates), which reached historic highs of close
to 4 % and, in turn, boosted investment. Against
this background, the recourse to external fi-
nancing, extended both by resident and non-
resident credit institutions, continued to grow,
even though the financial situation of firms re-
mained very healthy owing to the strong gener-
ation of own funds.
Despite such positive behaviour by the main
determinants of corporate investment, the avail-
able estimates show, as mentioned above, a
slight slowdown in this component of spending
in 1999. This slowdown, if confirmed, may part-
ly be explained by the weakness of demand ex-
pectations at the beginning of the year, but it al-
so seems to shown a certain reluctance by
firms to implement their investment plans. In
fact, the ratio of investment in capital goods to
GDP has grown less sharply in Spain than in
other economies growing strongly in the current
upswing. This result may reflect the fact that
Spanish firms have capitalised on such positive
circumstances as currently exist to increase
their international profile, as the momentum
achieved by foreign direct investment in recent
years would testify. If so, their investment activi-
ty will have been more significant than the fig-
ures for private productive investment alone
would suggest.
As regards the breakdown by component of
firms’ investment, construction was highly buoy-
ant in 1999, driven by investment in new indus-
trial and commercial premises. Office building
also rose very significantly, but represents only
a small percentage of total construction. Spend-
ing on capital goods, meanwhile, slowed during
the year.
Finally, stockbuilding contributed 0.1 per-
centage points to GDP growth in 1999, which
was similar to its contribution in 1998. In gener-
al, the persistence of low costs of holding
stocks, as a consequence of the low levels of
interest rates and non-energy commodity
prices (although the latter tended to rise as the
year elapsed) may have led to an increase in
the desired levels of stocks in certain indus-
tries. Moreover, the involuntary component of
stocks must have increased in the first half of
he year, when the percentage of firms report-
ing higher-than-desired levels of stocks rose
considerably, as a consequence of the weak-
ness of exports. This percentage declined in
the second half. By contrast, in the oil refining
industry stocks fell sharply as the year unfold-
d, owing to the rise in the price of oil on inter-
national markets.
III.2.2. External demand
In 1999, net external demand continued to
have a notably contractionary effect on GDP
growth. On provisional QNA estimates, this ef-
fect was 1.2 percentage points on average dur-
ing the year, somewhat higher than the esti-
mate for 1998 (one percentage point). This neg-
ative effect was particularly severe in the first
quarter, when exports (especially goods ex-
ports) felt the impact of the international eco-
nomic crisis and grew at very moderate rates,
while imports were highly vigorous. However,
the negative contribution fell significantly over
he rest of the year, as the very sharp recovery
in exports firmed, boosted by the improvement
in the external environment and, to a lesser ex-
tent, by the improvements in competitiveness in
certain markets, as a consequence of the de-
preciation of the euro. In 1999 as a whole,
goods and services exports grew by 8.5 %, in
real terms, while imports rose by 12.6 % (see
Chart III.4).
Goods exports were markedly weak at the
beginning of 1999, prolonging the trend that
had begun in the second half of 1998. This was
against an adverse international backdrop,
characterised by the slackness of demand in
the euro area economies and by recession in
most emerging Latin American and, to a lesser
extent, south-east Asian economies. However,
the swiftness of recovery in the emerging
economies of the latter region and the gradual
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improvement in the euro area countries led to
an increase in exports in the second quarter of
the year, which gained momentum as the im-
provement in the business climate spread and
strengthened. Consequently, goods exports,
which had grown at a real year-on-year rate of
3.8 % in the first quarter, were growing at rates
of more than 10 % by the end of the year.
As already mentioned, this recovery in ex-
ports was also assisted by the improvements in
competitiveness in markets outside the euro
area, mainly as a consequence of the deprecia-
tion of the exchange rate of the euro. However,
developments in competitiveness vis-à-vis the
euro area economies (Spain’s main trading
partners) continued to display certain adverse
features (see Chart III.5). In particular, although
export prices held at very similar growth rates to
those of this area (or were even somewhat low-
er), unit labour costs grew at comparatively high
rates, leading to a further narrowing of operat-
ing margins in those sectors most exposed to
international competition. As mentioned in
Chapter I above, should this situation (which
could spread to other markets, when the ex-
change rate of the euro reverses its recent
course) persist, it could hinder export growth,
jeopardising the presence of Spanish firms
abroad and, at the same time, making it easier
for foreign products to increase their penetra-
tion of the Spanish market.
Analysing exports at a disaggregated level, it
can be seen that their acceleration during 1999
was across the board, as regards both the main
product groups and geographical and economic
areas. Specifically, exports to the euro area,
which were practically stagnant in Q1, grew by
6.3 % in the year as a whole, boosted by the
pick-up in demand in the countries of this area,
while those to the rest of the world increased by
2.9 %, after sharp falls in Q1.
Within the euro area, there was some diver-
gence between the growth of sales to Portugal
and the smaller economies, which recorded rel-
atively high rates in Q2, and those to Germany,
France and Italy, which only gained momentum
towards the end of the year. Exports to the Unit-
ed States were very slack during the first half of
the year, a result which contrasts with the dura-
bility of the cyclical upswing in that economy
and with the strength of the US dollar against
the euro. Spanish products may have been dis-
placed from this market as a result of the gains
in competitiveness made by the Asian countries
in preceding years. Among these products, cer-
tain consumer manufactures and intermediate
products predominate, in the production of
which the emerging south-east Asian
economies strongly specialise. In any event, ex-
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CHART III.4
External demand and main determinants (a)
 Sources: IMF, OECD, Instituto Nacional de Estadística and Banco
de España.
   (a)   Real rates of change on a year ago.
   (b)   Average of the industrialised countries' imports, at constant
prices, weighted according to the significance of each country in
Spanish exports.
   (c)   Inverse of the Spanish exports deflator in relation to rest-of-
the-world exchange-rate-adjusted export prices.
   (d)   Positive values denote a gain in the competitiveness of
exports, imports and the Spanish tourism sector, respectively;
negative values denote a loss.
   (e)   Producer price index in relation to Spanish imports deflator.
   (f)   Average of the GDP of the countries of origin of tourism to
Spain, weighted according to the relative significance of the number
of visitors.
   (g)   Inverse of the real effecftive exchange rate against the
OECD countries.
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ports to the United States rebounded in the sec-
ond half of the year, assisted by the gains in
competitiveness arising from the depreciation of
the euro.
As for other markets, exports began the year
by recording very sharp falls. Thereafter a gen-
eral recovery was discernible, though it varied
in strength. In particular, sales to south-east
Asian countries showed renewed buoyancy
from the second quarter, recording growth of
8.6 % for the year as a whole. By contrast,
sales to Latin America declined by 2.1 % in the
year as a whole, as their recovery was slower
to arrive. Finally, in the case of the CIS and oth-
er central and eastern European countries,
there was a contrast between the patterns of
behaviour in those countries that have in recent
years signed trade agreements with the Euro-
pean Union, where Spanish exports grew in
strength as the year elapsed, and in the others,
such as Russia, where the recovery in exports
was weaker.
Tourism receipts were very expansionary in
1999, surpassing even the excellent results
achieved in the two previous years. The strong
expansion in this aggregate in recent years is
closely linked to the progressive appreciation of
sterling, which has permitted a massive inflow
of tourists from the United Kingdom, with a con-
siderable rise in the UK’s share in the total
tourist inflow. The gradual improvement in the
economic situation in Germany, France and
Italy in 1999 also had a favourable impact on
tourism receipts. In addition, the effects of the
campaigns of recent years that have aimed to
diversify the Spanish tourist industry offering
should be noted. These have stimulated the in-
flux of tourists outside the summer season.
Goods imports recorded high rates of growth
for the fifth year running. They were mainly driv-
en by the strength of domestic demand and, to
a lesser extent, by the slight improvement in the
competitiveness of imported products in 1999.
The prices of non-energy imports rose moder-
ately, and at a lower rate than domestically pro-
duced industrial goods, although in the last few
months of the year an acceleration was dis-
cernible, as the inflationary pressures in the
main supplier countries of the Spanish market
became more acute.
As regards the composition of imports by
product group, imports of capital goods were
extraordinarily buoyant, exceeding even the no-
table growth of the preceding three years. This
result, which is consistent with the investment
taking place in the Spanish economy in the cur-
rent upswing, also reflects the weakness of the
domestic supply of technological products,
which makes it necessary to resort to imports in
order to gain access to the most advanced
technologies. Non-food consumer good imports
have also been highly expansionary in recent
years, especially in the case of cars. As men-
tioned above, the low interest rates prevailing in
the Spanish economy have particularly affected
the demand for cars. The shift in consumer
preferences towards middle and top-range
higher capacity segments, in which the Spanish
industry does not specialise, should also be
noted. Imports of non-energy intermediate prod-
ucts displayed an upward trend over the year,
as the pick-up in industrial activity strength-
ened, while those of food products grew at high
rates, driven by the declining prices seen during
most of the year and by the scantness of the
domestic supply of these products. Finally, im-
ports of energy products recorded very heavy
declines from Q2, as a consequence of the
urge in oil prices on international markets,
which led Spanish refineries to use reserves
built up in previous years, prompting a sharp fall
in stocks.
In 1999, the buoyancy of goods imports was
accompanied by vigorous growth in tourism
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CHART III.5
Competitiveness indices (a)
   Source: Banco de España.
   (a)   A rise in the index denotes a loss in competitiveness.
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payments, which can be explained by the in-
crease in the spending capacity of Spanish con-
sumers and the high level of consumer confi-
dence. Moreover, this outcome is part of the
growing trend in Spaniards’ propensity to travel,
as higher levels of income have enabled con-
sumption patterns to be transformed. Finally,
payments for other services again recorded
very high rates of growth.
III.3. OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT
As seen above, national demand grew
briskly in 1999, at a rate of close to 5 %. This,
together with the progressive acceleration of
exports, gave rise to an increase of 5.7 % in fi-
nal demand, 0.3 percentage points up on 1998,
according to provisional QNA estimates. This
strong demand was satisfied through imports to
a greater extent than in 1998. Imports of goods
and services grew by 12.6 %, one-and-a-half
percentage points higher than in 1998, while
GDP rose by 3.7 %, 0.3 percentage points less
than in the preceding year. According to most
estimates, Spanish GDP was growing at above
its trend rate in 1999, although the difference
between these two rates (the output gap) was
similar to that in the previous year. The slow-
down in GDP did not affect all branches of ac-
tivity. While gross value added (GVA) fell in
agriculture and decelerated in non-market ser-
vices and in industry, in market services and
especially in construction expansion was more
rapid than in the preceding year (in terms of an-
nual averages, in all cases).
The vigorous growth in activity was accom-
panied by strong employment generation, which
was also helped by the containment of real
labour costs, as seen in Chart III.6. In fact, on
QNA estimates, the growth in the number of
full-time equivalent jobs ran at 3.4 %, 0.3 per-
centage points less than in 1998, with a profile
of slowdown over the year. In consequence, ap-
parent labour productivity grew at a very low
rate for the second year running a (0.3 %), al-
though it picked up as the year elapsed. In any
case, according to Labour Force Survey (EPA)
data discussed below, the surge in employment
in 1999 was translated into a significant reduc-
tion in the unemployment rate, of almost three
percentage points, which made for an average
unemployment rate of 15.9 % in 1999.
III.3.1. Output and employment
by industry
Activity in the primary sector was contrac-
tionary during 1999. Gross value added (GVA),
in real terms, fell by 2.1 %, in contrast to the
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CHART III.6
Real growth and main labour market variables
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   (a)   Non-centred year-on-year rates of the QNA trend-cycle series.
   (b)   GDP at constant prices.
   (c)   Persons in employment. Full-time-equivalent jobs.
   (d)   Ratio of GDP to employment.
   (e)   Ratio of compensation per employee to GDP deflator.
   (f)   Labour Force Survey. Ratio of unemployed to labour force.
growth recorded in the three previous years.
Activity in the sector deteriorated markedly in
the first half of the year, declining less rapidly in
the second half, as a result of the scant rainfall
recorded across most of Spain, with cereal and
olive production especially affected. The decline
in activity in the primary sector translated into
an even sharper fall in employment (–2.8 %),
which enabled apparent labour productivity to
recover somewhat (see Chart III.7).
In 1999 as a whole, industrial activity record-
ed modest growth. In terms of GVA, it grew by
1.8 %, well down on the 4.8 % rate recorded in
1998. As a result, it contributed only 0.4 per-
centage points to GDP growth, as against one
percentage point in 1998. During the year, how-
ever, industrial activity displayed a profile of
fairly marked recovery, driven by the impact the
upturn in the world economy and the deprecia-
tion of the euro against the US dollar had on ex-
ports.
The pick-up in activity was not common to
all branches of industry. In particular, energy
suffered a slight reduction in its GVA, according
to QNA figures, although its output, in real
terms, rose by 3.8 %. The difference between
these two results reflects the increase in the
volume of its inputs, in a year characterised by
drought. GVA in manufacturing grew by 2.3 %
in the year as a whole, with a clearly expan-
sionary quarterly profile that took the year-on-
year rate to 3.8 % by year-end. The recovery in
manufacturing was also uneven. The most dy-
namic branches included some of the most tra-
ditional ones with little weight in industry as a
whole, such as leather and footwear, and wood
and cork, growth in rubber and plastics also be-
ing notably high. Among the branches with
greater weight in Spanish industry, the healthy
performance of the chemicals and the paper,
graphic art and publishing industries was no-
table. These recorded above-average growth
and paths of recovery over the year. By con-
trast, food production was blatantly stagnant,
and transport equipment manufacturing
showed modest growth, with a slowdown over
the year.
Industrial employment rose by 3.1 % in
1999, which translated into a decline in appar-
ent labour productivity for the second year run-
ning. The disaggregated employment informa-
tion provided by EPA, shows that the fall in pro-
ductivity resulted from uneven behaviour by
output and employment in certain industries,
such as textiles and electrical equipment, where
real output contracted at the same time as em-
ployment expanded, and in metals where, de-
spite the low growth of activity, employment
rose by almost 8 %. Most industries, however,
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CHART III.7
Gross value added, employment
and productivity
   Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística.
   (a)    The chart does not depict the contribution of taxes to GDP
growth.
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recorded either nil or slightly positive apparent
productivity growth.
Construction was the most dynamic industry
in 1999. Its GVA grew on average by 0.1 % in
1999, contributing 0.6 percentage points to
GDP growth (as against 0.4 in 1998). Construc-
tion activity was on an upswing during 1998,
which extended into the first half of 1999, with a
slight slowdown commencing in the second
half. The loss of momentum in construction was
seen across the various types of work, although
it was stronger in civil engineering than in build-
ing, according to the monthly construction in-
dustry survey. The strength of activity resulted
in strong employment creation, which ran at a
rate of around 11 % during 1999. In conse-
quence, apparent labour productivity fell much
more sharply than in the preceding three years.
This outcome may have been partly determined
by the lower relative growth of civil engineering,
which is characterised by a higher level of pro-
ductivity than building. Also, the strong growth
in housing completion certificates should be
noted, since labour requirements are heaviest
in the final stages of construction.
The services sector recorded GVA growth of
3.5 % last year, 0.4 percentage points higher
than in 1998, which increased its contribution to
GDP growth to 2 percentage points. The
greater buoyancy of the tertiary sector was con-
centrated in market services, which grew by 4.2%
in the year as a whole, with a profile showing
acceleration in the second half of the year. Non-
market services, by contrast, recorded modest
growth in 1999 (1.1 %), with a sharp slowdown
in the second half. The expansion in market
services was not across-the-board. The highest
growth was in communications and, to a lesser
extent, personal and corporate services and ho-
tels and restaurants, where vigorous growth
was a consequence of the large influx of
tourists last year. The distributive trade posted
steady growth, in line with private consumption.
Finally, transport was weak, with the exception
of air transport, which was somewhat more ex-
pansionary.
Employment in services followed the same
pattern as GVA, rising by 3.2 % on aggregate,
slightly up on the previous year. This result was
a consequence of strong employment genera-
tion in market services, which sustained a
steady rate of growth throughout the year of
around 4.5 % (3.9 % on average in 1998), while
in non-market services employment slowed
continuously. Apparent labour productivity dis-
played a profile of moderate recovery over the
year, determined by the behaviour of market
services, where the higher growth of activity in
the second half did not translate into an equiva-
lent acceleration of employment. Nonetheless,
on average in 1999, apparent labour productivi-
ty in market services fell by 0.3 %, which was
similar to the rate seen in 1998.
III.3.2. Employment
As mentioned above, the strength of activity
and the decline in real wage costs enabled em-
ployment generation to display notable vigour in
1999. The high employment growth recorded by
QNA data was confirmed by other indicators,
such as the EPA and social security registra-
tions, which reflected an even stronger rise in
employment. Specifically, employment grew by
4.6 % according to the EPA, which is more than
one percentage point higher than the QNA fig-
ure (see Chart III.8). This difference, which was
much more pronounced than in previous years,
was largely due to the changes made to the
survey in January 1999 in order to adapt it to
the new harmonised European Labour Force
Survey(1). As a consequence of the improve-
ments made to the survey, the levels of employ-
ment estimated by the EPA have to a large ex-
tent converged with those according to the Na-
tional Accounts, although the rates of change of
the variables of this survey have been tem-
porarily distorted.
The expansion of employment and increase
in the labour force (1 %) recorded by the EPA in
1999 led to a reduction of almost three percent-
age points in the rate of unemployment, which
stood at 15.9 % in 1999 (15.4 % in Q4). Fur-
thermore, the participation rate for the popula-
tion between 16 and 64 years of age increased
by almost one percentage point to 63.9 %, step-
ping up convergence with European levels. The
increase in participation was particularly signifi-
cant in the case of women, where it rose to
more than 50 %, and among young people. De-
spite this, the reduction in the rate of unemploy-
ment was also largest in these groups. In the
case of women the unemployment rate was
three-and-a-half percentage points down on
1998, although it still stood at 23.3 %, which
was considerably higher than the male unem-
ployment rate (11.2 %). In the case of the under
30s, the unemployment rate fell by more than
five percentage points, to stand at around 25 %.
Other groups particularly hard hit by unemploy-
ment also saw their relative position improve.
The rate of long-term unemployment fell to 8 %,
to represent somewhat less than 50 % of all un-
employment. It should be noted that both wom-
en and young people and the long-term unem-
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(1) In application of Council Regulation (EC) No 577/98,
nd No 1571/98 which develops it.
ployed are the groups at which employment
promotion measures have been particularly
aimed. By level of education, the best results
were among those with secondary qualifica-
tions.
Both the QNA and the EPA show that, in net
terms, all the jobs created in 1999 were in de-
pendent employment. According to the survey,
the number of wage earners increased by 6.7% ,
while self-employment was down by 2.2 %. The
number of wage earners with permanent
contracts increased by 7 %, while those with
temporary contracts rose by 6 %, so that the
favourable effect of the measures to promote
stable employment introduced in 1997, and
backed up by concessions on social security
contributions for certain groups of newly-hired
workers, continued to be observed. These con-
cessions, which expired in May 1999, were ex-
tended to 31 December, although their size was
reduced by a different amount for each group.
The duration of the concessions remains two
years, except in the case of the over 45s, to
whom they apply as long as the contract lasts.
Despite this, the ratio of temporary to perma-
nent employment has only fallen by 0.2 per-
centage points, to stand at 32.8 %, and a fur-
ther increase was discerned in the rate of
turnover of temporary workers, as well as a re-
duction in the average duration of their con-
tracts (see Box III.2).
One of the main changes to labour market
regulations in 1999 was the new regulation of
part-time contracts, approved by Royal Legisla-
tive Decree 15/1998, which was intended to
stimulate the permanent variety of this form of
employment. In general, the new regulation de-
fines more strictly both what is meant by part-
time employment and the possibilities for dis-
tributing the working hours. Also, it raises the
level of social protection for these workers and
replaces overtime by supplementary hours, in
the permanent contract, abolishing it in the case
of the temporary contract. In addition, since
January 1999, there have been concessions on
social security payments for the same groups
as for other permanent contracts, while tempo-
rary hiring was penalised, with a rise in the un-
employment contribution rate. Although perma-
nent part-time contracts increased by 34.5 % in
1999, they continued to account for a very low
proportion of all contracts (1.5 %). The moder-
ate acceptance that the new stable part-time
contract seems to have had is probably the re-
sult of the excessive rigidity involved in the for-
ward planning of the working day and supple-
mentary hours during the year, although the lat-
ter are less expensive than overtime. According
to information supplied by the EPA, the percent-
age of part-time wage earners rose slightly in
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CHART III.8
Employment and unemployment
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    Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística and Banco de España.
   (a)   Non-centred year-on-year rates.
   (b)   Gross data.
   (c)   Labour Force Survey: adjusted for censual change 1995-96.
   (d)   Labour Force Survey.
   (e)   People unemployed for more than one year as a proportion of
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BOX III.2
The impact of measures to promote stable employment
Since 1996 a number of reforms have been introduced to encourage the hiring of workers on a permanent basis, to delimit the segments using temporary
employment contracts and to promote stable part-time employment. The measures to promote stable employment have mostly been designed to target partic-
ular groups of the population characterised by higher rates of unemployment and temporary employment: the under-30s, the long-term unemployed and the
over-45s. A special employment-promoting permanent contract has been established for these groups (in force from May 1997 to May 2001) with lower dis-
missal costs than under normal contracts and eligible for concessions on social security contributions that temporarily reduce labour costs further. This regime
is also being applied to temporary contracts signed prior to May 1998 that are
converted into permanent contracts, irrespective of the segment of population
concerned, and from that date to all contract conversions agreed through col-
lective bargaining. However, in the latter case, since January 2000, the conces-
sions have been granted more selectively (only for the conversion of appren-
ticeship, work-experience, training or stand-in contracts).
On Labour Force Survey (EPA) data, permanent employment has been
the decisive element in the expansion of dependent employment since 1996,
accounting for somewhat more than 70 % of the net employment created in
1999. Although this statistical source does not give figures for the number of
workers hired under employment-promoting permanent contracts, a preliminary
estimate indicates that, of the 1,078,500 permanent jobs created since the third
quarter of 1997, a very high percentage are based on stable-employment-pro-
moting contracts (around 14 % of all permanent employees). This new form of
contract has therefore had a relatively significant impact. The complementary
information provided by contract statistics confirms this estimate. From 1997
permanent contracts began to acquire importance. From representing 4 % in
1996, they amounted to 9.2 % in 1999, with a rate of growth of 25.5 % that year
(see adjoining table). As seen in the adjoining chart, a substantial increase in
employment-promoting contracts lies behind these overall figures, in the case
of both new contracts and, above all, converted contracts. In 1999, however,
there was a certain slowdown in the rate of growth of new employment-promot-
ing contracts, which became more pronounced in the first few months of 2000
and, in addition, there has been a loss of momentum in conversions of tempo-
rary into permanent contracts following the change in the rules governing con-
cessions.
In the period of 1997 to 1999 the ratio of temporary employment only de-
clined moderately (by one percentage point) to stand at 32.8 % in 1999, despite
the intense growth in permanent contracts, since temporary employment contin-
ued to grow strongly. In fact, according to the contract statistics, the share of
full-time temporary contracts rose during 1999, after two years of moderate de-
cline (see adjoining table). This outcome may have been the result of a certain
shift from part-time temporary employment, which has fallen significantly after
the entry into force of new regulations which, in comparison with the previous
situation, are more restrictive. As for the type of temporary contract, there has
been a shift towards task or services contracts, which are more flexible insofar
as the duration of the employment relationship is concerned. Although the cut in
the temporary employment ratio at the aggregate level has been small, it should
be noted that in the public sector the ratio of temporary employment rose by 1.6
percentage points in the 1999, while in the private sector there was a somewhat
more pronounced cut, of one percentage point. In addition, the chart shows
how the largest reductions have occurred in the groups most affected by this
situation: young people (with a temporary employment ratio of 56.2 %) and
women (with a ratio of 34.8 %). The gap between the sexes is now consider-
ably narrower, while significant differences persist across age groups.
In short, the measures implemented in recent years to promote stable
employment have had positive effects on employment, unemployment and tem-
porary employment within the groups targeted. However, the persistence of a
high temporary employment ratio at the aggregate level and the discernible
falling-off in employment-promoting contracts, suggests that there is room for
the reforms to be extended, using the employment-promoting contract formula
to target other groups that have considerable difficulty finding employment and
the core of firms which, due to their size and administrative set-up, continue to
account for most temporary employment.
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TOTAL CONTRACTS 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 13.5
Permanent 4.0 7.0 8.3 9.2 25.5
Full-time 2.7 5.8 7.1 7.7 23.9
Ordinary 2.4 1.6 1.5 1.7 24.0
Emp.-promoting 0.4 4.1 5.5 6.0 23.8
New 0.1 1.3 2.8 2.9 17.2
Converted 0.3 2.8 2.7 3.1 30.8
Part-time 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.5 34.5
Temporary 96.0 93.0 91.7 90.8 12.4
Full-time 78.4 74.6 72.6 74.1 15.7
Task 29.3 27.4 27.2 29.3 22.1
Casual 32.3 34.4 35.3 34.4 10.5
Substitution 10.1 7.1 5.0 5.4 20.9
Work-experience 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 –0.3
Training 2.1 1.5 1.3 1.2 4.5
Other 3.8 3.4 3.0 3.2 18.7
Part-time 17.6 18.4 19.0 16.7 –0.2
Sources: Instituto Nacional de Empleo and Newcronos.
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1999, to 8.2 %, although surprisingly this in-
crease is due to growth in the numbers of tem-
porary workers (13.6 %), those with permanent
contracts increasing by 1.9 %.
III.4. PRICES AND COSTS
In 1999, the main price indicators recorded
higher average growth rates than in a 1998.
Specifically, the CPI grew on average by 2.3 %,
as against 1.8 % in 1998, while the growth in
the final-demand and GDP deflators was 2.5 %
and 3.1 %, respectively (1.6 % and 2.3 %, in
1998). A large part of the rise in the inflation
rate in 1999 is attributable to exogenous fac-
tors, including the higher prices for energy prod-
ucts (and other commodities) on international
markets, the depreciation of the euro and the
adverse weather conditions. That said, the
strength of domestic demand was also con-
ducive to price rises.
On average in 1999, there was an accelera-
tion in both the domestic component of costs
and that associated with imported products,
which was somewhat more marked in the case
of the latter. As regards domestic costs, the dif-
ferent paths followed by labour costs and the
unit surplus should be noted. While the former
slowed, the growth rate of the latter rose con-
siderably. The slowdown in the unit labour cost
was the result of the moderate behaviour of
compensation per employee, which more than
offset the low growth in apparent labour produc-
tivity. The expansion of the unit surplus, mean-
while, was not generalised, since it contracted
in both industry (which is more exposed to for-
eign competition and where activity was at its
slackest in the year as a whole) and construc-
tion.
III.4.1. Costs and price formation
The final-demand deflator, as pointed out
above, grew by 2.5 % in 1999, 0.9 percentage
points more than in 1998. This acceleration,
which became stronger in the second half of the
year, when the year-on-year growth rate
reached 3.3 %, was the result of the upward
movement in the GDP deflator and, above all,
of the greater momentum of the imports deflator
which, notwithstanding this, continued on aver-
age during the year to display greater modera-
tion than the GDP deflator (Chart III.3). As can
be seen in Chart III.9, the heightened vigour of
the imports deflator in the second half of the
year was a consequence mainly of the upward
movement in oil prices on international markets,
which gave rise to a year-on-year increase of
79.5 % in the unit value index for imported en-
ergy products from the summer, as against a
decline of 9.8 % in the first half of the year. The
unit value indices for imported manufactures al-
so accelerated somewhat in the second half of
the year, although less sharply, while those for
non-energy commodities decreased to a lesser
extent. These results are in line with the pro-
gressive improvement in world activity during
the year, and with the depreciation of the euro
on the foreign exchange markets.
The GDP deflator posted growth of 3.1 % in
1999, 0.8 percentage points up on 1998. As
has been becoming normal in recent years, the
growth in this deflator, which incorporates the
taxes net of subsidies that are levied on output,
was greater than that of the GVA deflator
( 2 . 9%), which more closely approximates the
prices received by producers, although the lat-
ter also accelerated by 0.8 percentage points
with respect to 1998. The difference between
the growth rates of these two deflators reflects
the change in net taxes per unit of output,
which have been notably buoyant in recent
years, and particularly in 1999, when their
share in GDP rose by 0.7 percentage points.
This increase was primarily a consequence of
the strong growth in tax receipts, which oc-
curred despite there being no significant
changes in tax rates. Nor were any shifts in de-
mand towards products bearing a higher tax
burden detected.
As Table III.3 shows, the acceleration of the
GVA deflator in 1999 was a consequence of
stronger growth in the gross unit surplus, since
the growth rate of the cost of labour per unit of
value added fell by 0.2 percentage points, to
stand at 2.6 %. This led to a slight decrease in
the share of labour in GVA, although it was not
enough to wipe out the large increase in 1998.
The slowdown in labour costs stemmed from
the lower rate of growth of compensation per
employee, which fell from 2.8 % in 1998 to
2 . 4% in 1999. By contrast, value added per
person employed fell by 0.2 % for the second
year running, a phenomenon rarely observed in
the past. As indicated above, apparent labour
productivity, measured using GDP, also record-
ed low growth in 1999 (0.3 %), which was ab-
normally below its historical average.
The lower growth in compensation per em-
ployee in 1999 was confined to those industries
that make up the market sector of the economy,
since in non-market services, an aggregate
which basically includes general government,
the growth rate of compensation rose from
3 . 3% in 1998 to 4 % in 1999. The significant
public-sector wage drift implicit in these data
(civil servants’ basic pay rose by 1.8 %) is not
anomalous when compared with previous
70
years. However, it shows the need to tighten
control of this spending item, especially in terri-
torial government, where the phenomenon of
wage drift is most pronounced.
Compensation per employee in the market
sector slowed by 0.7 percentage points during
1999, to 1.9 %, although as the year elapsed
this loss of momentum became less marked, in
line with the increase in inflation. Very prelimi-
nary estimates of the growth of actual and im-
puted social contributions paid by employers in
1999 (items included in compensation per em-
ployee), seem to indicate that the slowdown of
gross wages and salaries was somewhat
greater than that of total compensation (by al-
most one percentage point), although their
growth rate would also have stood at 1.9 %.
This growth is well below that of wage rates in
the same year (2.4 %) and of total hourly earn-
ings as estimated by the Wages Survey (2.5% ) 
In any event, there was clearly a reduction in
wage drift in the private sector. This phe-
nomenon is associated with the high weight of
temporary employment and the increase in em-
ployee turnover, with the disappearance of se-
niority supplements in certain firms and with a
more intensive use of overtime, as already seen
in 1998.
As usual, the growth of wage rates across
industries was very uniform in 1999, the differ-
ences in the growth of total hourly earnings be-
ing more appreciable. Thus, while in services
the latter variable grew by 2.2 % and in industry
by 2.7 %, the increase in construction was 4 %.
Indeed, construction was the only industry in
which an increase in wage drift was recorded,
in line with the pick-up in its activity.
It should be pointed out that part of the wage
moderation in 1999 is attributable to the fact
that the inflation forecast initially established in
the budget (1.8 % for the December-on-Decem-
ber CPI), which was taken as reference in many
collective agreements and was used as the ba-
sis for determining the wage increases of civil
servants, was widely exceeded at the end of
the year. The overshooting of this forecast,
largely due to factors that were difficult to fore-
see when the budget was approved, triggered
the inflation-adjustment clauses included in
many of the agreements signed in 1999. Pay-
ments under these clauses are being paid in
the year 2000 and will be included in the com-
pensation for that year, although they arise from
wage bargaining in 1999.
Finally, the gross operating surplus per unit
of value added increased by 3.6 % in 1999, giv-
ing rise to a widening of margins (see Table
III.3). When estimating this variable, the com-
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TABLE III.3
Composition of final demand
and GDP deflators
Rate of change
Final demand deflator 2.9 2.4 1.6 2.5
Domestic component 2.4 0.5 0.9 1.3
GDP per unit of final demand –1.0 –1.7 –1.4 –1.8
GDP deflator 3.4 2.1 2.3 3.1
Import component 5.2 10.8 4.7 7.3
Imports per unit of final demand 4.5 6.9 5.4 6.6
Imports deflator 0.7 3.7 –0.6 0.7
GDP deflator 3.4 2.1 2.3 3.1
GVA deflator 3.3 1.9 2.1 2.9
Labour cost per unit of value added 2.9 1.8 2.8 2.6
Compensation per person employed 4.0 2.8 2.8 2.4
Value added per person employed 1.0 0.9 –0.1 –0.2
Gross operating surplus (a) 4.0 2.0 0.6 3.6
Taxes on goods (b) 6.5 7.7 7.4 11.3
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Share of net taxes in GDP 8.8 9.3 9.5 10.2
Share of income from work in GVA 66.5 66.5 67.0 66.8
ULCs (with GDP per person employed) 2.8 1.6 2.6 2.0
Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística and Banco de España.
( a ) Per unit of value added. Includes other taxes on production.
(b) Net of subsidies and per unit of output.
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   (a)   Goods imports unit value index.
pensation attributed to self-employed workers
(which matches compensation per employee)
was excluded, but the taxes on production net
of subsidies that are included in value added at
basic prices were maintained. When these tax-
es net of subsidies are also excluded, the
growth of the unit surplus rises to 3.9 %. It
should be noted that the concessions with re-
spect to social contributions –to promote stable
employment– are considered subsidies on pro-
duction. In any event, the growth in the unit sur-
plus must have been affected by the strength of
demand in the last two years. As seen in the
following section, this widening of margins at
the aggregate level did not extend to all indus-
tries.
III.4.2. Price formation across industries
The purpose of this section is to give an
overview of the price formation process industry
by industry (except in financial and non-market
services). The indicators used combine infor-
mation on the final prices set by firms (exclud-
ing taxes) and on their variable costs. More-
over, the variable costs include both those at-
tributable to the labour factor and those at-
tributable to inputs. The latter were of particular
interest in 1999, when the prices of energy
products increased considerably.
In agriculture, final prices fell in 1999 as a
whole, by somewhat more than in 1998. This
decline in selling prices, which was more pro-
nounced in the case of goods for export, is ex-
plained both by the reduction in variable costs
and by the lower demand pressure in this in-
dustry. The reduction in variable costs over the
year as a whole, which enabled unit margins to
rise slightly, was a consequence of the sharp
slowdown in unit labour costs, stemming from
both greater wage moderation and a larger in-
crease in productivity. As seen in Chart III.10,
intermediate costs accelerated during 1999
– driven by higher energy prices– and pushed
up total costs.
The final prices of energy products acceler-
ated sharply in 1999, recording a growth rate of
over 6 %. This increase was much greater in
the case of exported products. However, it
should be noted that electricity is the most im-
portant product among those produced for the
domestic market, and its prices decreased as a
consequence of measures taken to liberalise
the sector, while only oil products are exported,
and their prices also surged on domestic mar-
kets. Undoubtedly, the acceleration in the final
prices of this industry was the result of an even
greater acceleration in its variable costs, of
which the most significant component is import-
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   (a)   Year-on-year rate of change based on trend.
   (b)   Excluding the distributive trade.
ed crude oil. Over the year as a whole, unit
margins narrowed.
In manufacturing, final prices grew at stable
moderate rates, although they accelerated as
the year elapsed, with no significant difference
between domestic and export prices in 1999 as
a whole. This behaviour was similar to that of fi-
nal prices, in pesetas, for equivalent products
on international markets. Variable costs grew at
higher rates than final prices, so that unit mar-
gins continued to narrow. Among variable
costs, labour costs decelerated, as a conse-
quence of the lower growth of wages. Inputs, by
contrast, accelerated owing to the behaviour of
energy prices, although these products account
for only 4.5 % of variable costs. At a more dis-
aggregated level, the reduction in margins did
not extend to all industries. In wood, transport
material and rubber and plastics margins
widened, and in food they were unchanged.
The link between consumer prices and out-
put and goods import prices can be seen in the
distributive trade, its gross earnings margin be-
ing roughly equal to the difference between
them. In 1999, the growth rate of selling prices
in this industry rose markedly, particularly in the
case of energy products. The costs of purchas-
ing these goods also accelerated, but to a less-
er extent, since import prices grew moderately
on average during the year. This enabled the
gross earnings margin to increase, against a
background of sustained private consumption
buoyancy. The increase in the gross earnings
margin was passed through to the operating
margin since, despite accelerating significantly,
labour costs in this industry grew by less than
selling prices.
In construction, the growth rate of prices
rose sharply during 1999 without any widening
in unit margins, since variable costs accelerated
to the same extent. This acceleration stemmed
from unit labour costs, owing to the larger in-
crease in wages and the strong decline in pro-
ductivity. The growth rates of inputs held
steady, given the low weight of energy products
in this industry.
Finally, the growth rate of the prices of mar-
ket services remained unchanged in 1999,
while their variable costs accelerated. However,
the latter continued to grow at a lower rate than
prices, so that the gross unit margin widened,
against a background of increasingly buoyant
activity. The acceleration in variable costs
stemmed from inputs, since the growth rate of
unit labour costs fell significantly. The increase
in intermediate costs was very much greater
than in other industries (except energy), since
the weight of energy products is highest. The
widening of margins in services did not extend
to all sub-sectors, and they declined in commu-
nications and in other services. The liberalisa-
tion measures and tariff authorisation policy im-
plemented in these industries undoubtedly ex-
plain these declines, and clearly show their ef-
fectiveness in reducing inflationary pressures.
III.4.3. Final demand deflators
The acceleration of the final demand defla-
tor, which has been analysed from the view-
point of price formation in the previous section,
extended to all its components on the expendi-
ture side, with the sole exception of exports.
The exports deflator grew at a lower rate than in
1998, although it also accelerated during the
year.
The private consumption deflator grew by
2.8 % in 1999, 0.8 percentage points up on
1998. This growth exceeded that of the CPI
(2.3 %), its main short-term indicator, although
both displayed a profile of acceleration, as seen
in Chart III.11. The difference between these
two measures of inflation in private consump-
tion lies, as usual in recent years, in the differ-
ent systems used to weight their components.
In particular, the hotel and restaurant headings
(which include food outside the home) have a
higher weighting in the deflator than in the CPI,
while food, beverages and tobacco (food con-
sumed at home) have a lower weight. More-
over, rentals also have a higher weight in the
deflator, since the CPI does not include the im-
puted rentals paid by owner-occupiers. A large
part of the difference between the rates of
change of these indices is explained by the
higher growth in the items that are given a high-
er weighting in the deflator.
The CPI grew by 2.9 % during 1999, com-
pared with a 12-month rate of 1.4 % in Decem-
ber 1998. This pick-up was mainly a conse-
quence of the rises in energy products and pro-
cessed foods. Nonetheless, some of the mea-
sures customarily used to determine the under-
lying growth of consumer prices also displayed
an upward trend during the year (see Box III.3).
Meanwhile, a number of measures were taken
by the government during the year that had an
immediate impact on the CPI growth rate (see
Table III.4). These measures, adopted in the
broader framework of structural reform policy to
improve and liberalise the workings of the econ-
omy, had an estimated overall impact on the
12-month growth rate of the CPI of about 0.2
percentage points.
In 1999, the energy prices component of the
CPI grew by 3.3 % on average (9.4 % in Q4),
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seven percentage points up on the previous
year. This rise is in line with that seen in energy
output prices, after taking into account the dif-
ferences in the coverage of these two indices.
In the case of processed food, prices rose by
2 . 1 %, in 1999 as a whole, 0.8 percentage
points more than in 1998. These prices acceler-
ated during the year primarily as a result of the
rise in oil and wine prices. By contrast, the
prices of processed food slowed, recording an
increase of 1.2 %, which was higher than the in-
crease in farm-gate prices. Finally, the moder-
ate growth of the prices of non-energy industrial
goods was sustained, while the average annual
growth rate of service prices slowed by 0.2 per-
centage points, the growth rate of the former re-
maining well below that of the latter (1.5 %
against 3.4 %). In the case of industrial goods,
both the producer price index (PPI) for this type
of goods and the import unit value indices
recorded a slowdown in their annual average
rates. In the case of services, the moderate
growth of their variable costs has already been
mentioned.
The deflator of general-government final
consumption expenditure grew by 3.6 % in
1999, one percentage point up on 1998. All its
components picked up somewhat, but the
largest contribution came from the compensa-
tion of general-government employees, owing
to the notable wage drift mentioned above.
The deflator that accelerated most in 1999
was undoubtedly that of gross fixed capital for-
mation, which recorded growth of 3.7 %, as
against 1.2 % in the previous year. The growth
of capital goods prices was somewhat lower
(2.8 %) than that in construction (4.1 %), al-
though the acceleration on 1998 was greater.
These developments are in line with the be-
haviour of import prices, since the growth rate
of domestic prices remained unchanged. In the
case of construction, both the indicator of civil
engineering costs, which accelerated over the
course of the year, and housing prices, which
held at a high rate of growth (of around 10 %),
explain the strong rise in the deflator, which ex-
ceeded that of other final demand components.
Finally, the deflator of goods and services
exports was the only one to slow slightly in
1999 on average, with a growth rate of 0.4 %.
This loss of momentum stemmed from the
goods component, since the growth rate of the
deflator of services exports, consisting essen-
tially of tourism, increased. In fact, the deflator
of goods exports fell by 0.4 %, in line with the
unit value index, although it displayed a profile
of acceleration over the year. It is perhaps sur-
prising that, in a year in which international
prices were somewhat more inflationary and in
74
CHART III.11
Final demand deflators (a)
0
1
2
3
4
5
1996 1997 1998 1999
0
1
2
3
4
5 DEFLATOR
CPI
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION
% %
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1996 1997 1998 1999
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12 DEFLATOR
 CIVIL ENGINEERING WORKS
COSTS INDICATOR
 AVERAGE PRICE OF APPRAISED
HOUSING <1 YEAR
GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION IN CONSTRUCTION
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
1996 1997 1998 1999
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
 DEFLATOR
 IPI   CAPITAL GOODS
 IUVI (b)  CAPITAL GOODS
GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION IN CAPITAL GOODS
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
1996 1997 1998 1999
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
 DEFLATOR
 EUVI (b)
GOODS EXPORTS
 Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Banco de España and
Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda.
   (a)   Year-on-year rates of change based on the trend.
   (b)   IUVI and EUVI are the import and export unit value indices,
respectively (1995=100).
75
BOX III.3
Underlying inflation in 1999
In 1999, the year-on-year growth rate of the CPI rose
significantly, from 1.4 % in December 1998 to 2.9 % twelve
months later. A large part of this increase was due to the
surge in the prices of oil products from the spring of last
year. Nonetheless, given that the CPI is the indicator most
widely used to monitor the economy’s inflation rate, it is im-
portant to determine to what extent this behaviour may be
considered to be isolated and transitory or to be accompa-
nied by a more general upward movement in prices. Gen-
erally, the concept of underlying inflation is resorted to
when responding to this type of question. This specifically
tries to identify the trend in the general level of prices, elim-
inating the effects of transitory movements in individual
prices on the observed rate of inflation. However, the fact
that underlying inflation is a concept that is difficult to pin-
point means that there are several measures that attempt
to approximate it. These do not always give the same re-
sults and should be assessed jointly.
A first approximation of underlying inflation is the in-
dex of non-energy processed goods and service prices
(IPSEBENE), i.e. the CPI excluding the components (ener-
gy and unprocessed food) that are considered to be the
most variable. As seen in the adjoining chart, the profile
displayed by the IPSEBENE during 1999 was almost the
opposite of that of the CPI, especially in the second half of
the year when it slowed moderately. Overall, the
IPSEBENE was more stable than the CPI, staying within
the range of 2.2 % to 2.5 %, which would imply that the
sharp acceleration in the general index was the result of
isolated movements of certain prices, downwards at the
beginning of the year and upwards from the third quarter.
Other measures of underlying inflation, however, dis-
played profiles closer to that of the CPI during 1999. The
mean of the CPI trimmed by 10 % (which excludes the
items of the index which recorded the largest and smallest
price increases, corresponding to 5 % of the weight of the
index at each extreme) accelerated markedly, although not
as strongly as the general index. A detailed analysis of the
items excluded from the calculation of the trimmed mean
reveals that most of the energy items were excluded al-
most throughout 1999 (at the beginning of the year due to
their negative 12-month rates and subsequently due to
their very high rates). Olive oil and hotels and restaurants,
whose prices had a strongly expansionary component last
year, were also excluded, as were a number of industrial
goods (personal computers, books, television sets) whose
prices, by contrast, displayed extremely moderate be-
haviour. Note that many of these items do not belong to the
components considered most variable.
Nonetheless, little stability is observed in the items ex-
cluded from the top and bottom ends of the spectrum when
calculating the trimmed mean: only one of the eight items
excluded as being the most inflationary in January 1999
(table wine) was still in this category in December, as were only two of the nine excluded as being the most moderate (poultry
meat and personal computers). Meanwhile, four items moved from one extreme to the other, including edible oils and fuels (as
mentioned above). In any event, these products having been removed, the trimmed mean recorded a rising trend over the year,
exceeding the inflation rates indicated by the IPSEBENE by the end of the period.
Another way of approximating underlying inflation is to estimate such measures with structural VAR models, which use the
information provided by the changes in both prices and output. Following the methodology established by Blanchard and Quah,
a joint GDP/CPI model has been estimated for the Spanish economy from which two measures of inflation can be obtained:
permanent inflation, which incorporates only those disturbances with lasting effects on prices, and core inflation, which incorpo-
rates those disturbances to inflation that have no long-run effects on output. It should be pointed out that the level of inflation in-
dicated by these measures is fixed arbitrarily, only its profile being relevant. As seen in the chart, both core and permanent in-
flation display a rising profile during 1999, especially marked in the first half of the year, showing the impact of expansionary
factors of a permanent and general nature on the inflation rate.
In all, the various measures of underlying inflation analysed above show, either the persistence of relatively high inflation
rates (IPSEBENE), or else an upward movement in the inflation rate during 1999, partly reversing the improvement that the
same measures had identified in 1998 (trimmed mean and core and permanent inflation).
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which the euro fell significantly, export prices
did not grow by more. The explanation is to be
found in the orientation of goods exports, both
in terms of the geographical areas in which they
are concentrated (the euro area) and in terms
of the product sold (medium and low-technolo-
gy), which were subject to severe price compe-
tition on international markets. In the case of
tourism, the growth of its deflator must have re-
flected, in part, the notable and sustained buoy-
ancy of the demand for these services.
III.5. GENERAL GOVERNMENT
ACTIVITY
The impact of general government activity
on the behaviour of other sectors of the Span-
ish economy in 1999 and its contribution to de-
mand, activity and price developments have
been described in the foregoing sections. It is
now necessary to analyse what consequences
this general government activity has had for the
consolidation of government finances.
The 1999 budget set a target of 0.5 percent-
age points for the reduction in the general gov-
ernment borrowing requirement (to achieve a
deficit, defined in terms of the ESA-79 account-
ing framework, of 1.6 %). The budget figures
were based on a macroeconomic scenario con-
ducive to reducing the general government bor-
rowing requirement. This scenario was charac-
terised by real GDP growth of 3.8 %, under-
pinned by more buoyant domestic demand,
high employment generation and an increase in
consumer prices during the year of 1.8 %. On
the provisional figures available (see Table
III.5), the general government borrowing re-
quirement in 1999 stood finally at 1.1 % of
GDP, as against a 2.6 % deficit in 1998 (both
measured in accordance with the ESA-95 ac-
counting framework). This was against a back-
drop of an economic performance not far off
that initially forecast in terms of growth and em-
ployment, although the increase in consumer
prices was significantly higher.
Besides the risk associated with economic
growth being lower than in the budget scenario
(a risk which, as has just been pointed out, did
not materialise in 1999), there was another ele-
ment of uncertainty at the beginning of 1999
that might have curtailed the planned cut in the
general government borrowing requirement.
This concerned the impact on revenue of the
comprehensive reform of personal income taxa-
tion. As explained in more detail later in this
section, the partial information available sug-
gests that there was a moderate loss of person-
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TABLE III.4
Application of measures in 1999 with immediate effects on prices
— Telephony: former monopoly’s rates
• Connection charge In May, 5 %-10 %.
• Local calls In November, 13 % on average.
• Provincial calls In June, 6.5 %; in November, 4.36 %.
• Inter-provincial calls In June, 10.56 %; in November, 17.56%.
• International calls In June, 6.19 %; in December, 6.68 %.
• Landline-to-mobile calls In June, 6.4 %-15.4 %.
• Digital line rental In May, 5 %.
• Analogue mobile phone interconnection In July, 10 % cut in maximum level and elimination
of minimum limit.
— Electricity
• Tariff (domestic users) In January, 2.5 %; in April, 1.5 %.
• Tariff for third-party access to electricity In January, 25 %.
transport and distribution
— Natural gas: revision of maximum price formula In May.
— Butane canister: maximum price In May, 1.4 %; in October, 15 % and elimination for one
year of maximum price system.
— Drugs
• Distributor’s margin for normal packaging In May, from 11 % to 9.6 %.
• Prescription drug prices above PTA 558 From 15 September, between 4.6 % and 10%.
— Fees of notaries-public and registrars of In April, 25%.
mortgaged property and of house
sales/purchases
— Costs of company registration in Mercantile In April, 25%.
Registries
Measure Reduction
al-income-tax revenue, in line with the official
estimates supplied in the December 1998 Sta-
bility Programme.
It is important to point out that the change in
the accounting framework, from ESA 79 to ESA
95, gives rise to certain difficulties when making
comparisons between the results observed and
what was programmed in National Accounts
terms (see Box III.4 for a detailed explanation of
the changes). That said, any assessment of the
results observed in 1999 can also draw on the
cash-basis State budget data. According to the
latter, the 1999 budget outturn was a deficit of
ESP 1,057 billion, which was around PTA 360
billion less than initially forecast and 5.1 % be-
low the 1998 outturn. This outcome was due to
the better-than-expected behaviour of revenue
(tax revenue, in particular), since expenditure
rose by slightly more than budgeted. Here, it is
again necessary to note a relatively high vol-
ume of changes to State spending appropria-
tions (around ESP 875 billion), although these
were somewhat less in 1998 and were partly
used for the debt conversion operations carried
out during the year.
This improvement on the 1999 results was
also apparent in the data published for general
government as a whole in National Accounts
terms, despite the changes and modifications
that may have been occasioned by the intro-
duction of ESA 95. As seen in Chart III.12, the
reduction in the deficit in 1999 continued to
stem primarily from expenditure moderation, al-
though tax receipts also played a prominent
role in reducing net borrowing. The reduction in
the public deficit in 1999 was 1.5 percentage
points of GDP, of which 0.4 points were at-
tributable to the increase in total receipts and
the other 1.1 points to the fall in total expendi-
ture. As general government capital expendi-
ture rose by around 0.2 percentage points (in
line with the Spanish economy’s real-conver-
gence requirements), the decline in current ex-
penditure totalled 1.3 percentage points of
GDP. Of these, 0.7 points were attributable to
the decline in public-debt interest payments, so
that there was also a notable contraction in pri-
mary current spending (which excludes interest
payments) of nearly 0.6 percentage points of
GDP.
On the revenue side, the notable growth in
indirect tax receipts should be mentioned. Rev-
enue from taxes on products grew at rates of
8.2 %, bolstered partly by the increase in
receipts from taxes on hydrocarbons and on
certain means of transport, reflecting the buoy-
ancy of new car registrations and fuel con-
sumption. However, the main element deter-
mining the profile of tax revenue in 1999 was
the strong increase in VAT receipts (up by
more than 17 %), which cannot be fully ex-
plained by their main determinants, namely
domestic consumption, imports and purchases
of new dwellings. The increase in indirect tax
revenues in 1999 contributed about 0.6 per-
centage points of GDP to the reduction in the
deficit. Some of the acceleration in receipts
from taxes on production and consumption can
be explained by the strong increase in energy
prices last year, as well as by the path of
household consumption expenditure. However,
the only explanation for the vigorous growth
recorded is a certain surfacing of irregular eco-
nomic activity. This hypothesis would also be
consistent with the growth in personal income
tax revenue and, in particular, with the increase
in the number of Social Security registrations
last year.
As regards personal income tax, the data
available show that during 1999 there was no
ignificant reduction in the funds raised by this
tax. This must have been partly thanks to the
significant generation of dependent employ-
ment recorded last year and to the related im-
pact on tax withheld from pay. The 7.4 %
growth rate for total receipts from income and
wealth taxes (the only National Accounts infor-
mation available on direct taxation) reflects, as
in other years, very strong growth in corporate
income tax, which seems to have easily made
up for the practical stagnation of personal in-
come tax revenue. In any event, it is estimated
that the overall impact of general government
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TABLE III.5
Main general government non-financial transactions
(ESA 95)
% of GDP
Total revenue 39.3 39.6 39.6 40.0
Current revenue 37.9 38.2 38.3 38.8
Taxes on production and imports 10.2 10.5 11.1 11.7
Taxes on income and wealth 10.3 10.5 10.3 10.3
Social contributions 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2
Other revenue(a) 4.2 4.0 3.7 3.6
Capital revenue 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3
Total expenditure 44.3 42.7 42.2 41.1
Current expenditure 39.1 37.8 37.1 35.8
Final consumption expenditure 18.0 17.6 17.4 17.1
Social benefits in cash 13.8 13.4 13.0 12.6
Actual interest payments 5.4 4.8 4.4 3.7
Subsidies 1.0 0.9 1.2 1.2
Other transfers 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3
Capital spending 5.1 5.0 5.1 5.3
Gross capital formation (b) 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.4
Other expenditure 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.9
Net lending (+)/borrowing (–) –5.0 –3.2 –2.6 –1.1
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Primary balance 0.4 1.6 1.8 2.5
Gross debt 68.0 66.7 64.9 63.5
Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística and Banco de España.
( a ) Includes fixed capital consumption.
( b ) Includes net acquisition of non-financial non-produced assets.
1996 1997 1998 1999
last year (through the interplay of benefits and
taxes) would explain around 0.7 percentage
points of the nominal growth in household dis-
posable income (6.4 %), as compared with only
0.2 percentage points in 1998.
Similarly, the sharp increase in the total
number of persons registered with the Social
Security System would explain the positive
growth in revenue from contributions, which
rose by 7.3 % in 1999 (against 6.2 % in 1998),
given that contribution rates remained practical-
ly unchanged and only the bases of calculation
of certain groups were increased. In particular,
the total number of persons registered grew by
5 . 5% in 1999, thanks to the growth in regis-
tered employees and, among these, the sharp
increase in those in the construction sector
( 1 6 . 8% up on 1998). This growth in revenue
from social contributions largely explains the
turnaround in the Social Security System’s non-
financial transactions balance from a deficit of
0.1 % of GDP in 1998 to a surplus of 0.2 % in
1999.
As mentioned above, it was primarily
through developments on the expenditure side
that the public deficit was contained in 1999,
with notable reductions in expenditure on pub-
lic-debt interest payments. These savings were
attributable to the debt-conversion policy (which
was particularly significant in 1998) and to the
recent lengthening of the average life of debt
(from 3.7 years at the beginning of 1998 to 5.3
years at end-1999). As a result, the average im-
plicit interest rate on all outstanding general
government debt was significantly reduced in
1999 to stand at 6 % (6.9 % in 1998), practical-
ly one percentage point below the nominal GDP
growth rate. Two other items also helped to re-
duce total spending: general government final
consumption expenditure fell relative to GDP,
and social benefits moderated somewhat.
In 1999, general government final consump-
tion expenditure declined notably relative to
nominal GDP (by around 0.3 percentage
points), although there was a deterioration over
the year with respect to the initial estimates for
this component of expenditure. The information
available during the first three quarters of 1999
indicated notable control over this expenditure,
with relatively low nominal growth rates of close
to 4.5 %. However, the incorporation at the end
of the year of the provisional territorial govern-
ment figures raised these initial estimates to an
average rate of 5.5 %, for general government
as a whole, due to higher growth of compensa-
tion of employees and of intermediate con-
sumption. This expenditure therefore accelerat-
ed in 1999 (with respect to the 4.7 % growth
recorded in 1998), highlighting the importance
of stronger budget discipline mechanisms and
of co-ordination between central and territorial
government.
Finally, the reduction in spending on social
benefits (by 0.4 percentage points of GDP) was
primarily due to the moderate growth in the
number of pensions paid in 1999 (1.1 % against
1.5 % in 1998) and the significant saving on un-
employment benefit, which fell by around two
percentage points of GDP. This was prompted
by the notable reduction in the number of recip-
ients (9.5 %), which was nonetheless smaller
than the fall in registered non-agricultural unem-
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CHART III.12
Breakdown of the change in the general
government deficit (ESA 95)
   Sources: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, and Banco de España.
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BOX III.4
ESA 95 and measurement of the general government deficit
As announced in Box IV.1 of the 1998 Annual report,
the March 2000 deficit and public-debt notification, submit-
ted under the Excessive Deficit Procedure/Stability and
Growth Pact (EDP/SGP), was based on the conceptual
framework established by the European System of Nation-
al and Regional Accounts (ESA 95) and its supplementary
provisions. The application of these provisions has in-
volved new estimates of the deficit and debt of Spanish
general government for the years 1995 to 1998, which dif-
fer from those included in the notification sent to the Com-
mission in September 1999, which were based on ESA 79
and its supplementary provisions. The March 2000 notifica-
tion also included data for 1999, a year for which no calcu-
lations have been made in terms of ESA 79(1).
The adjoining table gives estimates of the public
deficit for the period 1995-1998, in terms of both conceptu-
al frameworks. The main differences are explained by the
new criteria established for the time of recording of interest,
by the fact that the accounting dividends paid by the Banco
de España to the Treasury (which arise from net capital
gains) are considered not to reduce the deficit and by the
changes in the definition of the general government sector.
These differences are reflected both in the determination of
the non-financial transactions of general government and
in that of their financial counterpart. It is important to take
into account that, in relative terms, the ratios of the new variables to GDP are also affected by the upward revision of this ag-
gregate following the introduction of ESA 95.
The differences arising from the different criterion applied to the recording of interest are not only due to interest being
recorded at the time of accrual (ESA 95) rather than at the time of payment (ESA 79). Also, some of the financial costs that
were previously not considered to be interest are now included as such(2). As a consequence of these methodological
changes, significant differences can be discerned in the adjoining chart in the path of interest costs according to ESA 79 (under
which their absolute value is lower and much more erratic) and ESA 95, under which the level is higher and the path much
smoother.
The differences in the determination of the public deficit which appear in the table due to the new recording of payments
from the Banco de España to the Treasury are not strictly due to any conceptual difference between ESA 79 and ESA 95, but
rather to the fact that there has now been a clarification (published in the manual cited in Footnote 1) as to how these transac-
tions should be recorded. Specifically, the adjustment is intended to make it clear that in the National Accounts dividends can-
not incorporate the result of realised capital gains, since these operations do not involve the generation of income, but rather a
change in the valuation of the assets of the unit affected.
As regards the definition of the sector, the main changes arising from ESA 95 have involved the inclusion of units previ-
ously classified as public enterprises. Their effect on the deficit has been small (see adjoining table), but their impact on the val-
uation of public debt has been more significant, entailing an average increase in its absolute value of approximately EUR 3 bil-
lion in each of the years from 1995 to 1998. However, as a percentage of GDP, debt is from 0.3 to 0.5 percentage points lower
than under ESA 79, due to the higher value of nominal GDP under ESA 95, as mentioned above. The level of public debt at
end-1999 was 63.5 % of GDP, as against 63.8 % in 1995.
Finally, it should be taken into account that a draft Council and Parliament Regulation is currently being debated in the Eu-
ropean Parliament which is intended to clarify the principles for recording taxes and social contributions under ESA 95. The pur-
pose of this draft is to avoid the recording of unpaid taxes and contributions. When the current legal process is concluded it will
be possible to assess whether the estimates now available for the deficit are affected and, if so, to what extent.
Interest burden. State issues
(Originally issued in pesetas/euro)
   Source: Banco de España.
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twelve months of the initial placement, were not considered interest. Such premiums/discounts were considered instead to be capital gains/losses.
General government deficit according to the EDP/SGP
% of GDP
1. September 1999 notification (ESA 79) –7.1 –4.5 –2.5 –1.7 …
2. March 2000 notification (ESA 95) –6.6 –5.0 –3.2 –2.6 –1.1
3. Differences (2 – 1). Non-financial transactions 0.5 –0.4 –0.7 –0.9 …
Adjustment for different time of recording of interest 0.1 –0.5 –0.5 –0.5 …
Adjustment for different recording of Banco de España dividends 0.3 0.1 –0.1 –0.3 …
Adjustments for changes in definition and other adjustments 0.0 –0.1 –0.2 –0.1 …
Effect of the change in GDP 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 …
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
GDP at market prices (GNP Directive) (ESA 79) (PTA bn) 71,771.2 75,953.2 80,465.0 85,591.5 …
GDP at market prices ESA 95 (PTA bn) 72,841.7 77,113.4 81,782.0 86,968.5 93,068.3
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
ployment (counting only those previously em-
ployed) of 11.7 %. As a result, the net eligibility
ratio rose to 63.5 % (61.9 % in 1998).
The results recorded in 1999 are a good
starting point for making headway in 2000 in the
necessary process of consolidation of Spain’s
public finances, which should continue to be re-
flected in further increases in the primary sur-
plus. The updated Spanish Stability Pro-
gramme, presented at the beginning of 2000,
set a deficit target for the year of 0.8 % of GDP,
as against an estimate of 1.3 % for 1999, which
as already mentioned was subsequently re-
vised down. The macroeconomic scenario un-
derlying these targets is in line with the official
forecasts used in the preparation of the 2000
budget (real GDP growth of 3.7 %). Current
forecasts point to higher growth (probably over
4 %) which should facilitate the attainment of
the targets set and permit more rapid progress
than initially planned towards a balanced bud-
get.
III.6. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
AND CAPITAL ACCOUNT OF
THE INSTITUTIONAL SECTORS
As implied by the analysis in the previous
section, the reduction in the public deficit in
1999 gave rise to a significant increase in gen-
eral government saving. However, this improve-
ment in public saving was offset by lower sav-
ing on the part of firms and households, whose
consumption expenditure remained highly
buoyant throughout the year. The saving ratio
of the economy thus remained unchanged at
around 24 % of GDP. Meanwhile, the strength
of investment by households and firms resulted
in a significant rise in the economy’s investment
ratio, which approached levels of 25 % of GDP.
For the third year running investment rose as a
percentage of GDP, driven by the extended up-
swing in the Spanish economy, with rates of
growth of close to 4 % in this period. As seen in
Chart III.13, the buoyancy of investment and
the stable saving ratio first of all reduced the
economy’s net lending (in 1998), which subse-
quently turned into net borrowing by the nation
(in 1999).
The balance of payments figures reflected
the change from a situation of net lending by
the economy to one of net borrowing. According
to these figures, the overall deficit on current
and capital account amounted to EUR 5,414
million in 1999, a significant change given the
surplus of EUR 3,082 million in 1998. This re-
sult stemmed from the progressive widening of
the current deficit as the year unfolded, set
against the smaller improvement in the capital
account surplus. In terms of GDP, the overall
balance on current and capital account stood at
–1 % of GDP (2), compared with an average
surplus of 0.6 % in 1998 (see Table III.6 and
Chart III.14).
The widening of the current account deficit
was a consequence of the significant deteriora-
tion in the balance of goods and services trade,
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CHART III.13
Saving, investment and net lending (+)
or borrowing (–) of the nation
   Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística  and Banco de España.
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( 2 ) This figure does not exactly coincide with national
net borrowing, in National Accounts terms, which is provi-
sionally estimated at –0.6 % of GDP in 1999.
given the weakness of sales of merchandise
abroad in the first few months of the year and
the sustained high growth rates of imports, bol-
stered by the buoyant demand. The growth dif-
ferential between goods exports and imports in
real terms was significant, though even more so
in nominal terms, since in 1999 there was a
marked deterioration in the terms of trade, due
to the impact of dearer energy on import prices.
The excellent results recorded by tourism re-
ceipts, which rose by 13.7 %, and the conse-
quent improvement in the tourism surplus could
only partly make up for the notable widening of
the merchandise deficit.
As for other current transactions, in 1999, as
in preceding years, the income deficit continued
to increase, due to the fall in receipts, while
payments grew moderately. The fall in invest-
ment income receipts was closely linked to the
decline in the reserve assets of the Banco de
España, which led to a significant fall in the re-
turns received by the credit system. By con-
trast, the receipts of the non-financial private
sector sustained high growth rates, in line with
the expansion in the external assets of Spanish
firms. As regards payments, those correspond-
ing to the credit system remained practically un-
changed, due to the reduced buoyancy of for-
eign investment in the form of short-term de-
posits, while those made by general govern-
ment accelerated reflecting the increase in ac-
quisitions of public debt by non-residents. There
was a slight decline in the current transfers sur-
plus, stemming from the deterioration in the
general government balance, which was essen-
tially due to an increase in the payments corre-
sponding to VAT Resource and additional GNP
Resource (in both cases to finance the EU bud-
get).
Finally, the surplus on capital account (which
basically reflects capital transfers between the
EU and Spain) increased as a consequence of
the notable increase in receipts from the ERDF
and the EAGGF-Guidance.
The negative balance on current and capital
account shows that the level of saving in the
economy was not sufficient to finance the in-
vestment made in 1999. A sectoral breakdown
of the information shows that the increase in the
general government saving ratio translated into
a notable fall in its net borrowing, but that this
was insufficient to offset the significant fall in
the net lending of the private sector (see Chart
III.13). These developments mean that there
has been a significant change with respect to
the previous cyclical expansion. Then, general
government net borrowing held practically un-
changed, and even rose in some years, while in
the current expansion public spending has con-
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CHART III.14
Current- and capital-account balances
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TABLE III.6
Balance of payments: summary table
% of GDP
Current account 28.3 31.5 32.4 31.9
Goods 16.9 19.1 19.2 18.6
Services 7.3 7.9 8.5 9.0
Tourism 4.5 4.8 5.1 5.4
Other services 2.8 3.1 3.3 3.5
Income 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.1
Current transfers 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.2
Capital account 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.4
Current account 28.2 31.1 32.9 34.1
Goods 19.6 21.5 22.8 23.6
Services 3.9 4.4 4.7 5.1
Tourism 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9
Other services 3.1 3.6 3.8 4.2
Income 3.3 3.6 3.8 3.7
Current transfers 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.7
Capital account 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2
Current account 0.1 0.5 –0.5 –2.2
Goods –2.7 –2.4 –3.5 –4.9
Services 3.4 3.6 3.8 3.9
Tourism 3.7 4.0 4.3 4.5
Other services –0.4 –0.4 –0.5 –0.7
Income –1.0 –1.2 –1.3 –1.6
Current transfers 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5
Capital account 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Overall balance on current
and capital account 1.2 1.6 0.6 –1.0
Source: Banco de España.
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tracted considerably (in the context of the re-
quirements of the Stability Pact) leading to a re-
duction in general government net borrowing as
a percentage of GDP.
As regards the firms sector, there was an
ongoing fall in its net lending, which turned neg-
ative in 1999 (to the extent of around –1.5 % of
GDP) due to the buoyancy of gross fixed capital
formation in recent years, together with the
smooth decline in the saving ratio. However,
the healthy financial position of firms at the be-
ginning of the current upswing and the positive
performance of funds generated have allowed
them to finance the increase in their productive
capacity without a significant increase in their
net borrowing, at least to 1999.
With regard to household net lending, the
downward trend that has prevailed since 1995
continued in 1999, owing to higher growth in
private consumption than in disposable income
(and to the consequent reduction in the house-
hold saving ratio) and to the growth in purchas-
s of dwellings. As already mentioned, the ex-
pansion of disposable income, the decline in in-
terest rates, the revaluation of financial wealth
and the favourable climate of confidence
among Spanish households are the factors that
sustained their spending.
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CHAPTER IV
SPANISH FINANCIAL MARKETS,
INTERMEDIARIES AND FLOWS
IV.1. INTRODUCTION
As indicated in previous chapters, the finan-
cial performance of the Spanish economy in
1999 was closely governed by the establish-
ment and implementation of the single mone-
tary policy. However, the existence of this policy
does not, per se, ensure that monetary and fi-
nancial conditions are uniform throughout the
various countries of the area. Such conditions
depend, among other factors, on the mecha-
nisms through which monetary impulses are
transmitted, and these mechanisms reside in
the structure and workings of the national finan-
cial systems.
In Spain, three important events shaped de-
velopments in financial markets and financial
flows in 1999: the start of Stage Three of Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union (EMU); the entry in-
to force of the reform of the Securities Market
Law; and the changes in the taxation of a large
number of financial assets. Broadly, these
events tended to promote competition in the
markets as well as giving a further boost to pro-
cesses that have been running for some years:
financial disintermediation and international di-
versification of investors’ portfolios and of bor-
rowers’ sources of financing.
Against this backdrop, there was a break
with the main trends observed in recent years in
the prices of assets quoted on the Spanish f i -
nancial markets.While the yields negotiated on
the public-debt markets increased over the year
as a whole, cutting short the downward path
that began in 1995, the general upward move-
ment in equity prices was at first checked and
then subsequently resumed, with behaviour
varying widely across sectors. Both these de-
velopments were in tune with those recorded by
most European countries.
As regards turnover, there were two notable
developments in 1999. On one hand, private
fixed-income markets grew strongly, stimulated
by an unprecedented boom in new issuance
(especially by credit institutions) that offset the
effects of lower growth in public debt markets.
This increased the opportunities for final in-
vestors and borrowers to diversify their portfo-
lios and sources of financing, respectively. On
the other hand, there was a drastic fall in
turnover on the fixed-income derivatives mar-
ket. With the advent of the euro the products of-
fered by the various European markets became
highly substitutable, leading to strong concen-
tration of these transactions, in the British mar-
ket (for the short maturities) and in the
Swiss/German market (for the medium and long
maturities).
Unlike in the previous three years, the finan-
cial intermediarieschannelled a relatively small-
er volume of funds in 1999, reflecting the higher
level of financial disintermediation. However,
the most notable feature of the activity of de-
posit money institutions was, yet again, the
strong growth in the total financing extended to
the resident private sector, against a backdrop
f highly buoyant aggregate demand and rela-
tively low interest rates. Despite the recovery in
deposits and the greater recourse to national
capital markets mentioned above, this increase
obliged the institutions to raise a significant vol-
ume of net funds abroad. The net interest in-
come, gross income and net income of the insti-
tutions, measured as a percentage of their av-
erage total assets, fell again in 1999, as in pre-
vious years, although pre-tax profits continued
to improve thanks to the fresh reduction in
write-downs and provisions. It should be noted
that the start of Stage Three of EMU, by modify-
ing the framework in which the deposit money
institutions operate, prompted the adoption of
strategic decisions. This, above all, boosted the
process of bank consolidation, leading to the
emergence of two major banking groups (BBVA
and BSCH).
The growth in the funds raised by institution-
al investors declined considerably. This was a
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consequence of the degree of maturity attained
by the mutual funds industry (especially by
money market funds) and of the reduction, for
certain maturities and levels of income, in the
fiscal attractiveness of mutual fund shares in re-
lation to other investments following the latest
reforms. By contrast, growth in pension funds
and insurance products was clearly higher, es-
sentially due to their scant relative level of de-
velopment and, in the case of insurance, to the
improved tax treatment of certain products,
again depending on maturities and income lev-
els.
The growing financial internationalisation
mentioned above also shaped the develop-
ments in financial flows between the sectors of
the economy.The Spanish economy, after five
consecutive years of positive net financial sav-
ing recorded net dissaving of approximately
one-half of a percentage point of GDP in 1999
as a consequence of the significant increase in
gross capital formation and a stagnant level of
gross saving. This net dissaving did not, howev-
er, prevent resident sectors from seizing invest-
ment opportunities abroad, as shown for exam-
ple by the international diversification of their
portfolios and the external expansion of major
Spanish companies, including through the ac-
quisition of foreign firms. Indeed, financial trans-
actions with the rest of the world grew signifi-
cantly, involving both increases in liabilities and
the acquisition of financial assets.
In terms of sectors, the net financial saving
of firms and households fell to zero, essentially
due to the strong growth in private consumption
and investment expenditure. General govern-
ment again decreased its net financial dissav-
ing, as a result of the significant growth in its
gross saving, combined with moderate expan-
sion in its gross capital formation. This be-
haviour, which was fairly uniform across the
public-sector, enabled outstanding public debt
to be reduced again relative to GDP.
IV.2. THE FINANCIAL MARKETS
At the beginning of 1999, cash and securi-
ties accounts for the trading, quotation and set-
tlement of transactions on Spanish financial
markets were re-denominated in euro. This
change, linked to the start of Stage Three of
EMU, coincided with the entry into force of the
reform of the Securities Market Law (Law
37/1998). This adapts Spanish law to various
Community directives and completes the pro-
cess of opening up Spanish markets to foreign
competition, by enshrining the principle of the
right of establishment and the freedom to pro-
vide investment services within the EU. A tax
reform also entered into force in 1999, which
equalises the tax treatment for legal persons of
fixed-income assets issued by private compa-
nies (provided that they fulfil certain require-
ments) with that for State debt.
The completion of Monetary Union entailed
the integration of the money markets of the
countries that make up the area. It has also en-
abled the yield spreads on the debt issued by
the various member countries to hold at low
and stable levels, and movements in yields to
be highly correlated. In turn the institutional and
legal changes made in 1999 helped to reduce
the barriers between national capital markets,
thereby reinforcing the tendency, which already
existed in previous years, for greater interna-
tional diversification of residents’ assets and lia-
bilities. This boosted competition in markets in
the euro area. Finally, the improved tax treat-
ment for private debt stimulated its issuance.
Developments on the Spanish financial mar-
kets in 1999 are analysed below against this
backdrop, starting with the behaviour of the
prices of quoted assets and then moving on to
consider the growth of turnover on primary and
secondary markets.
In 1999, there was a change in the trends
that had prevailed in the immediately preceding
years in the prices of assets quotedon Spanish
financial markets. Public-debt yields, on a
downward path since 1995, began to climb in
parallel with the sovereign debt of the other eu-
ro area states (see Chart IV.1), with interest
spreads holding steady (at around 20-25 basis
points in the case of Spanish and German
debt).
The change in the course of yields began to
be discerned in February at the medium and
long maturities, and was apparently caused by
the spillover effect on euro-denominated debt of
the fall in debt prices in the US since October
1998, which reflected market fears that the vig-
orous growth recorded by the US economy
would give rise to inflationary pressures. How-
ever, transmission was not complete, given the
different cyclical position of the economies of
the member countries. By contrast, expecta-
tions of an easing of European monetary policy
caused public-debt yields at the short maturities
to edge even lower during the first few months
of the year.
Towards the middle of the year, the rise in
yields accelerated and extended to all maturi-
ties, amid the increasingly palpable signs of
economic recovery in the euro area displayed
by some indicators. In this new scenario, short-
term yields began to reflect expectations of ris-
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ing intervention rates in the euro area and, sub-
sequently, they adjusted to the 50 basis point
increase in the interest rate on the main refi-
nancing operations of the Eurosystem that took
place in November. At the medium and long
maturities, the rise in yields may have reflected
both an upward revision in inflation expecta-
tions, partly fuelled by the upward path of oil
prices and by the depreciation of the euro, and
also by an improvement in the outlook for eco-
nomic growth.
In the year as a whole, yields rose by around
40 basis points on three-month repos, by
around 80 basis points on issues of one-year
bills and by around 130 basis points on issues
of ten-year debt. As a result, the slope of the
zero-coupon yield curve, as measured by the
difference between overnight and 15-year rates,
steepened from 190 basis points at end-1998 to
290 basis points at end-1999. So far during the
current year, the zero-coupon public-debt curve
has flattened slightly, with an increase in the
short rates and a decline in long rates (see
Chart IV.1).
During most of 1999, in contrast to the gen-
eral upward movement that had continued
since 1995, equity prices were characterised by
a lack of direction. From November however,
the general indices turned sharply upwards
again. As a result, the Spanish Stock Exchange
Ibex-35 index was 18.3% higher at the end of
1999 than at the beginning of the year.
Equity prices in 1999 were influenced by
several factors pushing in different directions,
which were also present in most of the main in-
ternational markets and, in particular, in those
of the euro area. The progressive signs of im-
provement in the international economic envi-
ronment and, in particular, the increasingly firm
prospects for recovery in activity in the euro
area had a positive impact on the prospective
earnings of listed firms and, especially, of those
with the most pro-cyclical profits. This change in
outlook was also bolstered by, in most cases,
better-than-expected earnings figures. Howev-
er, these favourable effects were at least par-
tially offset by the increase in long-term interest
rates. Finally, during the last few months of the
year there was a notable increase in the de-
mand for shares in firms whose business is di-
rectly or indirectly related to new technologies.
Many of these firms obtained their stock ex-
change listing in 1999. This demand led to
sharp increases in the prices of the firms in
these sectors which, in many cases, came on
top of the considerable price rises seen in previ-
ous years. Although the increase in prices part-
ly reflected an upward revision in expected prof-
its, the size of the cumulative increases gave
87
CHART IV.1
Government debt yields (a)
2
4
6
8
10
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
2
4
6
8
10
 3-MONTH REPOS
 1-YEAR BILLS
 3-YEAR BONDS
 10-YEAR BONDS
SPANISH DEBT% %
2
3
4
5
6
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
2
3
4
5
6
 DECEMBER 1998
 JUNE 1999
 DECEMBER 1999
 MARCH 2000
ESTIMATED ZERO COUPON CURVE IN SPAIN
Year
0
2
4
6
8
10
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
0
2
4
6
8
10 GERMANY
 UNITED STATES
 JAPAN
 SPAIN
10-YEAR BOND YIELDS
   Source: Banco de España.
   (a)   Monthly averages.
rise to mounting fears of a possible correction in
the prices of the shares that had risen most.
The different impact of the above-mentioned
factors resulted in widely varying behaviour
across sectors. Notable in the Madrid Stock Ex-
change indices was the growth in the communi-
cations sector, which rose by 86.6 % on its end-
1998 level. This was basically attributable to the
price of Telefónica which, like those of other
European telephony operators, surged. Also, oil
companies outstripped the general index
( 4 1 . 9%), some being helped by the upward
movement in oil prices, while the banking sector
also performed better than the general index
(19.4 %). By contrast, most other firms listed on
the Stock Exchange suffered price falls in 1999,
including firms in the construction sector
( – 2 6 . 3%), in the food industry (–26.2 %), in
other industries (–27.2 %) and in the electricity
sector (–12.1 %). As mentioned in Chapter II,
Spanish indices performed poorly relative to the
main international stock exchanges.
In 2000 to date, prices have been more
volatile, basically owing to the behaviour of the
shares in firms connected with new technolo-
gies. Prices continued to rise in these sectors to
mid-March, while in most other sectors they
continued to fall slightly. However, from mid-
March there were significant reductions in the
prices of many of the shares that had previously
risen most, amid an international sell-off of
technology securities.
On the primary markets,the most signifi-
cant development in 1999 was the boom in pri-
vate-sector fixed-income issuance, with net
volumes five times higher than in 1998 and, for
the first time, significantly above those of gen-
eral government (see Table IV.1). Credit insti-
tutions and, to a lesser extent, asset-backed
securities funds, played a leading role in this
boom, which was the result of several causes.
On the demand side, the surge in issuance
was stimulated by two factors that reduced the
disadvantages of private debt compared with
public. On one hand, in the operational frame-
work for the single monetary policy, private
fixed-income securities were included in the
lists of eligible collateral for Eurosystem mone-
tary policy operations. On the other hand, the
tax reforms introduced exempted legal persons
from withholding tax on the returns obtained on
private debt fulfilling certain requirements,
putting the tax treatment of such debt on an
equal footing with that of State debt. Besides
these factors, the increased stability of the
Spanish economy and the lower nominal re-
turns on low-risk assets may have stimulated a
shift in investment from public debt towards
other instruments with higher expected returns,
but greater risk, such as the debt issued by pri-
vate-sector firms.
The growth in issuance was also assisted by
the heavy fund-raising requirements of some
agents, such as credit institutions and certain
non-financial corporations that are currently ex-
panding abroad, while the smaller State borrow-
ing requirement left room for issuance by other
sectors. Also, the regulatory changes intro-
duced in 1998 had made the process of issuing
securities simpler and less costly for private-
sector firms(1).
It should be pointed out that this growth in
the weight of debt issued by the private sector
is part of a general trend, which will foreseeably
strengthen in future and which also affected
other countries, particularly those of the euro
area. The Stability and Growth Pact will tend to
reduce the weight of public debt in financial
markets and the environment of economic sta-
bility will be conducive to investment in instru-
ments with greater risk. In addition, in the case
of Spain, the potential for growth in private-debt
markets is very great, since they are still rela-
tively underdeveloped.
The expansion of private-debt markets offset
the shrinking of the public-debt market and
broadened potential sources of funds and the
possibilities for portfolio diversification. The de-
velopment of private-debt markets also made it
possible for deposit money institutions to in-
crease their holdings of eligible assets available
for Eurosystem tenders.
Net issuance of other instruments – public
debt and equity – also increased, although at
much more moderate rates than that of private
debt (see Table IV.1). As already mentioned
above, the slowdown in the growth of the sup-
ply of Treasury securities is a consequence of
the lower State borrowing requirements.
New share issues having reached a very
high level in 1998, the amounts placed through
public offerings in 1999 were well below those
of the two preceding years, as a consequence
of the smaller number of privatisations of public
enterprises. However, other public offerings
surged due, above all, to initial public offerings
(IPOs). These operations were generally re-
ceived favourably by investors, who were in-
creasingly ready to invest in equities. In this re-
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( 1 ) Specifically, Royal Decree 2590/1998, on changes
in the legal regime for the securities markets, introduced the
programme prospectus – which enables several issues to
be made without the need to submit a complete prospectus
for each – and abolished the prospectus for admission to
listing.
spect, it should be pointed out that a not in-
significant proportion of IPOs were by firms be-
longing to sectors that are poorly represented
on the Spanish exchange, such as the technol-
ogy sector (TPI, Amadeus and Terra Networks)
and the media (Sogecable).
Developments on the secondary markets
were influenced not only by developments on
the primary markets, but also by the back-
ground of greater intra-European competition. It
was in the trading of fixed-income derivatives
that the introduction of the euro entailed the
most fundamental transformation. The high de-
gree of substitutability between the products of-
fered by the various European markets was
conducive to the geographical concentration of
activity. In these circumstances, the managing
companies of the Spanish derivatives markets
decided to establish an alliance with their
French, Portuguese and Italian counterparts,
giving their members direct access to the trad-
ing of contracts on the other markets in the al-
liance. Nonetheless, despite the efforts made,
activity in euro interest-rate derivatives ended
up concentrated in the Swiss/German Eurex
market (in the case of the medium and long-
term section of the rate curve) and in the British
LIFFE market (in the case of the short-term ma-
turities). This involved a drastic shrinking of the
turnover on MEFF RF (see Table IV.2). Given
this situation, the managing company of MEFF
RF is currently concentrating its activities on the
sale among its members of products offered on
other markets. Since March 2000, it has been
acting as a Eurex intermediary, thereby en-
abling its members to trade the contracts on
debt of this latter market from their screens, as
if they were MEFF RF products.
The introduction of the euro did not involve
such radical changes in trading on the rest of
the Spanish secondary markets, although re-
forms were undertaken in most cases to adapt
them to the new competitive environment.
Turnover on private fixed-income markets grew
significantly in 1999 (see Table IV.2). This was
a consequence of the boom in issuance on the
primary market, the operations relating to the
s curing of liquidity in Eurosystem tenders by
deposit money institutions, the improvements in
the taxation of transactions based on commer-
cial paper and the listing of preferential equity
holdings (participaciones preferentes).The lat-
ter are hybrid instruments combining fixed in-
come and equity features, usually issued by the
subsidiaries of Spanish credit institutions locat-
ed abroad. The attractiveness of Spanish pri-
vate fixed-income markets can be expected to
be bolstered in future by the agreement
reached between AIAF (Association of Securi-
ties Dealers), the stock exchanges and the
SCLV (Securities Clearing and Settlement Ser-
vice) to create a common recording, clearing
and settlement platform that will standardise
and simplify such procedures for fixed-income
securities trades on the AIAF and the Spanish
stock exchanges. When it enters into force, this
initiative will help to strengthen the competitive
position of the markets insofar as the transac-
tion costs of operating on them are reduced.
On the Public Debt Book-Entry Market, al-
though activity may have suffered from the shift
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TABLE IV.1
Issuance and public offerings of marketable securities (a)
EUR millions
Net issuance 33,231 17,096 29,931 58,326
Fixed income 31,105 16,107 20,799 47,841
State 29,893 13,139 12,354 13,571
Territorial government 2,180 1,421 1,634 1,492
Credit institutions (a) 264 2,645 3,889 24,676
Other financial corporations 1,005 77 3,211 5,287
Non-financial corporations –2,237 –1,175 –289 2,815
Equities 2,126 989 9,132 10,485
Credit institutions 202 208 4,869 944
Other financial corporations 122 52 178 1,010
Non-financial corporations 1,802 729 4,085 8,531
Public offerings 2,103 10,652 11,240 5,042
Privatisations 1,701 9,852 10,857 772
Other 402 800 383 4,270
Source: Banco de España.
(a) Includes resident issues in both domestic and foreign currency.
1999199819971996
in derivatives trading towards contracts traded
on other markets (since Spanish debt is not the
underlying asset for such contracts), the re-
forms implemented have improved the market’s
attractiveness by lowering transaction costs.
Such reforms involved, on one hand, an in-
crease in the rights and obligations of market
makers and, the possibility that, for the first
time, non-resident entities could enjoy such sta-
tus. On the other hand, in 1999 the four screen
networks of the “blind” broker system were
merged into a single electronic platform to
which debt traders have access. At the Euro-
pean level, a pan European trading platform lo-
cated in London was set up at the end of 1999
for fixed-income instruments, called Euro MTS.
Along with the debt of other European coun-
tries, benchmark Spanish Treasury issues be-
gan to be traded on this platform, with settle-
ment through the State Debt Book-Entry Sys-
tem (CADE). The overall result of these factors,
combined with the slowdown in debt issuance,
was a moderate decline in turnover on the Pub-
lic Debt Book-Entry Market (see Table IV.2).
As regards equities, turnover grew in 1999
at more moderate rates than in recent years,
amid the initiation of certain structural transfor-
mations (see Table IV.2). At the end of the year
a market, called Latibex, was created for Latin-
American firms, with trading in euro through the
Spanish Stock Exchange electronic system and
with settlement through the SCLV. At the same
time, the Spanish stock exchanges reached an
agreement with seven other European stock ex-
changes to establish an interlinking system to
permit pan-European trading, although little
headway was made during 1999, given the diffi-
culty in harmonising the various criteria and
procedures used. In April 2000, the Spanish
stock exchanges set up a new trading seg-
ment, called the Nuevo Mercado, with listing
and information requirements tailored to the
particular needs of high-growth firms (see
B o xIV.1). With this initiative, the Spanish secu-
rities markets came into line with other Euro-
pean markets, so that it is to be hoped that it
will help to improve their competitive position
and to facilitate the financing of high-growth
Spanish firms.
On the equity derivatives market (MEFF RV)
turnover continued to grow, albeit at lower rates
than in previous years, in line with develop-
ments on the spot market (see Table IV.2). It
should be pointed out that the agreement with
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TABLE IV.2
Turnover on secondary and derivatives markets
EUR millions
Public-debt book-entry market (a) (b) 8,439,406 11,684,345 14,035,896 13,109,674
Spot 1,608,197 2,110,187 2,311,155 1,817,465
Repos 6,800,842 9,544,534 11,700,054 11,254,308
Forward 30,367 29,624 24,687 37,901
AIAF fixed-income market (a) 14,929 21,173 43,120 86,269
Commercial paper 3,474 4,447 7,935 25,284
Ordinary and asset-backed bonds and mortgage
certificates 8,823 10,950 28,761 58,572
Matador bonds 2,632 5,776 6,424 2,413
Stock exchange: fixed-income (a) 78,070 54,217 53,148 44,718
State debt 53,226 21,890 603 160
Territorial government debt 21,045 30,043 51,791 42,858
Other 3,799 2,284 754 1,700
Stock exchange: equities 77,145 163,261 261,276 291,975
MEFF derivatives markets (c) 2,285,515 3,286,810 2,668,336 960,964
Fixed-income 2,194,386 3,012,658 2,111,985 376,118
Short-term 904,867 1,631,754 1,125,442 19,972
Medium and long-term 1,289,519 1,380,904 986,543 356,146
Equities 91,129 274,152 556,351 584,846
Ibex 35 89,642 270,719 549,329 570,032
Stock options 1,487 3,433 7,022 14,814
Sources: AIAF, MEFF, Spanish stock exchanges, CNMV and Banco de España.
(a) Nominal turnover.
(b) Only includes transactions with State securities.
(c) Volumes are expressed in monetary units and have been obtained by multiplying the number of contracts traded by their size.
1996 1997 1998 1999
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BOX IV.1
The new stock markets for high growth companies
The so-called “New Markets” are segments of traditional stock
markets (or independent stock exchanges) on which the shares of
new-technology and high-growth companies are quoted and traded
and information is disseminated. These markets are characterised by
rules on listing, quotation and information transparency that are better
adapted to the particular nature of this kind of firm. Specifically, the
New Markets have more flexible listing requirements. Given the uncer-
tainty associated with the future profits of growth companies, New
Markets require more information to be made available to investors on
the future course and the risks of these firms. Finally, given the greater
volatility of their share prices, the fluctuation limits are wider than in
traditional stock markets.
The paradigm of New Markets is Nasdaq, a market located in
the US which began to operate in 1971 and was formed independent-
ly of other US markets. In terms of capitalisation this market is now
second only in the world to the New York Stock Exchange. In Europe,
the creation of New Markets has been more recent and they have
generally been set up as segments of traditional stock exchanges.
The first, Le Nouveau Marché, was set up as a segment of the Paris
Bourse in 1996. Subsequently, other markets emerged in the Frank-
furt, Amsterdam, Brussels and Milan exchanges. At the end of 1999
the London Stock Exchange also created a segment called Techmark,
listing technology firms. Besides these markets, there is another one
in Europe for high growth firms, the EASDAQ, located in Brussels
which, unlike the other European New Markets, is an independent
market like Nasdaq.
The supply of marketable securities on all the New Markets grew
strongly in 1999 owing to IPOs, which also represented a significant
part of all the IPOs on the main stock markets (see Table 1). Although
Nasdaq remained in the lead, the growth of the European markets
was striking, especially in the case of the German new market.
The boom in New Market placements is the result of a combina-
tion of the large financing requirements of an increasing number of
high growth firms and high demand on the part of investors for their
equity, bolstered by revaluation expectations. In this respect, the exis-
tence of the New Markets has helped to satisfy part of such demand
insofar as, in many cases, the latter could not have been channelled
through traditional markets. From the point of view of investors, the ex-
pansion of the supply of securities has helped to increase the sectoral
diversification of their portfolios, enabling the weight of sectors with
higher growth prospects (basically those relating to new technologies)
to be increased. From the firms’ viewpoint, the boom in the New Mar-
kets has increased their financing possibilities.
As regards the size of the New Markets, in terms of their capital-
isation at end-March 2000 and 1999 turnover, the information supplied
in the table shows the underdevelopment of the European New Mar-
kets vis-à-vis Nasdaq, both when comparing levels and considering
their importance in relation to traditional markets. This suggests that
there is very significant growth potential for the New Markets in Eu-
rope.
In Spain, the Nuevo Mercado(1) has been formed as a special
segment of the continuous market or Stock Exchange Interlinking Sys-
tem run by the Sociedad de Bolsas. The segment began to operate on
10 April 2000 with ten securities and a capitalisation of EUR 40.2 bil-
lion, making it the third largest New Market in the euro area (see
Table2). There are certain significant differences between the Nuevo
Mercado and the traditional stock market. As regards the listing re-
quirements, the requirement to obtain profits in future years(2) is e-
placed by the filing of a report by the company on its business
prospects and results in future years. At the same time, there is
greater information transparency in this segment, as a result of: the description, in the listing prospectus of the risks associated with the firm’s ac-
tivity; the disclosure of the lock-ups affecting shareholders with significant holdings; and, at least once a year, publication of the progress of the
business and its future prospects. Finally, as regards quotation, the fluctuation limits are made more flexible – there are no limits upon quotation
and subsequently they are 25% (and may be increased during the session), as opposed to 15% in the traditional market.
The creation of the Nuevo Mercado in Spain has involved the Spanish securities markets coming into line with those of other European coun-
tries. The Nuevo Mercado will help to improve Spain’s competitive position, making it easier for Spanish high-growth firms to obtain financing and it
will stimulate the supply of securities issued by such firms, thereby helping to absorb the growing demand for this type of security.
TABLE 1
Launches on the new stock markets: 1999
NASDAQ 485 47,313 266.5 48.1
EASDAQ 12 774 –22.2 —
Techmark
(London) 9 2,282 — 68.1
Neuer Markt
(Germany) 136 7,633 342.5 40.2
Le Nouveau Marché
(Paris) 32 570 9.6 8.2
Nuovo Mercato
(Milan) 6 234 — 49.4
Nieuwe Markt NMAX
(Amsterdam)(b) 1 77 –85.7 0.4
EURO NM
(Brussels) (b) 6 40 189.2 1.8
S o u r c e s :FESE, NASDAQ, London Stock Exchange, Paris Bourse, EASDAQ and
EURONM.
(a) National stock markets are taken to be the sum of the new market and the tra-
ditional market. In the case of NASDAQ, the national stock market is the sum of the lat-
ter to the New York Stock Exchange. In the case of Techmark and the Nuovo Mercato,
only the period November-December 1999 is included.
(b) Amounts placed by domestic companies.
No.
offerings
Amounts placed
1999
(EUR
millions)
Change
99/98
(%)
% of national
stock
markets(a)
TABLE 2
Size of the new markets
NASDAQ 4,830 6.551,874861,125 34.1 50.6
EASDAQ 58 59,500 28 — —
Techmark
(London) 202 1.196,222 33,569 40.3 11.1
Neuer Markt
(Germnay) 242 193,677 10,679 8.6 8.9
Le Nouveau Marché
(Paris) 117 31,106 320 1.9 0.5
Nuovo Mercato
(Milan) 8 28,037 588 3.4 1.2
Nieuwe Markt NMAX
(Amsterdam) 14 1,690 52 0.2 0.1
EURO NM
(Brussels) 13 564 10 0.1 0.2
Nuevo Mercado
(Spain) 10 40,268 — 10.0 —
S o u r c e s :NASDAQ, FIBV, London, Milan, German, Paris, Madrid, EASDAQ and
EURO NM Stock Exchanges.
(a) As at 31.3.2000, except Easdaq (as at 7.4.2000) and the Nuevo Mercado (as
at 10.4.2000).
(b) Monthly average for 1999. Trading System View: Germany, Paris, Italy, Brus-
sels. Regulated Environment View: NASDAQ, London, Amsterdam. In the case of
Techmark and Nuovo Mercato, only the part of the year these markets were operating
is considered (as from November and June, respectively).
(c) National stock markets are taken to be the sum of the new markets and the tra-
ditional markets. In the case of NASDAQ, the total stock market is taken as the sum of
the latter and the New York Stock Exchange.
(d) National companies only.
No.
of
Issuers
(a)
Capitalis-
ation
(EUR m)
(a)
Turnover
(EUR m)
(a)
As % of national
markets (c)
Capitalis.
(a) (d)
Turnover
(b)
(1) The Ministerial Order of 22 December 1999 authorised the creation of a special trading segment called the “Nuevo Mercado”. Subsequently, the more detailed aspects of listing were
specified in CNMV Circular 1/2000 of 9 February 2000. Later, Sociedad de Bolsas Circular 1/ 2000 established the rules for trading on the Nuevo Mercado and Circular 2/2000 the rules for act-
ing as a specialist on the Nuevo Mercado.
(2) The 1967 Stock Exchange Regulations originally established the requirement for profits to have been reported in the last two years or in three of the last five years. Subsequently, this
requirement was replaced by the Ministerial Order of 19 July 1997 with another for the provision of evidence that profits will be earned in future years. The purpose of this change was, to a cer-
tain extent, to make listing requirements more flexible, with a view to the privatisation of public enterprises.
other European derivatives markets, whereby
the members of each have access to the trad-
ing of the products traded on the others, also
applies here.
To sum up, in the medium and long term
Spanish markets will continue to be shaped by
an increasingly competitive environment, and to
be in accelerated transformation due to the on-
going introduction of reforms. Irrespective of the
(foreseeably significant) effects of these trans-
formations on the location of financial business,
they will help to reduce the costs of operating
on the markets, which will facilitate the diversifi-
cation of investors’ portfolios and widen firm’s fi-
nancing possibilities.
IV.3. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
In Spain, the growing process of financial in-
ternationalisation and the consequent possibility
of tapping external savings have enabled the
private sector to sustain a high rate of growth of
capital formation, to diversify its portfolios inter-
nationally and to undertake external expansion,
including the acquisition of foreign firms. Natu-
rally this process has largely been based on the
activity of Spanish financial intermediaries (and,
in particular, of deposit money institutions).
These institutions have raised a large volume of
funds abroad, thereby assuming risks that it will
be very important to monitor closely in order to
preserve the financial stability required by the
sound functioning of the economy.
Overall, the volume of funds channelled by
the financial intermediaries (the credit system,
portfolio investment institutions, securities-deal-
er companies and securities agencies, insur-
ance corporations, pension funds and other fi-
nancial intermediaries), taken to include all the
assets and financial liabilities acquired by the
various institutions belonging to the sector, fell
by 1.3 % in 1999, to stand at 43 % of GDP, as
against 46 % in 1998. This decline was in stark
contrast to the high growth of the previous three
years and is explained by the collapse in the
acquisition of financial assets and liabilities by
portfolio investment institutions. The main
groups of institutions are analysed in greater
detail below.
IV.3.1. Deposit money institutions
During 1999, deposit money institutions had
to confront various challenges. These derived
from the creation of a single money market
throughout the euro area, from the changes in
the monetary-policy implementation arrange-
ments and from greater competition with the de-
posit money institutions of the other euro area
countries, which now operate in the same mar-
ket. These fundamental changes to the frame-
work in which the institutions operate, in turn,
prompted significant reactions from them, in an
attempt to adapt to the new environment and
capitalise on their potential advantages. In this
respect, the fresh round of consolidation in the
credit system should be noted, particularly
among the major institutions. This led to the
emergence of two significant banking groups
(BBVA and BSCH), which between them ac-
count for around 40 % of the total assets of all
deposit money institutions. Also the activity of
the branches of foreign banks in Spain, basical-
ly engaged in interbank business, was particu-
larly affected by the start of Stage Three of
EMU. In the last two years, twelve foreign
branches operating in Spain (out of a total of 53
as at end-1997) have closed, while the activity
of some of the remaining branches of foreign
banks still operating in Spain has diminished as
a consequence of the concentration of their
Treasury operations in other European cen-
t es(2).
The reduction in the activity of foreign
branches and the unwinding of interbank posi-
tions between merged institutions(3) account
for practically the whole decline in the rate of
expansion of the total assets of deposit money
nstitutions between 1998 and 1999 (see
T a b l eIV.3). In fact, this decline occurred only
among the banks, while savings banks and
credit co-operatives continued last year to
record similar or higher rates of growth in their
balance sheets to those of the previous year.
The start of Stage Three of EMU also gave
rise to operational changes, notable among
them being the new system of tenders adopted
by the Eurosystem for its main refinancing oper-
ations. The use of fixed rate tenders, together
with determination by the monetary authority of
the total amount to be provided to the system,
led to a high degree of rationing in proportion to
counterparties’ bids. This entailed certain prob-
lems for Spanish deposit money institutions
which, in comparison with those of the other
countries of the area, are characterised by hav-
ing a smaller volume of assets eligible as collat-
eral for such tenders. The result of this was a
fall in the financing obtained by the Spanish
counterparties from the Banco de España (EUR
7.4 billion on average in the year) and an incen-
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(2) There were also twelve new branches, mainly of eu-
ro area institutions, but their impact on the volume of total
assets has been small.
( 3 ) In particular, between Banco Exterior, Banco
Hipotecario, Caja Postal and Corporación Bancaria de Es-
paña, which were merged in 1998.
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TABLE IV.3
Deposit money institutions
Structure of balance sheet and profit and loss account
% of average total assets
ASSETS:
Cash and central banks (b) 1.9 1.8 1.4 1.4 2.8 2.3
Interbank market assets (c) 25.3 20.0 31.1 24.1 15.2 14.2
Lending 47.1 50.4 42.8 46.1 54.2 56.9
General government 3.4 3.0 3.2 3.0 4.0 3.2
Other resident sectors 40.0 44.1 34.2 38.2 49.3 52.7
Non-residents 3.7 3.4 5.3 4.9 0.9 1.0
Securities portfolio 18.8 19.9 17.8 20.2 21.2 19.9
Of which:
Government debt 11.3 10.1 10.4 9.6 13.3 11.0
Equities 4.1 4.6 4.1 4.8 4.3 4.5
Other assets (d) 7.0 7.9 6.9 8.3 6.7 6.7
LIABILITIES:
Banco de España 2.6 1.5 2.9 2.0 2.3 0.8
Interbank market liabilities (e) 27.2 25.6 37.2 34.8 10.0 11.5
Customer funds 55.0 56.5 44.1 45.7 73.8 73.3
Asset repo sales to customers 10.8 8.9 9.1 7.8 14.6 11.3
Accounts payable: general government 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9
Accounts payable: other resident sectors 36.0 37.5 25.3 25.7 53.0 54.7
Accounts payable: non-residents 4.9 5.9 6.7 8.2 1.9 2.3
Borrowing 1.7 2.5 1.4 2.2 2.5 3.1
Own funds, special reserves
and subordinated financing 9.8 10.1 9.5 9.9 10.2 10.5
Of which:
Subordinated financing 1.6 1.9 2.1 2.5 0.8 1.2
Other liabilities (f) 5.3 6.3 6.2 7.7 3.7 4.0
PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT:
(+) Interest income 5.70 4.73 5.62 4.69 5.82 4.78
(–) Interest expenses 3.39 2.53 3.70 2.89 2.88 1.99
Net interest income 2.31 2.20 1.92 1.80 2.94 2.78
(+) Commissions 0.67 0.70 0.68 0.74 0.64 0.65
(+) Profits on financial operations 0.14 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.15 0.09
Gross income 3.12 2.99 2.73 2.62 3.73 3.52
(–) Operating expenses 2.01 1.96 1.78 1.76 2.38 2.26
Net income 1.11 1.03 0.95 0.86 1.35 1.26
(–) Write-downs and provisions 0.41 0.24 0.38 0.20 0.46 0.30
(+) Other income 0.22 0.15 0.19 0.12 0.30 0.21
Pre-tax profit 0.93 0.94 0.77 0.78 1.19 1.17
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Pre-tax profit
(as a % of own funds) 16.2 16.7 14.8 15.7 18.5 18.3
Average total assets (EUR m) 900,207 948,225 573,578 584,529 297,242 331,337
Year-on-year growth rate (%) 8.2 5.3 7.5 1.9 9.5 11.5
Source: Banco de España.
(a) Banks, savings banks, and credit co-operatives. Total turnover figures, including banks’ foreign branches but not subsidiaries, which
refer to all the institutions existing in each period.
(b) Cash, central banks (except BE repos) and ECB.
(c) Credit and savings institutions (forward accounts, repos and recurities lending) and repo purchases from the BE.
(d) Premises and equipment, sundry accounts and other assets with credit and savings institutions.
(e) Credit and savings institutions (forward accounts, repos and creditors on short sales).
(f) Sundry accounts and other liabilities with credit and savings institutions.
Total (a)
1998 1999 1999 19991998 1998
Banks Savings Banks
tive to increase the available volume of securi-
ties eligible as collateral in their portfolios. In
consequence, there was a considerable decline
in sales of assets to the private sector under re-
pos (which may have been caused by the lower
demand from mutual funds) and a significant in-
crease in the portfolio of private fixed-income
securities. The latter was possible due to the
major development of the Spanish private fixed-
income market in 1999, as already mentioned
in the previous section of this chapter. Howev-
er, its continued narrowness and the lower is-
suance of securities by general government
meant that a large part of the increase in the
total fixed-income portfolio of the institutions
took the form of securities issued by non-resi-
dents.
The Spanish deposit money institutions, as a
whole, were able to offset the decline in the fi-
nancing extended by the Banco de España with
loans from the rest of the euro area, obtained
through the single interbank market. There
were some significant changes, under this new
framework, in the customary positions in the in-
terbank market between the various groups of
Spanish institutions. The institutions traditionally
in surplus (savings banks and credit co-opera-
tives) reduced their net creditor position vis-à-
vis other Spanish credit institutions, while the
branches of foreign banks drastically reduced
their net debtor position. These branches,
which usually raise funds in the domestic mar-
ket, fulfilled a very important role in securing net
funds from abroad, possibly through their own
parent institutions, to on-lend to other Spanish
institutions(4).
The other notable element of the activity of
Spanish deposit money institutions in 1999 was
another major expansion in lending to the resi-
dent private sector, which continued to gain
weight in the balance sheet (see Table IV.3).
Specifically, considering both lending in the
strict sense and the private fixed-income portfo-
lio (which also includes the institutions’ holdings
of shares in mortgage-backed securities funds),
total financing from Spanish deposit money in-
stitutions to the resident private sector grew by
17.6 % in 1999, almost two percentage points
more than in the previous year.
The main factors behind this strong growth
in lending are basically the same as those
mentioned in the 1998 Annual Report.Low in-
terest rates, the buoyant economy and corpo-
rate restructuring, including the acquisition of
firms in Spain and abroad, have continued to
strongly boost the demand for credit. This de-
mand must also have been strengthened by
the improvement in the financial situation of
firms and households as a consequence of the
reduction in interest payments on debt and the
revaluation of financial assets in recent years.
The strong competition between institutions
and the low default rates have contributed to
lending growth through an easing of the condi-
tions applied to its extension. In this respect, it
should be noted that, in 1999, the default rate
on private sector non-financial credit fell fur-
ther, to the historical low of 1.4 %, so that net
write-downs owing to bad debts were down to
0.25 % of total lending. In comparative terms,
the relative weight of provisions on loans in
1999 was very low in relation to historical lev-
els in Spain.
The high rates of credit expansion were on-
ly partially financed by deposits, even though
there was a significant recovery in 1999 in
those of the resident private-sector. This re-
covery was helped by the recent reform of per-
sonal income tax, which made deposits more
attractive from a tax point of view and mutual
funds less attractive, against a background of
low returns on low risk assets and greater un-
certainty on stock markets. On average in
1999, the deposits of “other residents sectors”
(mostly households and firms) grew by 9.8 %,
as against 6.5 % in 1998, with a very sharp in-
crease in sight deposits and a notable recov-
ery in time deposits, particularly those with
maturities of more than two years, which have
benefited most from the new tax arrange-
ments. Nonetheless, the increase in deposits
was offset by a strong fall in sales of assets to
the private sector under repos (see Table
IV.3). This is explained by the lower demand
from mutual funds, the deposit money institu-
tions’ own need to have securities, not subject
to repos, available in their portfolios for use as
collateral in Eurosystem liquidity tenders and,
perhaps also, due to the substitution of de-
posits for repos. Overall, funds from resident
private-sector customers (without including the
loan issues made) rose by 4 % in 1999, which
was clearly insufficient to finance the increase
in credit.
In fact, the vigorous expansion of credit in
1999 could be sustained because the deposit
money institutions, as a whole, again raised sig-
nificant net funds abroad (see Chart IV.2), the
commercial banks being the most active in this
respect. However, there were certain differ-
ences in how the institutions obtained financing
compared with previous years, which should be
pointed out.
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( 4 ) Another example of the centralisation of Treasury
operations entailed by the advent of the euro is the fact that
the branches of foreign banks cut back their recourse to the
Banco de España drastically, reducing it to 5 % of the 1998
level.
On one hand, the deposit money institutions
resorted to a greater extent to capital markets
(domestic and international) as a source of fi-
nancing, in order to limit the liquidity risks in-
volved in interbank financing and to take advan-
tage of their recent development. Both the
banks and savings banks exploited the im-
proved conditions on Spanish private fixed-in-
come markets, by significantly increasing the
volume of debt issues in the domestic market,
as already mentioned in the previous section of
this chapter. As a result, for the first time in re-
cent years, loan and subordinated issues cov-
ered a significant volume of the institutions’ net
borrowing (around 18 %, as shown in Chart
IV.2). In turn, under the creditors heading, the
strong growth in non-resident creditors was at-
tributable to the channelling to parent compa-
nies, through deposits, of funds raised by sub-
sidiary non-bank financial institutions, through
debt issues and preference shares on interna-
tional markets.
On the other hand, the existence of a single
money market in the euro area encouraged net
interbank borrowing abroad by Spanish deposit
money institutions to start to shift towards this
m a r k e t(5), owing to the absence of currency
risk and to the operational advantages entailed
by TARGET and access to the Eurosystem
lending and deposit facilities. However, it
should be noted that excessive recourse to the
euro interbank market, where the only security
for (uncollateralised) loans is the borrower’s
credit quality, could involve a liquidity risk for
Spanish institutions.
The profit and loss accountsof deposit mon-
ey institutions displayed the same trends as in
previous years. Measured as a percentage of
average total assets, net interest income, gross
income and net income fell again, yet pre-tax
profits continued to rise (see Table IV.3). No-
tably, net income declined in absolute terms, as
well as in terms of average total assets. Be-
sides from the fall in net interest income, this
outcome stemmed from the lower growth of
commissions on the sale of mutual fund shares,
from the negative impact of developments in
the financial markets during the year on profits
on financial operations and from the increase in
operating expenses. The latter, despite moder-
ating in 1999, still grew faster than gross in-
come, so that there was a deterioration in the
efficiency ratio (operating expenses to gross in-
come) of the deposit money institutions as a
whole, from 64.4 % to 65.6 %. The growth in
operating expenses was significantly higher in
the case of savings banks, which increased the
numbers of their employees and branches, than
in that of banks.
As in previous years, the decline in net in-
come was more than offset by lower write-
downs and provisions, against the backdrop of
a very favourable economic situation, which
translated into an increase in pre-tax profits. In
particular, in 1999 there were declines in provi-
sions for country risk (which had been relatively
high in the two preceding years, as a conse-
quence of the international crisis in emerging
market countries), in write-downs in the portfolio
of permanent holdings of commercial banks (al-
so very high in 1998) and in other transfers to
specific provisions. In turn, transfers to provi-
sions for bad debts in the loan portfolio contin-
ued to fall, despite the low levels already
reached. In this respect, the Banco de España
has recently modified the regulations on provi-
sions for bad debts, introducing the so-called
“provision for the statistical coverage of insol-
v e n c y ”(6). The application of the new regula-
tions from the middle of this year can be ex-
pected to reverse the ongoing decline in provi-
sions for credit risk since 1993, and at the same
time induce the institutions to seek ways of in-
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CHART IV.2
Deposit money institutions
   Source: Banco de España.
   (a)   Change in annual average balances.
   (b)   Includes repo sales and accounts payable to non-residents.
   (c)   Includes subordinated financing.
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(5) Although, two thirds of the net external interbank po-
sition is still vis-à-vis credit institutions outside the euro
area.
( 6 ) The new regulation is explained in detail in the Jan-
uary 2000 issue of the Banco de España Economic bul-
l e t i n .
creasing their net income in order to preserve
profit levels.
In any event, the signs point to a recovery in
net income, since the long downswing in mar-
ket interest rates came to an end in 1999, with
interbank rates currently more than six percent-
age points below their average 1995 level (see
Chart IV.3). In the new environment of rising in-
terest rates, the existence of unremunerated li-
abilities or liabilities remunerated at low rates
will allow the net interest income of deposit
money institutions to recover somewhat. How-
ever, given the strong competition existing and
the significant technological transformations
that have occurred, the gains to be obtained
through net interest income might be expected
to be small.
By contrast, the possibilities arising from
adaptation to the new environment, in which
capital markets and new distribution channels
will play a much more prominent role than at
present, are much more important. In this re-
spect, some institutions have taken significant
steps to increase the degree of diversification
of their income sources (see Box IV.2), both
inside Spain (increasing their activity in portfo-
lio management and the sale of products
through non-bank subsidiaries) and outside
S p a i n .
In particular, during recent years Spanish
institutions have undertaken a significant ex-
pansion in Latin America, a market that is espe-
cially attractive for Spanish banks. The Latin
American economies have high growth poten-
tial, their banking systems are still underdevel-
oped and characterised by the persistence of
wide net interest margins, which suggest higher
levels of risk and also room for improvement in
efficiency levels. The experience acquired from
the growing competition in the Spanish domes-
tic market has particularly favoured expansion
in these markets.
Finally, some institutions have taken steps to
introduce the latest technological advances into
their productive processes, have begun to pro-
vide other financial services through modern
distribution channels and have entered into al-
liances with enterprises in the new technology
sector to develop new products and business
opportunities.
IV.3.2. Other financial intermediaries
This section analyses the so-called institu-
tional investors (investment companies, mutual
funds, pension funds and insurance corpora-
tions). These offer diverse financial services to
companies and households, but have in com-
mon the fact that they take the savings of these
agents and invest them in the various financial
assets available. They therefore play an impor-
tant role both in channelling savings and in the
operation of capital markets. This, together with
their growing weight in the Spanish financial
system as a whole, makes the analysis of their
behaviour increasingly important.
The net asset value of mutual funds, having
grown very strongly in previous years, grew by
only EUR 2.5 billion last year. The net asset
value of securities funds (FIMs) rose by EUR
10.6 billion, while that of money market mutual
funds (FIAMMs) fell again, by EUR 8.1 billion.
The high fees charged by the latter, which in
an environment of low nominal interest rates
entail a significant reduction in the net return
on this product, must have contributed to this
decline. The smaller increase in the net asset
value of mutual funds stemmed from the lower
portfolio revaluation, due to the behaviour of fi-
nancial asset prices and lower net share sub-
scriptions by firms and households. These low-
er net subscriptions were, in turn, influenced by
the loss of attractiveness of mutual fund shares
in relation to alternative investments. The re-
cent tax reforms reduced, for certain levels of
income and maturities, the tax advantages of
this type of product vis-à-vis others, such as
bank deposits, pension funds and insurance
p r o d u c t s .
By contrast, pension funds and insurance
products continued to experience growing de-
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BOX IV.2
The main differences between the activity of banking groups and their parent banks
In recent years, Spanish banks and, in particular, the major banking groups, have pursued strategies
for the diversification of their business, mainly through the development of mutual funds and pension funds
and through expansion in the markets of other countries, especially in Latin America. This process has
largely been carried out through subsidiaries of banking groups, so that its reflection in the individual bal-
ance sheets of the banks (those analysed in the main text of this report) has been very limited. According-
ly, this box briefly analyses the activity of banking groups (in which the weight of subsidiaries is more sig-
nificant)(1) in comparison with that of individual parent banks, in order to examine the impact of these
strategies on the structure of banking business, the generation of income and costs and the banks’ gener-
al risk profile.
The growing weight of the activity of Spanish banks through mutual funds is reflected, on one hand, in
the growth in the net asset value of mutual funds managed by subsidiary banks. As a percentage of the to-
tal balance sheet of banking groups, this value rose from 8.3 % in 1995 to 21 % in 1999. On the other
hand, the rise in commission income as a percentage of the groups’ gross income is also notable (from
44% to 55% over the same period) as is the growing difference between the commission income record-
ed by the groups and that recorded in the individual statements of the parent banks, which roughly shows
the income obtained from this activity by subsidiary management companies (0.16 % of average total as-
sets in 1995 and 0.49 % in 1999).
The importance of international geographical diversification, largely focused on Latin America, is
shown by the trends in the differences in the information provided by the individual financial statements
and by those of the group on the margin between loans and deposits, on the net interest margin, on oper-
ating expenses and on the default rate and net write-downs. The main effect of the incorporation into the
balance sheet of foreign subsidiaries has been to moderate the decline in the margin between loans and
deposits, due to the inclusion of banks with margins that are almost double those obtained by the banks in
their domestic market business. This is clearly reflected in the consolidated net interest margin of banking
groups, which is significantly higher than in individual statements. However the international expansion of
business has also affected operating expenses, which have increased as a consequence of the inclusion
of less efficient banks, and solvency risks, which are higher as a consequence of the inclusion of assets of
lesser credit quality.
In any event, the comparative analysis of banking groups and their parent banks shows that the diver-
sification strategies adopted by banks in recent years have had a positive overall effect. First, the develop-
ment of mutual funds has enabled banks: to avoid losing market share in the attraction of savings; to in-
crease the efficiency of their distribution network, by exploiting it to sell new products; and to reduce the
impact on their income of the shift from intermediation between loans and deposits to other more sophisti-
cated forms of intermediation. Second, the strategy of diversification through expansion in other countries
has enabled the impact of the decline in operating margins in domestic business to be reduced, as well as
allowing Spanish banks to secure a privileged position in the main Latin American financial markets. That
said, these investments have a component of higher risk, which must be taken into account by banks’
management and by the supervisory authorities.
Main differences between banking groups’ balance sheets and those of their parent banks
I) MANAGEMENT OF MUTUAL FUNDS:
Net asset value of mutual funds as % of group balance sheet 8.3 12.2 17.8 20.5 21.0
Commission income as % of group’s gross income 43.5 39.6 46.4 52.9 54.9
Commission income as % of average total assets (ATA):
difference between the group and the parent bank 0.16 0.17 0.27 0.39 0.49
II) REGIONAL DIVERSIFICATION:
Differences between the group and the parent bank
Lending/deposit margin (as % of ATA) –1.25 –0.95 –0.49 0.78 0.76
Net interest margin (as % of ATA) –0.04 0.13 0.33 0.52 0.79
Operating expenses (as % of ATA) –0.22 –0.27 –0.47 –0.69 –0.83
Default rate (as % of total credit) 0.27 0.22 0.23 0.54 0.69
Loan write-downs (as % of ATA) –0.05 –0.02 0.07 0.16 0.18
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
(1) In the other groups included in the aggregate of deposit money institutions, subsidiaries are much less important, although the
larger savings banks are beginning to develop growing activity in this respect.
mand, as a result of the maintenance of signif-
icant tax advantages and their lower degree of
maturity (see Table IV.4). For example, ac-
cording to provisional data supplied by the Di-
rectorate General of Insurance, life assurance
premiums grew by almost 40 % in 1999. Of
this growth, a substantial part must have cor-
responded to life assurance premiums whose
mathematical provisions are invested in unit
linked, the main attraction of this product be-
ing that, under certain circumstances, it is
possible to switch mutual fund without any tax
c o s t .
In any case, whatever the institutional vehi-
cle chosen, the channelling in recent years of
growing portions of the saving of the firm and
household sector towards institutional investors
has helped to change the distribution of the
wealth of the sector significantly. This has had
important consequences both for the behaviour
of firms and households and for the transmis-
sion mechanisms of monetary impulses, which
are now much more closely linked to develop-
ments on financial markets.
At the same time, end-savers also had re-
course to these institutional investors as their
preferred means of securing greater diversifica-
tion of their assets. This process remained in-
tense during 1999, assisted by the fact that
savers continued to demand products with a
higher expected return, but also with more risk,
to a greater extent. Consequently, institutional
nvestors’ portfolios displayed further reductions
in investment in public debt and in repos, and
more investment in equities, in securities issued
by non-residents and in private fixed income
(see Chart IV.4). Especially notable in 1999
was the internationalisation of portfolios, which
was accentuated by the advent of the euro. It
hould be pointed out that at end-1999, the ex-
ternal portfolio of securities funds represented
approximately 32 % of total net asset value
(with a balanced distribution between equities
and fixed income), as against 18 % twelve
months earlier, while the equivalent percentage
for money market mutual funds was 20%
(12% in 1998).
Part of this intense process of internationali-
sation can be explained by a desire to diversify
the portfolio risk, although another part is, in all
probability, due to the narrowness of some do-
mestic financial markets. This may be the ex-
planation for the strong investment in euro area
fixed-income securities. Nonetheless, the posi-
tive response of mutual funds to the develop-
ment of the commercial paper market in 1999
confirms that there is significant room for do-
mestic financial markets to develop and ex-
pand.
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TABLE IV.4
Funds raised by other financial intermediaries
EUR millions
Total (b) 37,839 47,998 35,436
Pension funds
Net contributions (c) 2,365 2,322 2,692 3,014
Change in net asset value 4,619 4,469 5,251 4,439 31,600
Life assurance
Premiums net of claims 4,697 5,389 4,578
Change in mathematical provisions 6,341 10,791 7,678 11,726 61,904
Mutual funds
Net subscriptions 30,777 40,287 28,166 2,877 206,294
FIAMMs 11,668 1,532 –12,267 –5,752 42,598
FIMs 19,109 38,755 40,433 8,629 163,696
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Deposit money institutions: change
in accounts payable: other resident sectors21,091 25,388 15,917 18,795 453,938
Sources: Banco de España, CNMV, INVERCO and Dirección General de Seguros.
(a) Balances to December. Net asset value in the case of funds, and mathematical provisions in the case of insurance.
(b) Sum of contributions, premiums and net subscriptions.
(c) INVERCO estimate for 1999. Prior to that year: own estimate based on the change in net asset value of and annual return on funds.
1996 1997 1998 1999 1999Balances (a)
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BOX IV.3
The implications for monetary and financial analysis of financial accounts based on ESA 95
The preparation of financial accounts in accordance with the methodology of the ESA 95 system of national accounts entails alterations to the information
on the financial assets and liabilities of the various institutional sectors that has been used for monetary and financial analysis. The changes made affect all
sectors although, from the viewpoint of the analysis of the saving and financing decisions of private agents, the most important are those affecting the house-
holds and non-financial corporations sectors. This box details some of the implications for analysis of the figures provided by the new Financial Accounts pre-
pared in accordance with ESA 95.
In addition to the changes in the Financial Accounts due to the incorporation of the methodological criteria of ESA 95, there have been others owing to
the availability of more information, especially on small and medium-sized firms. This has involved a number of alterations of various kinds(1), which have af-
fected most of the financial assets and liabilities of households and corporations. The alterations with the most important impact include the following:
a) Under ESA 95 methodology, sharesare now valued at market prices. Likewise, the share portfolios of the various institutional sectors are also now val-
ued at market prices. This has led to a significant increase in the value of the share portfolios held by corporations and households, according to the Fi-
nancial Accounts, which now therefore better reflects their market value. This alteration to the criterion for valuing shares is one of the elements that most
contributes to increasing the value of the financial wealth of these sectors.
b) The incorporation of information on small and medium-sized firms, supplied by the mercantile registries, has led to a significant revision in the stock of
unquoted shares and equity in firms other than public limited companies. As a result, the stock of shares and, especially, of other equitissued by non-fi
nancial corporations has increased significantly, as have the holdings of the households and private non-profit entities sector, which is referred to as
“households” for short.
c) The information on small firms has led to a revision of the estimates of trade credit between the various sectors. The result of this revision has been a
significant increase in the outstanding trade credit between non-financial corporations (both on the assets and liabilities side) and a reduction in the trade
credit granted to households. Trade credit granted by non-financial corporations to general government, previously included under other,is now included
under the trade credit heading.
d) Under ESA 95 methodology, interest payable on securities is now recorded in accordance with the accruals principle, with interest accrued and unpaid
recorded at the value of the financial transaction giving rise thereto. This change in criterion with respect to ESA 79 gives rise to changes in the flows of
securities transactions. In quantitative terms, these are not as important as the three foregoing changes. Yet the significance of this change in criterion is
greater, as it enables adjustments for discrepancies between the criteria for recording interest used by the various sectors to be eliminated, thus helping
to reduce the amount of the otherheading, as discussed below.
e) The stock and, sometimes, the flow of the o rheading have generally been reduced by the change in the set of transactions it includes. This heading
included a broad range of transactions pending receipt or payment and statistical adjustments for differences in valuation criteria and of other types,
which largely disappear or are reclassified with the application of the ESA 95 methodological criteria.
As a consequence of the changes indicated, and of other less significant ones, there has been a small change in the net financial saving (net financial
transactions,according to the ESA 95 nomenclature) of the households and corporations sector (see the left-hand chart below). This change involves a slower
reduction in household financial saving under ESA 95 than under ESA 79, which is partly offset by the somewhat faster deterioration in the saving of non-finan-
cial corporations. Also, the financial saving of these two sectors is closer, under ESA 95, to the amount of the net lending/net borrowing according to the na-
tional accounts.
The introduction of the market price valuation criterion, along with the incorporation of more information, has led to an upward revision to the growth of
gross wealth(financial assets) and of the liabilities of the households and corporations sector, as well as an increase in the level of these variables. The stock
of financial assets at end-1999 was 259% of GDP under ESA 79 and 363 % of GDP under ESA 95. Similarly, the level of liabilities according to ESA 79 (223%
of GDP) was less than under ESA 95 (348 % of GDP). This revision has also been reflected in an increase in the level of the net financial wealthof households
and non-financial corporations (defined so as to exclude shares from the liabilities of corporations) and in its rate of growth. Since 1995, there has been a cu-
mulative increase in the value of net wealth of 80 % of GDP, according to ESA 95, while under ESA 79 this increase was hardly 37 % of GDP. This higher
growth under the latest version of the financial accounts is attributable both to the increase in the value of the share portfolio of non-financial corporations and
to that of households. By contrast, under ESA 79 the increase in the value of the net wealth of households and corporations was basically attributable to the in-
crease in the value of the portfolio of households.
Although the revision to the value of the financial wealth of households and corporations has basically been the result of the introduction of the market
price valuation criterion in the financial accounts under the ESA 95 methodology, some of the other changes mentioned have also involved a change in the vol-
ume of financial transactions of the sector (acquisition of financial assets or increase in liabilities). The right-hand chart below shows the relative contribution of
each of these elements to the higher growth in gross wealth under ESA 95 compared with ESA 79. It can be seen that the higher volume of financial assets ac-
quired by households and corporations, under ESA 95, helps to explain the differences in the value of gross wealth to a much lesser extent than the increase
arising from the change in valuation criteria.
The implications for monetary and financial analysis of financial accounts according to ESA 95
   Source: Banco de España.
   (a)   Calculated as the changes in stocks less financial transactions.
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(1) See the forthcoming Economic bulletinarticle “Presentation of the Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy. ESA 95. 1995-1999”.
IV.4. SAVING AND ECONOMIC
AND FINANCIAL FLOWS (7)
In 1999, the Spanish economy once again
required net financing from the rest of the world,
following a four-year period of net lending. In
1999, the nation’s net lending was –0.6 % of
GDP, 1.4 percentage points down on 1998. As
seen in Table IV.5, this decline stemmed from a
reduction in gross national saving and, above
all, from the increase in gross capital formation.
In terms of net financial saving(8), the trend of
recent years of progressive decline in the net fi-
nancial saving of non-financial corporations and
households continued. This contractionary ef-
fect on national net financial saving was only
partially offset by the improvement in the finan-
cial situation of general government (see
ChartIV.5). Financial developments in each of
these sectors, as well as the financial flows of
the nation as a whole vis-à-vis the external sec-
tor, are examined below.
IV.4.1. Households and firms
Following the trend of recent years, the net
lending of households and non-financial corpo-
rations declined again in 1999. In both sectors
this was a consequence of the fall in gross sav-
ing and of the strength of private investment.
Analysing the flows of financial assets and lia-
bilities, along with these variables, an increase
is observed in assets and liabilities, which was
greater in the case of the latter. Financial as-
sets and liabilities grew more rapidly in the case
of firms. The notable increase in firms’ liabilities
was used to finance not only gross capital for-
mation, but also the acquisition of financial as-
sets and, in particular, of majority holdings in
foreign companies. Insofar as the nature of this
direct investment is closer to that of capital in-
vestment than to the mere purchase of financial
assets, it makes more sense to analyse it in
conjunction with national gross capital forma-
tion. This analysis shows that Spanish firms’ in-
vestment activity is much higher than reflected
by the capital account figures (see the top panel
of Chart IV.6).
The net financial saving of non-financial cor-
porationswas –1.4 % of GDP in 1999. This was
100
(7) The financial accounts information analysed here in-
corporates the methodological criteria of ESA 95, which
means that the financial flows and stocks data used in the
past to compile the periodic reports of the Banco de España
have been revised. Box IV.3 examines the main changes
introduced by these new criteria into the analysis of the fi-
nancial flows of the economy.
( 8 ) Net financial saving is the difference between the
flows of financial assets and liabilities, and is equivalent to
the concept of net financial transactionsdefined in ESA 95.
CHART IV.4
Institutional investors
   Sources: CNMV, Banco de España and INVERCO.
   (a)   Cumulative return over last 12 months.
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TABLE IV.5
Use of income, capital and financial accounts. National economy
Breakdown by sector (% of GDP)
1. Gross disposable income 100.2 99.6 99.5 99.3 99.0
General government 16.2 16.7 18.1 18.6 20.1
Financial institutions 2.2 2.0 1.7 1.9 1.4
Non-financial corporations and households 81.7 80.9 79.7 78.8 77.6
Households 69.4 68.9 68.1 67.7 67.1
Non-financial corporations 12.4 12.0 11.6 11.1 10.5
2. Consumption 77.9 77.6 76.9 76.6 76.6
General government 18.1 18.0 17.6 17.4 17.1
Households 59.8 59.6 59.3 59.2 59.5
3. Gross national saving (1– 2) 22.3 22.0 22.5 22.7 22.4
General government –1.8 –1.2 0.5 1.2 3.0
Financial institutions 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.7 1.1
Non-financial corporations and households 22.3 21.5 20.7 19.9 18.4
Households 10.0 9.5 9.1 8.8 7.8
Non-financial corporations 12.4 12.0 11.6 11.1 10.5
4. Gross capital formation (a) 21.3 20.8 21.0 22.0 23.0
General government 4.8 3.7 3.6 3.8 4.1
Financial institutions 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6
Non-financial corporations and households 15.7 16.6 16.7 17.7 18.3
Households 4.7 5.2 4.9 5.3 5.8
Non-financial corporations 11.0 11.3 11.8 12.4 12.5
5. Net lending (+) or borrowing (–)
of the nation (3– 4 ) 1 . 0 1 . 2 1 . 6 0 . 8 – 0 . 6
General government – 6 . 6 – 5 . 0 – 3 . 2 – 2 . 6 – 1 . 1
Financial institutions 1 . 0 1 . 2 0 . 8 1 . 2 0 . 5
Non-financial corporations and households 6 . 6 5 . 0 3 . 9 2 . 2 0 . 1
Households 5 . 3 4 . 3 4 . 2 3 . 5 2 . 0
Non-financial corporations 1 . 4 0 . 7 – 0 . 2 – 1 . 3 – 2 . 0
6 . Net financial saving (7– 8 ) 1 . 0 1 . 2 1 . 6 0 . 8 – 0 . 6
General government – 6 . 6 – 5 . 0 – 3 . 2 – 2 . 6 – 1 . 1
Financial institutions 1 . 0 1 . 2 0 . 8 1 . 2 0 . 5
Non-financial corporations and households 6 . 6 5 . 0 3 . 9 2 . 2 0 . 1
Households 6 . 3 4 . 8 4 . 1 2 . 9 1 . 5
Non-financial corporations 0 . 3 0 . 2 – 0 . 1 – 0 . 7 – 1 . 4
7 . Change in financial assets 3 7 . 9 4 2 . 2 4 5 . 0 5 0 . 6 5 1 . 8
General government 1 . 5 3 . 7 0 . 5 1 . 5 1 . 8
Financial institutions 1 7 . 6 1 9 . 9 2 1 . 9 2 4 . 1 2 2 . 2
Non-financial corporations and households 1 8 . 8 1 8 . 5 2 2 . 7 2 5 . 1 2 7 . 8
Households 9 . 9 8 . 9 1 0 . 0 9 . 7 9 . 5
Non-financial corporations 9 . 0 9 . 7 1 2 . 7 1 5 . 3 1 8 . 3
8 . Change in financial liabilities 3 6 . 9 4 1 . 0 4 3 . 5 4 9 . 8 5 2 . 4
General government 8 . 1 8 . 6 3 . 7 4 . 1 2 . 9
Financial institutions 1 6 . 6 1 8 . 8 2 1 . 1 2 2 . 9 2 1 . 7
Non-financial corporations and households 1 2 . 2 1 3 . 6 1 8 . 7 2 2 . 9 2 7 . 7
Households 3 . 6 4 . 1 5 . 9 6 . 8 8 . 0
Non-financial corporations 8 . 6 9 . 5 1 2 . 8 1 6 . 1 1 9 . 7
Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística and Banco de España.
(a) Includes the change in stocks and net acquisitions of valuables and of non-financial non-produced assets.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
0.7 percentage points below the 1998 level (see
the top panel of Table IV.6), but significantly
less negative than in the previous upswing in
the late eighties. The relatively favourable posi-
tion indicated by the figures for firms’ net finan-
cial saving may be a consequence of the rela-
tively low buoyancy of gross capital formation
and higher foreign direct investment; the latter
flows, since they represent financial assets of
firms, are not deducted when calculating the
sector’s net financial saving. However, the situ-
ation is also the result of the financial restructur-
ing which has taken place in recent years, part-
ly based on the lower financial cost of borrowed
funds (see Box IV.4). In this respect, it should
be pointed out that the process of gradual de-
cline in interest rates came to an end in 1999,
so that firms cannot expect the financial
charges on their debt to continue to decline as
they have in recent years.
Despite the increase in their borrowing, the
net financial wealth(9) of firms continued to
rise in 1999, primarily as a consequence of the
revaluation of their share portfolios (see the top
panel of Chart IV.7). This revaluation may have
had two types of positive effect on investment.
First, insofar as the ratio between the market
value of firms and the cost of increasing in-
stalled capacity has risen, the revaluation will
have boosted fixed-capital investment demand.
Second, the increase in the value of the securi-
ty available for obtaining financing will have
helped to reduce the cost of borrowing and, as
a result, the user cost of capital. It is also possi-
ble that the growth in firms’ net financial wealth
has affected the credit extended to the sector,
by increasing firms’ readiness to borrow and al-
so by increasing the supply of bank credit,
through raising the market value of collateral.
A breakdown by instrument of firms’ financial
investment (see Table IV.6) shows that the bulk
corresponded to the acquisition of shares and
other equity and the extension of inter-company
credit. In the first case, a significant part of the
securities acquired represents the takeover of
foreign companies, under the strategy of inter-
national expansion pursued by large domestic
firms, in their desire to attain a larger size and
to exploit the business opportunities of less ma-
ture markets.
As for the liabilities of the firms, the most no-
table development in 1999 was the diversifica-
tion of the sectors’ sources of financing. As al-
ready mentioned in section IV.2, the healthy
economic and stock market outlook encouraged
IPOs and capital increases by certain firms. Is-
suance of fixed-income securities was small,
but it should also be stressed that this market
was revitalised by certain tax changes and the
start of Stage Three of EMU. Loans from
abroad also increased forcefully, and may to a
certain extent have financed the acquisition of
assets abroad. Finally, bank credit grew signifi-
cantly, although the appeal to other sources of
financing meant that its relative importance in
the total flow of liabilities declined from 33 % in
1998 to 29 % in 1999.
One way of assessing a sector’s financial po-
sition is to compare its debt with its financial as-
sets. It can be seen, using this method, that de-
spite the sharp increase in the liabilities of firms
in recent years, as a proportion of total financial
assets they were in decline (see Table IV.6),
owing to the accumulation of assets and, above
all, to the sharp revaluation of equities. Howev-
er, if equities are deducted from total financial
assets (given that their realisable value is less
certain), the trend in firms’ liabilities relative to
their total financial assets was less favourable.
The gross saving of householdsin 1999, al-
though higher than residential investment, con-
tinued to decline in relation to GDP (see the
bottom panel of Chart IV.6). The sustained high
volume of acquisition of financial assets and the
increase in the purchase of real assets were fi-
nanced, therefore, through higher borrowing
(see Chart IV.8). The flows of financial assets
and liabilities led to a significant reduction in net
financial saving in 1999. The latter fell to 1.5 %
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CHART IV.5
Net financial saving
   Source: Banco de España.
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( 9 ) Net financial wealth is the difference between the
stocks of financial assets and of liabilities, and is equivalent
to the concept of net financial assetsdefined in ESA 95.
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BOX IV.4
Interest income flows in Spain between 1995 and 1999
Interest rate movements are immediately reflected in the composition of agents’ portfolios of financial assets and liabilities, since they change both the
relative attractiveness of one financial asset to another and the levels of debt assumed. The trend in interest rates affects the flows of income that periodically
accrue on financial assets and liabilities directly and indirectly. The change in interest rates itself directly alters the income accruing on a given stock, and also
induces an indirect effect on stocks and the composition of portfolios.
Expression (I) represents the change in income received (or paid) as a result of holding a financial asset (or liability) between time t=T (IT) and a r fer-
ence time t=0 (I0). This change in income, [IT – I0], breaks down, by means of a simple arithmetic manipulation, into two summands. The first can be interpreted
as the change in income attributable to the change in interest rates between times 0 and T, [S0
* (iT – i0)], while the second reflects the change in the amount of
income accruing as a result of the change in stocks during the same period [(ST – S0)
* iT].
DIt = IT – I0 = ST * iT – S0 * i0 = S0 * (iT – i0) + (ST – S0) * iT (I)
This breakdown has been used to calculate the total changes in interest income on the portfolios of each group of agents, which has enabled the total in-
come received and paid to be allocated between sectors(1). Taking as a basic reference the levels of interest rates and the structure of portfolios of financial
assets and liabilities as of the final quarter of 1995 (t = 0), the cumulative changes in income have been calculated for each group of agents to the fourth quar-
ter of 1999(2). This period was characterised by a continuous decline in interest rates that began in the final quarter of 1995 and continued until mid-1999.
The decline in interest rates means that the most indebted sectors, in net terms, have seen their income rise, basically as a consequence of the lower in-
terest payments on their liabilities. Non-financial corporations and general government come into this category (see the chart below). The counterpart sectors,
negatively affected by the decline in interest rates, in terms of interest income, were those that have traditionally maintained a net creditor position in instru-
ments generating periodic flows of interest, such as credit institutions and households.
As regards households,their interest income fell by around 3.3 % of GDP during the reference period(3). Even if it is considered that households are the
main shareholders of mutual funds, their interest income still does not increase if they are consolidated with that sector. However, it should be recalled that
households’ financial assets (in particular, shares in mutual funds and equities) have been significantly revalued in recent years, largely coinciding with the de-
cline in interest rates. This revaluation can be estimated, in cumulative terms, as equivalent to 55 % of GDP. Although the effects on demand of the lower inter-
est income and the large revaluation in financial assets may cancel each other out, assessing their total net effect on household spending decisions is compli-
cated. In the case of households, the net amount of accrued income associated with the change in stocks was negative, due primarily to the fact that the lower
level of interest rates stimulated an increase in the sector’s indebtedness. Consequently, the liabilities generating interest payments grew to a greater extent
than the financial assets on which periodic income accrues.
For non-financial corporations,the decline in interest rates had a very favourable impact, estimated at 2.9 % of GDP, although the effect of the change in
stocks partly offset the income gains obtained through the fall in interest rates. As in the case of households, this was due to the significant increase in the net
indebtedness of the sector in recent years, against a background of economic expansion, rising corporate profitability and reductions in the cost of borrowing.
The case of general government was somewhat similar. Between 1996 and 1999 it recorded cumulative net saving equal to 5 % of GDP. This can be broken
down into a reduction in payments, equal to 7.7 % of GDP, due to the change in interest rates, which far outweighed the increase in payments (estimated to
have been 2.7 % of GDP) associated with the change in stocks (arising from the growing stock of outstanding public debt in the period). The change in interest
rates also significantly affected credit institutions. During the period considered, these institutions suffered a decline in their cumulative net income equal to
3.4% of GDP. Despite this drastic reduction, credit institutions have adapted to the new low interest rate environment by restructuring their sources of income
and reorienting their business towards new activities. For example, in recent years, their income from commissions on transactions and fees for services pro-
vided to customers has increased notably, enabling the effects of the narrowing of the net interest margin to be neutralised.
Finally, it should be stressed that interest rate developments have led to a fall in the payments of interest by the Spanish economy to on-resident in-
vestors.The total effect is the sum of two components: a saving of interest payments arising from the fall in interest rates, equal to 1.8 % of GDP; and an in-
crease in interest payments owing to the rise in external indebtedness on the part of credit institutions and non-financial corporations, estimated to be equal to
0.6 % of GDP. The total interest paid thus declined by 1.2% of GDP.
Cumulative changes in interest income between 1996 and 1999
As a % of 1999 GDP
   Source: Banco de España.
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(1) In this exercise, the financial assets and liabilities on which periodic interest receipts and payments accrue are considered to be the following: transferable deposits, short-term securi-
ties, bonds and loans. Similarly the following sectoral groupings have been considered: households, non-financial corporations, credit institutions (including the Banco de España, other mone-
tary institutions, the Official Credit Institute and specialised credit institutions), the so-called institutional investors (portfolio investment institutions, securities-dealer companies and securities
agencies and insurance corporations), general government and, finally, the external sector.
(2) The criteria used to estimate the inter-sectoral changes in interest income are set out in greater detail in the February 2000 issue of the Banco de España Boletín económico,in an ar-
ticle entitled “Evolución de los flujos por intereses en España entre 1995 y 1999”.
(3) This figure was obtained by accumulating the saving recorded, year by year, during the period 1996-1999 and dividing by the GDP of 1999.
of GDP (from 2.9 % in 1998), representing the
smallest flow of household saving in the past
decade.
Despite this increase in liabilities, the net fi-
nancial wealth of households continued to in-
crease in 1999. As in the case of firms, this was
partly the result of the net acquisition of new fi-
nancial assets, but mainly it was a conse-
quence of the revaluation of assets. The strong
growth in the financial wealth of households in
recent years, together with the increase in the
wealth of the sector held in real assets, as a
consequence of rising house prices and the
growth in residential investment, has been a
factor that has tended to expand aggregate de-
mand. First, it has encouraged households to
spend a higher proportion of their disposable in-
come (thereby helping to reduce the saving ra-
tio) and second it has made it easier for house-
holds to borrow.
In recent years, within households’ acquisi-
t on of financial assets there was a major
switching of funds from traditional bank instru-
ments towards other assets capable of being
revalued in a low interest rate environment,
such as mutual fund shares and equities. This
pattern changed in 1999. First, as analysed in
section IV.3, the bringing of the tax treatment of
bank deposits into line with that of mutual funds
led to a significant increase in the demand for
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CHART IV.6
Saving, investment and financing of households and non-financial corporations
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   (a)   Calculated by subtracting foreign equities from the change in assets.
   (b)   Gross capital formation includes changes in stocks and purchases of valuables and of non-financial assets.
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TABLE IV.6
Non-financial corporations and households. Financial transactions
% of GDP
Net financial saving –0.1 –0.7 –1.4
Net change in financial assets 12.7 15.3 18.3
Cash and transferable deposits 1.5 1.6 1.0
Other deposits 1.6 0.1 –0.9
Of which: rest of the world 1.1 1.5 –1.1
Short-term securities and bonds 0.1 0.1 1.1
Shares and other equity 1.7 3.5 7.5
Of which: shares in mutual funds 0.7 0.6 0.2
Insurance technical reserves 0.2 0.1 0.1
Credit and other 7.6 9.9 9.5
Net change in liabilities 12.8 16.1 19.7
Short-term securities and bonds –0.1 0.0 0.4
Shares and other equity 1.7 2.3 3.8
Credit 10.9 13.8 15.7
Of which:
Credit institutions 4.5 5.3 5.8
Trade credit 6.3 6.7 6.8
Rest of the world 0.1 1.7 2.9
Insurance technical reserves and other 0.3 0.0 –0.1
MEMORANDUM ITEM (%):
Stock of liabilities (a)/stock of financial assets 87.4 79.8 76.8
Stock of liabilities (a)/stock of financial assets (a) 128.0 126.3 130.0
Net financial saving 4.1 2.9 1.5
Net change in financial assets 10.0 9.7 9.5
Cash and transferable deposits 1.0 1.2 2.1
Other deposits –1.7 0.6 4.4
Of which: rest of the world 0.8 0.8 0.6
Short-term securities and bonds 0.0 –0.4 0.4
Shares and other equity 9.4 5.0 –1.8
Of which: shares in mutual funds 8.2 5.4 –1.7
Insurance technical reserves 2.6 2.4 2.8
Credit and other –1.4 1.0 1.7
Net change in liabilities 5.9 6.8 8.0
Credit 6.0 7.0 8.3
Of which:
Credit institutions 4.5 5.9 6.5
Trade credit 1.2 0.6 1.2
Rest of the world 0.4 0.4 0.5
Insurance technical reserves and other –0.1 –0.2 –0.4
MEMORANDUM ITEM (%):
Stock of liabilities (a)/stock of financial assets 30.6 29.1 29.4
Stock of liabilities (a)/stock of financial assets (a) 41.6 43.1 45.7
Source: Banco de España.
(a) Shares not included.
1997 1998 1999
HOUSEHOLDS
NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS
bank deposits and, in particular, time deposits.
Second, households disposed of part of their
securities portfolio in 1999. However, this was
the result of a reduction in equities and in
shares in money market and fixed income funds
(made less attractive by the low short-term inter-
est rates and the higher long-term rates), while
investment in equity funds increased. That said,
the stock of households’ equity holdings grew
considerably last year, to represent around one
third of the financial assets of the sector by end-
1999, equivalent to nearly 70 % of GDP. Finally,
the continued investment in financial insurance
products was notable. For several years now
these have channelled a relatively stable flow of
household saving equal to nearly 3 % of GDP.
As a result, the stock of such products exceed-
ed 20 % of GDP by end-1999.
The financing obtained by households sus-
tained the upward trend of previous years (see
Chart IV.8). Most of this financing came from
bank credit, which rose by 6.5 % of GDP, the
largest flow of the past decade. Among other
factors, the low level of interest rates and the
strategies of banks, continued to boost credit
for the acquisition of housing, which grew by
nearly 20 % over the year as a whole. By con-
trast, the stock of loans to finance the acquisi-
tion of consumer durables slowed during the
year, although its growth held at high rates.
Households’ liabilities as a proportion of their
total financial assets fell slightly in 1999 to
30%. As in the case of firms, this was primarily
due to the revaluation of shares. Deducting
shares from financial assets reverses this trend,
with a small acceleration in recent years (see
Table IV.6), although even in this case, the
stock of financial assets held by households is
still more than double the sector’s liabilities.
IV.4.2. General government
General government saving continued to in-
crease in 1999, to stand at 3 % of GDP. This,
together with the moderate rate of growth of
gross capital formation, led to a reduction in the
sector’s borrowing requirement, to 1.1 % of
GDP (see Chart IV.9). The reduction in the pub-
lic deficit in recent years has enabled the out-
standing stock of debt to decline from its 1996
peak by 4.5 percentage points of GDP. Accord-
ing to Government data submitted under the
Excessive Deficit Procedure in March, the con-
solidated nominal gross debt of general govern-
ment was 63.5 % of GDP in 1999 (Box III.4
contains a detailed analysis of the impact on
the general government sector of the introduc-
tion of the new system of accounts known as
ESA 95)
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CHART IV.7
Financial wealth of non-financial corporations
     Source: Banco de España.
   (a)   Stocks include the changes in assets (or in liabilities), along
with changes in value having arisen during the period.
   (b)   Excludes shares.
   (c)   Includes shares, shares in mutual funds and other holdings.
   (d)   Includes fixed-income securities, shares and other holdings.
   (e)   Includes resident and non-resident institutions.
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CHART IV.8
Household financial wealth
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   (a)   Stocks include the changes in assets (or in liabilities), along
with the changes in value having arisen during the period.
   (b)   Includes, shares, shares in mutual funds and other holdings.
   (c)   Includes resident and non-resident institutions.
CHART IV.9
General government saving,
investment and financing
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The decline in the general government
deficit was the result of lower borrowing require-
ments on the part of all the bodies making up
the sector. The decline in the general govern-
ment borrowing requirement in 1999 was re-
flected in a smaller increase in its liabilities than
in previous years, while the increase in assets,
relative to GDP, was sustained. Net issuance of
short-term securities remained negative, al-
though less so than in 1998. The outstanding
stock of medium and long-term securities con-
tinued to rise, although the volume of net is-
suance extended the downward path of the last
four years (see Chart IV.9). This strategy of ad-
justing financing maturities was accompanied in
1999 by operations to exchange State securi-
ties issued in the past at higher interest rates,
for new securities paying interest at a lower
rate. The purpose of these exchanges (which
totalled EUR 5.6 billion in 1999) was to reduce
the financial expenses on outstanding debt in
coming years. However, there was an increase
in the financial charge last year, owing to the re-
demption of liabilities paying higher interest
rates than those issued in the same period. The
pattern of securities issuance at the various ma-
turities, together with these exchanges, enabled
the average life of state debt to continue to
lengthen. It stood at more than five years at the
beginning of 2000.
Among the sectors that financed general
government in 1999, non-residents were the
main purchasers of instruments issued by gen-
eral government. The institutional investors
(which had absorbed the bulk of the public se-
curities issued in the three previous years) re-
duced their portfolio of public debt, insofar as
they sold money market and fixed income mu-
tual fund shares (see the bottom panel of Chart
IV.9).
IV.4.3. Saving, investment and financing
of the economy
As indicated in the introduction to this sec-
tion, following a four-year period of positive net
lending, in 1999 the Spanish economy once
again required financing from the rest of the
world (see Table IV.5). The existence of this net
borrowing (which amounted to 0.6 % of GDP)
shows that national saving was not high enough
to finance the strong growth in gross capital for-
mation last year. However, in balance of pay-
ments terms, this net borrowing was covered by
a debtor position on the financial account of
2 % of GDP, the discrepancy being explained
by the existence of an errors and omissions
item and the use of different valuation criteria.
In terms of assets and liabilities, external liabili-
ties rose by 16.3 % of GDP, while assets vis-à-
vis the rest of the world increased by 14.3 % of
GDP.
External assets and liabilities have grown
strongly in recent years. This has been a con-
sequence of, among other factors, the complete
liberalisation of capital movements, the interna-
tionalisation of financial markets and the
macroeconomic-stability policy pursued in
Spain, which gave rise to expectations (subse-
quently confirmed) that the Spanish economy
would join the euro area. The total stock of ex-
ternal assets and liabilities reached more than
176 % of GDP in 1999, compared with 109 % of
GDP in 1995. Despite the notable increase in
external debt, the rate of acquisition of assets
was even faster, so that by end-1999 external
assets represented 80 % of liabilities, ten per-
centage points up on the 1995 level.
The accumulation of external assets basical-
ly took the form of direct and portfolio invest-
ment, which represented 13.8 % of GDP. In
1999, direct investment stood at twice the al-
ready high level recorded the previous year, pri-
marily as a result of the acquisition of holdings in
Latin American companies. Portfolio investment
also expanded strongly, through purchases of
equities, shares in foreign mutual funds and
fixed income securities. As already mentioned in
sections IV.2 and IV.3, this reflects both the
growing interest of institutional investors and the
banking system in diversifying their securities
portfolios internationally, and a certain scarcity
of securities on the domestic market.
Other Spanish investment abroad (which in-
cludes loans and deposits) saw a significant de-
cline in the deposits of the non-credit private-
sector in non-resident credit institutions (includ-
ing the foreign branches of Spanish banks),
which meant a departure from the trend dis-
played by these capital flows in recent years
(see Table IV.7). The reasons for this may be
connected with changes in the post-tax financial
return on foreign deposits relative to other fi-
nancial instruments. Also, resident credit institu-
tions reduced their external assets slightly. The
assets of the credit system as a whole rose,
however, due to the assets held by the Banco
de España in the Eurosystem, which were driv-
en by the transfers of funds between Spanish
credit institutions and the rest of the euro area.
As regards reserve assets, the fall in 1999 re-
flected the transfer of reserves from the Banco
de España to the ECB at the beginning of the
year, and the expiry of currency swaps entered
into in the past.
In relation to capital inflows, unlike in 1998
when more than half of the increase in liabilities
was due to loans obtained and deposits taken
108
by the credit system, in 1999 it was notable that
other resident sectors (i.e. general government
and the non-credit private-sector) resorted sig-
nificantly to external financing. In particular, the
non-credit private sector obtained a similar vol-
ume of funds from the rest of the world (through
direct investment, the sale of securities and
loans) to that raised by the credit system. This
shows the growing capacity of Spanish firms to
tap international markets directly in order to
cover their borrowing requirement.
Finally, as already mentioned in section IV.3,
the credit system continued to resort to external
financing in 1999, although at a more moderate
rate and with greater diversification than in pre-
vious years. While in 1996 and 1997 more than
8 0 % of capital inflows destined for the credit
system were in the form of short-term loans and
deposits, in 1999 this percentage was only
3 3 %, the rest being distributed among long-
term loans and deposits and the placement of
securities. Moreover, credit institutions reduced
their borrowing requirement by selling external
assets.
The capital flows seen in recent years show
that the Spanish economy has reached a cer-
tain level of maturity. From being an economy
which had to finance its domestic growth
through inflows of foreign capital, it has become
a more open economy more integrated into the
international economy, with a very significant
foreign investment outflow. Moreover, this pro-
cess is permanent in nature, being bound up in
the medium-term expansion strategies of large
Spanish firms. Such a situation certainly in-
volves risks, but these are inseparable from the
higher rates of return that Spanish firms can ob-
tain in third countries. The firms concerned, the
supervisory authorities and the investor com-
munity should make a prudent assessment of
such risks, each promoting control mechanisms
and good governance in the firms, so that in-
centives exist for the right decisions to be
reached.
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TABLE IV.7
Financial account of the Balance of Payments
As a % of GDP
FINANCIAL-ACCOUNT BALANCE –0.3 –0.7 –0.6 0.0 2.0
Change in external liabilities 5.8 4.6 7.0 12.8 16.3
Foreign investment in Spain 4.7 1.6 3.4 5.0 9.3
Direct investment 1.1 1.1 1.1 2.0 1.6
Portfolio investment 3.6 0.5 2.3 2.9 7.8
General government 3.0 0.3 2.0 0.8 4.5
Other resident sectors 0.6 –0.1 0.2 1.6 1.8
Credit system 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.5 1.4
Other foreign investment in Spain 1.1 2.9 3.6 7.9 6.9
General government 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0
Other resident sectors 0.1 –0.2 0.1 0.8 2.7
Credit system 0.7 3.1 3.5 6.8 4.3
Change in external assets 6.0 5.2 7.6 12.8 14.3
Spanish investment abroad 0.9 1.7 5.2 11.2 13.8
Direct investment 0.7 0.9 2.2 3.3 5.9
Portfolio investment 0.2 0.7 2.9 7.9 7.8
Other resident sectors 0.1 0.4 2.1 6.0 5.4
Credit system 0.1 0.4 0.9 2.0 2.4
Other Spanish investment abroad 6.3 –0.4 0.3 4.0 4.2
General government 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Other resident sectors 1.6 1.1 2.5 3.3 –1.6
Credit system 4.6 –1.6 –2.3 0.6 5.8
Of which: BE: intra-system assets … … … … 5.9
Reserve assets –1.2 4.0 2.1 –2.3 –3.7
MEMORANDUM ITEM: BREAKDOWN OF FLOWS BY SECTOR
(CHANGE IN LIABILITIES – CHANGE IN ASSETS)::
Credit system (without BE) –4.1 4.7 4.7 4.5 3.5
Banco de España (a) 1.2 –4.0 –2.1 2.3 –2.1
General government 3.2 0.2 2.0 0.9 4.4
Other resident sectors –0.5 –1.6 –5.1 –7.8 –3.8
Source: Banco de España.
(a) Includes reserve assets and intra-system assets.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
ANNUAL ACCOUNTS OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA (*)
1999
(*) Subject to the provisions of Article 4.2 of Law 13/1994 of 1 June 1994 of Autonomy of the Banco de España.
INTRODUCTION
The annual accounts of the Banco de Es-
paña (“the Bank”), as established by Article
29.1 of its internal rules, comprise the balance
sheet, the profit and loss account and the notes
to the accounts. The accounts, pursuant to the
provisions of the same article, have been pre-
pared in accordance with the Bank’s internal
accounting rules. These rules follow generally
accepted accounting principles, adapted to the
special characteristics of the operations and
functions of a central bank. They also comply,
in all applicable aspects, with the accounting
criteria and valuation rules established for the
European System of Central Banks (ESCB), as
required by Article 26.4 of the Statute of the ES-
CB, relating to standardisation of accounting
principles and practices in the Eurosystem.
The annual accounts of the Banco de Es-
paña have been submitted, in accordance with
the provisions of Articles 29 and 32 of its inter-
nal rules, to internal audit by the In- house Audit
Department and to review by the Accounts Re-
view Committee, appointed for the purpose by a
resolution of the Governing Council of the Ban-
co de España of 21 December 1999, whose re-
port is included below. The accounts have also
been audited by independent external auditors,
as stipulated by Article 27 of the Statute of the
ESCB, whose report is also included below.
Under the provisions of Article 4.2 of Law
13/1994 of 1 June 1994 of Autonomy of the
Banco de España, it is for the government, up-
on proposal by the Economy and Finance Min-
ister, to approve the balance sheet and ac-
counts of the Bank, which will be sent to Parlia-
ment for informational purposes. The Governing
Council of the Bank, under the provisions of Ar-
ticle 21.1 (g) of said Law, is responsible for for-
mulating the Bank’s accounts.
Unless otherwise indicated, the figures refer
to millions of euro. For ease of comparability,
1998 figures are given on the same basis, i.e.
using the same unit of account (converting pe-
setas into euro at the irrevocable exchange rate
of PTA 166.386 per euro) and the new structure
of the balance sheet, profit and loss account
and accounting standards established by the
ESCB. It should be pointed out that the discrep-
ancies that may, on occasions, be observed be-
tween the breakdowns in the notes and the fig-
ures in the balance sheet and profit and loss
account arise from the rounding of the former.
This document presents the accounts for the
year 1999. Section I includes the reports of the
external auditors and of the Banco de España
Accounts Review Committee; Section II, the
balance sheet and profit and loss account; Sec-
tion III, the notes to the accounts, with the valu-
ation criteria used and explanatory notes on the
most important aspects of the balance sheet
and profit and loss account. Finally, Section IV,
in compliance with Article 4.2 of the Law of Au-
tonomy, details the contributions made to the
Deposit Insurance Funds and the loans and
transactions not conducted on an arm’s-length
basis or which in any other way entail a loss of
profit or losses for the Bank, giving estimates of
the amount of such loss of profit or losses.
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I. REPORTS OF THE EXTERNAL
AUDITORS AND OF THE BANCO
DE ESPAÑA ACCOUNTS REVIEW
COMMITTEE
I.1. LETTER FROM THE EXTERNAL AUDITORS
The Governor and Governing Council of the Banco de España
We have audited the annual accounts of the Banco de España, comprising the balance sheet as of
31 December 1999, the profit and loss account and the notes to the accounts for the year then end-
ed. The Governing Council is responsible for the preparation of the accounts. It is our responsibility
to express an opinion on the annual accounts taken as a whole based on our audit.
We conducted our audit in accordance with International Standards of Auditing, which require us to
plan and conduct the audit in such a way that we can be reasonably certain that the annual ac-
counts do not contain any material errors. An audit includes examination, by means of selective
tests, of the documentation supporting the annual accounts and evaluation of their presentation. It
also includes an evaluation of the estimates made and of whether the accounting principles applied
are appropriate to the Banco de España’s circumstances and adequately disclosed. We consider
that our work provides an adequate basis for our opinion.
For purposes of comparison, the attached annual accounts present, in addition to the 1999 figures,
those for the previous year for each balance sheet and profit and loss account item. Our opinion
refers solely to the 1999 annual accounts.
In our opinion, the annual accounts referred to above present a true and fair view, in all material re-
spects, of the net worth and financial position of the Banco de España as of 31 December 1999,
and of the net profit from its operations in the year then ended, and contain the sufficient necessary
information for their proper interpretation and comprehension, in conformity with the accounting prin-
ciples and standards referred to in Section III.1 of the notes to the accounts, based on the account-
ing rules established for the member central banks of the European System of Central Banks, which
are consistent with those applied the previous year.
Pricewaterhouse Coopers Auditores, S.L.
[signed]
Juan José Hierro
Partner – Auditor
1 June 2000
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I.2. REPORT OF THE ACCOUNTS REVIEW
COMMITTEE
We the undersigned, José Manuel Gonzá-
lez-Páramo, Eduardo Bueno and Jaime Re-
queijo, members of the Governing Council of
the Banco de España and of the Accounts Re-
view Committee appointed by the Governing
Council, were given the task of reviewing the
accounts of the institution for the year 1999.
By virtue of this mandate, the Accounts Re-
view Committee has analysed the operations of
the Banco de España. This examination basi-
cally involved: 1) studying the Annual Accounts
of the Banco de España for the year 1999, pre-
pared by the Control and Accounting Depart-
ment of the Banco de España; 2) studying the
internal audit of the balance sheet and profit
and loss account of the Banco de España for
1999, conducted by the In-house Audit Depart-
ment; 3) studying the documentation requested
by the members of this Committee from the in-
dependent external auditors; 4) interviewing the
senior managers of the Control and Accounting
Department and of the In-house Audit Depart-
ment of the Banco de España; 5) interviewing
the senior managers of the independent exter-
nal audit firm; and 6) making proposals for the
modification, correction or clarification of vari-
ous matters, all of which have been satisfactori-
ly incorporated in the Annual Accounts by the
Control and Accounting Department.
The basic conclusion of our report is that
from the analysis carried out of the examination
and accounting procedures, of the accounting
records and of the internal controls carried out,
it can be inferred that the Annual Accounts for
the year 1999 present a true and fair view of the
net worth and financial position of the Banco de
España.
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D. JOSÉ MANUEL GONZÁLEZ-PÁRAMO D. EDUARDO BUENO CAMPOS D. JAIME REQUEIJO GONZÁLEZ
MARTÍNEZ-MURILLO
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I I . BALANCE SHEET AND PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT
Balance sheet of the Banco de España as at 31 December 1999
(EUR millions)
ASSETS
1. Gold and gold receivables 1 4,872.62 4,813.79
2. Claims on non-euro area residents denominated in foreign currency 32,655.83 47,453.50
2.1. Receivables from the IMF 2 1,933.49 2,555.49
2.2. Balances with banks and security investments, external loans and
other external assets 3 30,722.34 44,898.01
3. Claims on euro area residents denominated in foreign currency 0.03 0.00
4. Claims on non-euro area residents denominated in euro 4 4,118.98 43.02
4.1. Balances with banks, security investments and loans 4,118.98 43.02
4.2. Claims arising from the credit facility under ERM II 0.00 0.00
5. Lending to financial sector counterparties of euro area
denominated in euro 5 24,184.30 26,876.67
5.1. Main refinancing operations 20,347.70 23,134.89
5.2. Long-term refinancing operations 3,379.30 0.00
5.3. Fine-tuning reverse operations 0.00 0.00
5.4. Structural reverse operations 0.00 0.00
5.5. Marginal lending facility 453.00 3,711.26
5.6. Credits related to margin calls 1.55 25.88
5.7. Other claims 2.75 4.64
6. Securities of euro area residents denominated in euro 0.00 0.00
7. General government debt denominated in euro 11,632.68 12,181.61
7.1. State 6 9,842.54 10,341.28
7.2. Social Security 7 1,790.14 1,840.33
8. Intra-Eurosystem claims 8 32,821.83 444.68
8.1. Participating interest in ECB 444.68 444.68
8.2. Claims equivalent to the transfer of foreign reserves 4,446.75 0.00
8.4. Other claims within the Eurosystem (net) 27,930.40 0.00
9. Items in course of settlement 9 4.81 303.09
10. Other assets 6,563.92 7,684.91
10.2. Tangible and intangible fixed assets 10 223.50 229.51
10.3. Other financial assets 11 3,534.83 3,687.56
10.4. Off-balance-sheet instruments revaluation differences 12 0.00 767.12
10.5. Accruals and deferred expenditure 13 738.97 597.31
10.6. Sundry 14 2,066.62 2,403.41
TOTAL ASSETS 116,854.99 99,801.27
Note
number 1999 1998
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LIABILITIES
1. Banknotes in circulation 15 58,911.16 52,731.24
2. Liabilities to euro area financial sector counterparties
denominated in euro 16 12,490.92 7,410.69
2.1. Current accounts (covering the minimum reserve system) 12,462.00 6,431.34
2.2. Deposit facility 28.00 967.46
2.3. Fixed-term deposits 0.00 0.00
2.4. Fine-tuning reverse operations 0.00 0.00
2.5. Deposits related to margin calls 0.92 11.89
2.6. Other liabilities 0.00 0.00
3. Debt certificates issued 17 3,301.82 6,345.81
4. Liabilities to other euro area residents denominated in euro 22,082.66 13,874.80
4.1. General government 18 20,947.66 12,846.14
4.2. Other liabilities 19 1,135.00 1,028.66
5. Liabilities to non-euro area residents denominated in euro 20 451.07 48.99
6. Liabilities to euro area residents denominated in euro 2.66 1.21
7. Liabilities to non-euro area residents denominated in foreign currency 548.38 0.53
7.1. Deposits, balances and other liabilities 21 548.38 0.53
7.2. Liabilities arising from the credit facility under ERM II 0.00 0.00
8. Counterpart of special drawing rights allocated by the IMF 22 407.86 359.90
9. Intro-Eurosystem liabilities 0.00 0.08
9.2. Liabilities related to promissory notes backing the issuance of ECB
debt certificates 0.00 0.00
9.3. Other liabilities within the Eurosystem (net) 0.00 0.08
10. Items in course of settlement 23 260.81 509.10
11. Other liabilities 891.10 1,267.65
11.1. Off-balance-sheet instruments revaluation differences 24 1.22 0.00
11.2. Accruals and deferred income 25 125.25 151.21
11.3. Sundry 26 764.63 1,116.44
12. Provisions 27 3,796.81 3,790.06
13. Revaluation accounts 28 9,641.37 6,988.21
14. Capital and reserves 4.54 4.54
14.1. Capital 29 1.37 1.37
14.2. Reserves 30 3.17 3.17
15. Profit for the year 31 4,063.83 6,468.46
TOTAL LIABILITIES 116,854.99 99,801.27
Note
number 1999 1998
Balance sheet of the Banco de España as at 31 December 1999 (continued)
(EUR millions)
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Profit and loss account of the Banco de España for the year ending 31 December 1999
(EUR millions)
Interest income 1 3,091.84 4,471.79
Interest expense 2 –699.74 –936.76
Net interest income 2,392.10 3,535.03
Realised gains/losses arising from financial operations 3 2,304.78 745.54
Write-downs on financial assets and positions 4 –398.21 –13.52
Transfer to/from provisions for foreign exchange rate and price risks 0.00 0.00
Net result of financial operations, write-downs and risk provisions 1,906.57 732.02
Fees and commissions income 35.94 24.18
Fees and commissions expense –1.33 –1.58
Net income from fees and commissions 5 34.61 22.60
Income from equity shares and participating interests 6 1.60 1.45
Net result of pooling of monetary income 7 –22.61 0.00
Other income 8 139.17 2,527.06
TOTAL NET INCOME 4,451.44 6,818.16
Staff cost 9 –170.35 –164.15
Other administrative expenses 10 –54.08 –45.66
Depreciation of (in)tangible fixed assets 11 –16.22 –15.53
Banknote production services 12 –56.41 –43.95
Other expenses 13 –0.85 –0.76
TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES –297.91 –270.05
Transfers and additions to other funds and provisions 14 –89.70 –79.65
PROFIT FOT THE YEAR 15 4,063.83 6,468.46
Note
number 1999 1998
III. NOTES TO THE ACCOUNTS
III.1. VALUATION CRITERIA
1. Basic principles
The following accounting principles have
been applied:
• economic reality and transparency;
• prudence;
• recognition of post-balance-sheet events;
• materiality;
• the accruals principle;
• consistency and comparability.
2. Basis of accounting
The accounts have been prepared on a his-
torical cost basis, modified to include market
valuation of marketable securities, gold and the
foreign currency position. Transactions in finan-
cial assets and liabilities are reflected in the ac-
counts on the basis of the date on which they
are settled.
As an exception to the application of the
general historical cost criterion it should be
pointed out that, on 31 December 1998, in ap-
plication of the harmonised accounting stan-
dards established for the European System of
Central Banks, gold, domestic and foreign se-
curities and foreign currencies were valued at
their market prices and exchange rates, without
recognition of profits, in the event of unrealised
gains, and with a charge to the profit and loss
account in the case of unrealised losses.
The specific valuation criteria applied to
each of the assets and liabilities specified were
the following:
Gold
Purchases are recorded at their purchase
price, including the expenses inherent to the
transaction. The cost of sales is determined by
applying the daily LIFO method. In the event
that the cash to be paid or received is specified
in a foreign currency, it is translated into euro at
the mid-market exchange rate two business
days before the settlement date.
On the last day of each calendar quarter
stocks are valued at the market price per troy
ounce of fine gold supplied by the European
Central Bank, with the appropriate accounting
adjustments, without changing the average
book price
Unrealised losses existing at the end of the
year are taken to the profit and loss account
and the average book price is changed. Such
losses are considered irreversible.
Sales of gold for foreign currency under re-
purchase agreements are recorded as off-bal-
ance-sheet items, with no effect on the balance
sheet. Possible differences arising between
gold delivered spot and that received forward
are recorded as if there had been an indepen-
dent outright sale or purchase.
Special drawing rights
SDRs and the net IMF position are valued at
the year-end SDR market exchange rate. 
Foreign securities
Foreign securities are recorded at the pur-
chase price, which is determined by the cash
amount paid, after deducting any accrued gross
coupon.
The cost of foreign securities sold or re-
deemed is determined by the average book
price of the security in question.
Foreign securities are revalued quarterly, in
line with market price. This revaluation is car-
ried out without any netting of unrealised gains
and losses on different security codes. Gains
and losses (with the exception of losses at
year-end are reflected in adjustment accounts
and credited or debited, respectively, to revalu-
ation and expense accounts, with both can-
celled at the end of the following quarter.
Losses existing at the end of the year are
taken to the profit and loss account. Their
amount is credited directly to the securities ac-
count, and the average book price – and there-
fore the implicit rate of return - of the security
code concerned is changed. Such losses are
considered irreversible, not being cancelled at
the end of the following quarter.
Any premiums, discounts and coupons that
have accrued but are not due are recorded in
accruals accounts, using the implicit rate of re-
turn of each security code for their calculation.
The above references to purchase and mar-
ket prices shall be understood to refer to the rel-
evant currency, these amounts being translated
into euro, as stipulated below.
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Convertible currencies
Purchases and sales of foreign currencies
against euro are valued at the exchange rate
agreed in the transaction. Where foreign cur-
rencies are bought and sold against other for-
eign currencies the euro valuation is at the mid-
market exchange rate of the currency sold on
the contract date.
The cost in euro of foreign currency sold is
calculated using the daily LIFO method.
On the last day of each calendar quarter
stocks are valued at the mid-market exchange
rate, with the relevant adjustments, without
changing the average book price. Losses exist-
ing at the end of the year, for each currency,
are taken to the profit and loss account, and the
average book exchange rate changed. Such
losses are considered irreversible.
Repurchase agreements involving securities
Securities acquired under reverse repur-
chase agreements are recorded on the assets
side of the balance sheet as collateralised loans
for the value of the loan. The securities ac-
quired purchased under this type of agreement
are not revalued nor included in the securities
portfolio.
Securities sold under repurchase agree-
ments are recorded on the liabilities side of the
balance sheet as a deposit collateralised by se-
curities. The balance sheet shows the deposits
and the value of the items that have been given
as collateral. Securities that have been sold un-
der this type of agreement remain on the bal-
ance sheet of the Banco de España and are
treated as if they remained part of the portfolio
from which they were sold. Repurchase agree-
ments involving securities denominated in for-
eign currencies have no effect on the average
cost of the currency position.
Doubtful debtors
Where there is any reasonable doubt over
the recovery of an asset it is recorded separate-
ly and the relevant provision set aside.
Special loans to the State and the Social
Security System
Special loans granted to the State that are
referred to in transitional provision seven of Law
21/1993 on the State budget for 1994, and
those granted to the Social Security System
that are envisaged in transitional provision six
of Law 41/1994 on the State budget for 1995,
are valued at their nominal amount, in accor-
dance with the ESCB’s harmonised rules for
recording loans.
Intra-Eurosystem balances
The net positions of Intra-Eurosystem bal-
ances (except for the participating interest in
the ECB and positions resulting from the trans-
fer of reserve assets to the ECB) are shown on
the assets or liabilities side of the balance
sheet, as appropriate.
Domestic securities
The criteria used to record and value do-
mestic securities are the same as those indicat-
ed above for foreign securities.
Participating interests in institutions and other
entities
Participating interests in the ECB and in the
Bank for International Settlements are valued at
their purchase price.
Tangible and intangible fixed assets
In general, fixed assets are valued at the
purchase price, which includes any non-recov-
erable VAT paid and all additional expenses
that may arise to bring them into operation.
Annual charges for the depreciation of de-
preciable assets are calculated on the basis of
the estimated economic life of the various as-
sets using the straight-line method. Land and
items forming part of the Bank’s art collection
are not considered to be depreciable assets.
Depreciation is carried out on a monthly ba-
sis, starting from the month following that of the
date the asset concerned is recorded in the ac-
counts or put into operation.
Assets paid for out of the Beneficent-Social
Fund (Fondo de Atenciones Benéfico-Sociales)
are valued at their purchase price and consid-
ered automatically depreciated.
Expenses relating to projects due to be in ef-
fect for several years may be capitalised, in
which case they are depreciated over a maxi-
mum period of four years.
Purchases of silver are recorded at the pur-
chase price. At year-end the stocks are reval-
ued at the US dollar London market price per
troy ounce, translated into euro at the prevailing
120
exchange rate. This revaluation is carried out
only in the event that the amount so obtained is
less than the book value.
In 1999, the depreciation percentages ap-
plied to the various fixed assets were the same
as those applied in 1998, and were as follows:
Fixed assets whose cost is less than EUR
120 are recorded as expenses in the year in
which they are acquired.
Banknotes
Banknotes in circulation are recorded on the lia-
bilities side of the balance sheet at their face value.
Their issuance costs are not capitalised. The
production costs of those acquired from the
Fábrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre (National
Mint) are recorded each year in the expense
account.
Recognition of income and expenses
Income and expenses are recognised in the
period in which they are earned or incurred.
Realised gains and realised and unrealised
losses are taken to the profit and loss account.
An average cost method is used to calculate
the purchase price of individual items sold. In
the case of unrealised losses on any item at the
year-end, its average cost is reduced in line
with the end-of-year market price and/or ex-
change rate
Unrealised gains are not recognised as in-
come, but are transferred to a revaluation ac-
count.
Unrealised losses are taken to the profit and
loss account if they exceed previous revaluation
gains recorded in the corresponding revaluation
account, and are not reversed in subsequent
years against new unrealised gains. Unrealised
losses in any one security or currency or in gold
are not netted against unrealised gains in other
securities or currencies.
Premiums or discounts arising on issued
and purchased securities are calculated and
shown as interest income or expenses and
amortised over the remaining life of the securi-
ties concerned, according to the implicit rate of
return method.
Pension scheme
Contributions to an external pension fund by
employees who, having joined the Bank after
1.1.1986, are entitled to and form part of the
Pension Scheme, are established at 6.5 % of
the so-called “regulating salary”, consisting of
the salary items determined in the Scheme
Rules. The amounts contributed by the Bank
are recognised as current expenses in the year
to which they relate.
Off-balance-sheet positions (1)
Foreign exchange forward transactions, for-
ward legs of foreign exchange swaps and other
currency instruments involving an exchange of
one currency for another at a future date, have
been included in the net foreign currency posi-
tions for calculating foreign exchange gains and
losses. Interest rate instruments are revalued
on an item-by-item basis and treated in a simi-
lar manner to securities. Profits and losses aris-
ing from off-balance-sheet instruments are
recognised and treated in a similar manner to
on-balance-sheet instruments.
Post-balance-sheet events
Assets and liabilities are adjusted for events
that occur between the annual balance sheet
date and the date on which the Governing
Council formulates the financial statements if
such events materially affect the condition of
assets and liabilities at the balance sheet date.
III.2. NOTES ON THE BALANCE SHEET
1 Gold and gold receivables
The Banco de España’s gold holdings
amount to EUR 4,872.62 million, consisting of
16,830 million troy ounces of fine gold, valued at
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• Buildings for own use 2
• Facilities 6
• Furniture and office equipment
— Libraries 10
— Furniture 10
— Office machines other than computer equipment 20
— Machines for the treatment of banknotes and coins 20
— Computer equipment 25
— Otrher machines and equipment 20
• Transport equipment 20
• Computer applications 33
• Art collection 0
%
( 1 ) The net position under foreign exchange forward
transactions and swaps, and the foreign-exchange gains
and losses generated by such position are shown in the bal-
ance sheet under items 10.4 on the assets side and 11.1 on
the liabilities side, depending on their sign.
EUR 289.518 per ounce. (2) As a consequence
of the rise in the market price of gold during the
year, the value of the Bank’s holdings is EUR
58.8 million higher than at end-1998, despite a
decline in stocks from the level at the end of the
previous year (19,539 million ounces). The re-
duction is almost entirely accounted for by the
transfer of 2,707 million ounces, to the value of
EUR 667.01 million, on 5 January 1999, as part
of the Banco de España’s contribution to the re-
serves of the ECB, pursuant to Article 30 of the
Statute of the ESCB/ECB.
2. Receivables from the IMF
These include: a) drawing rights within the
reserve tranche (EUR 1,516.73 million) which
include the net IMF position (EUR 1,516.73 mil-
lion) and the euro tranche position and its bal-
ancing account (EUR 2,639.43 million, with a
positive and negative sign); b) special drawing
rights (EUR 259.04 million), and c) other claims
(EUR 157.72 million). In total, receivables from
the IMF fell by EUR 622 million with respect to
end-1998, due to various factors. Notable
among them were operations carried out
through the IMF, basically aid to other coun-
tries, loan repayments and the subscription and
payment of the increase in the IMF quota, in-
volving a net reduction of EUR 852.95 million,
while stocks of SDRs rose by EUR 216.79 mil-
lion owing to their revaluation at year-end, 
3. Balances with banks and security
investments, external loans and other
external assets
This item includes balances with banks,
loans and other claims on non-euro area resi-
dents denominated in foreign currency. Their
total amount is EUR 30,722.34 million, with the
following breakdown:
At end-1999, 96.25 % of the balances with
foreign banks, loans denominated in foreign
currency and security investments were denom-
inated in US dollars.
The significant decline in this item (EUR
14,175.67 million) was basically due to the net
effect of the following factors: a) the transfers,
to the value of EUR 143,401.76 million (in US
dollars) and EUR 377.97 million (in Japanese
yen), as part of the Banco de España’s contri-
bution to the ECB’s reserves; b) the net effect
of foreign exchange swaps to the value of EUR
9,971.88 mill ion, entered into to adjust the
Bank’s foreign-currency portfolio; c) net sales of
foreign currency during the year, which in the
case of US dollars amounted to EUR 4,433.20
million; d) revaluations due to exchange rate
movements, involving an increase of EUR
4,287.99 million; e) the fall in the value of the
portfolio as a consequence of the decline in the
price of securities and their subsequent revalu-
ation at year-end, to the value of EUR 681.96
million; and f) finally, the increase in stocks of
US dollars as a consequence of gold/dollar
swaps, to the value of EUR 471.10 million. The
remaining difference was basically due to
changes arising in currencies other than the US
dollar.
Under “external loans and other external
assets” are included certain assets, to the val-
ue of EUR 44.23 million, considered to be of
doubtful recovery. Country-risk provisions of
EUR 14.86 million have been set aside in re-
spect of these assets. Of the aforesaid EUR
44.23 million, EUR 18.52 million will be written
off in 2000, relating to the outstanding bal-
ance as at 31.12.1999 of loans granted to the
Dominican Republic (EUR 14.34 million) and
to the central bank of Equatorial Guinea (EUR
4.18 million), which will be assumed by the
State, pursuant to additional provision eigh-
teen of Law 54/1999 on the State budget for
the year 2000. The provisions relating to
these loans were cancelled, and their amount
credited to the profit and loss account, at end-
1 9 9 9 .
4. Claims on non-euro area residents
denominated in euro
This item, totalling EUR 4,118.98 million at
end-1999, includes the debtor position vis-à-vis
the Banco de España with non-participating
NCBs, arising from cross-border payments
made by the banking system through TAR-
GET (3) (EUR 4,080.55 million), the net amount
of bilateral agreements denominated in euro
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(2) One troy ounce is equal to 31.1035 grams.
Balances with banks 253.60 233.48
Security investments 30,238.30 44,355.19
External loans and other
external assets 243.24 338.47
Loan provisions –14.86 –30.81
Non-euro area banknotes 2.06 1.68
TOTAL 30,722.34 44,898.01
Type of asset 1999 1998
(EUR millions)
(3) Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settle-
ment Express Transfer system.
(EUR 38.43 million) and the balance on corre-
spondent accounts in euro held with non-partic-
ipating NCBs, which was nil at year-end. Almost
the whole of the change in this group of ac-
counts (EUR 4,075.96 million) was due to the
balances arising from payments made through
the TARGET payment system, which was not
operational in 1998.
5 Lending to financial sector
counterparties of euro area
denominated in euro
This includes euro-denominated lending to
euro area counterparty financial institutions, for
the conduct of monetary policy. Most of this
lending is in the form of main refinancing oper-
a t i o n s .
Although the year-end data show a decline
of 10 % with respect to those for 1998 (EUR
24,184.30 mill ion in 1999, compared with
EUR 26,876.67 at end-1998), it should be
pointed out that the average daily flow of fi-
nancing during the year was down 42 %, from
EUR 23,510.53 mill ion in 1998 to EUR
13,644.20 in 1999. This decline was basically
connected with the workings of the tender
system for providing liquidity to the financial
sector and the high levels of available collat-
eral required, as well as the lower borrowing
requirement of foreign banks in Spain, which
were able to obtain financing in euro from
their parent institutions.
In compliance with the provisions of Article
4.2 of the Law of Autonomy of the Banco de Es-
paña of 1 June 1994, it is hereby stated that no
loans were granted to financial institutions other
than on an arm’s-length basis.
6 General government debt denominated
in euro. State
Loans which, by virtue of their respective
laws of creation, were granted to the State prior
to the entry into force of Law 21/1993 of 29 De-
cember 1993 on the State budget for 1994.
Transitional provision seven of this Law states
that the terms and maturities originally estab-
lished in such loans shall be maintained, and in
the absence thereof they shall be repaid on a
straight-line basis within twenty-five years, by
means of annual payments as from 1999.
The outstanding balance at 31 December
1999 of the loans granted to the State amount-
ed to EUR 9,842.54 million, broken down as fol-
lows:
The change was solely due to repayments
made during the year, as specified in the above
table.
7 General government debt denominated
in euro. Social Security System
This item corresponds to the outstanding
amount of two loans granted to the Social Se-
curity System under Law 41/1994 of 30 Decem-
ber 1994 on the State budget for 1995. The first
includes the principal of another loan granted to
this institution, which was not paid on its maturi-
ty, of EUR 1,539.19 million, and the second in-
cludes the interest due but not paid on the pre-
vious loan to 31.12.1994, amounting to EUR
501.90 million. The repayment of this loan,
which shall begin on 31.12.2000, is treated in
the same way as established for the repayment
of special loans granted to the Sate, referred to
in the previous note. The loan for interest due to
31 December 1994 will be repaid on a straight-
line basis over ten years, the first repayment
having been made on 31 December 1995.
The change of EUR 50.19 million corre-
sponds to the receipt of the fifth repayment un-
der the loan of EUR 501.90 million, which took
the year-end balance to EUR 250.95 million.
The amount of the said repayment was recov-
ered by means of set-off against amounts due
to the Social Security System in respect of in-
terest payable on its interest-bearing accounts
with the Banco de España.
8. Intra-Eurosystem claims
a Participating interest in ECB
The fully paid-up subscription of the Banco
de España to the capital of the ECB amounts to
EUR 444.68 million, which is equal to a share of
8.8935 % in such capital. This is the percentage
corresponding to the Banco de España, accord-
ing to the capital keys established by the Euro-
pean Commission. The key for Spain was set in
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Treasury. Law 3/1983 special
account 2,440.64 97.63 2,538.27
Treasury. Law 4/1990 special
account 6,600.58 347.39 6,947.97
Subrogation under loans to
Tabacalera, S.A. (Law 31/1991) 25.80 12.90 38.70
Credits arising from subscription
for participating interests,
contributions and quotas
in international agencies 775.52 40.82 816.34
TOTAL 9,842.54   498.74  10,341.28
Type of asset 31.12.1999 Repay-ment 31.12.1998
(EUR millions)
accordance with its population and GNP, and
remained unchanged during the year.
b) Claims equivalent to the transfer
of foreign reserves
Pursuant to Article 30 of the Statute of the
ESCB/ECB, the Banco de España transferred
to the ECB at the beginning of 1999 foreign re-
serve assets to the value of EUR 4,446.75 mil-
lion. The division of the amounts transferred in-
to gold, US dollars and Japanese yen has been
given in notes 1 and 3 above. These claims are
equivalent to this transfer. They are subject to a
possible reduction of up to 20 % in their initial
value, in the event that the European Central
Bank incurs unrealised losses caused by falls in
the exchange rates relating to the reserve as-
sets and the ECB is unable to cover them either
with its reserves or through appropriation of the
monetary income for the year pooled by the
participating NCBs. In 1999, it was not neces-
sary to use this means to cover unrealised loss-
es of the ECB.
c) Other claims with the Eurosystem (net)
This reflects the net position vis-à-vis the
Eurosystem, with the breakdown shown in the
table below, in respect of the transfers
issued/received through TARGET, as well as
the balances held with the national central
banks that belong to the Eurosystem through
correspondent accounts, the latter constituting
an insignificant part of the total.
In this first year since the start of Stage
Three of EMU, the net balance at end-1999 of
the intra-Eurosystem accounts (excluding those
mentioned in (a) and (b) above) totalled EUR
27,930.40 million. This increase, the result of
the processing of cross-border payments of the
national banking systems and, marginally, of
the payments made between the member cen-
tral banks of the Eurosystem, was significantly
influenced by the following factors: a) the re-
course of Spanish credit institutions to external
financing in euro, due to the working of the ten-
der system used for providing liquidity to the fi-
nancial sector and the high level of available
collateral required; b) a lower recourse to bor-
rowing from the Banco de España on the part of
many foreign institutions which in 1998 had bor-
rowed funds in pesetas on the domestic market
and in 1999 were financed instead in euro by
their parent institutions, and c) the maturation in
1999 of swap transactions by means of which a
significant part of the foreign-currency sales of
the Banco de España in 1998 were executed.
All the factors mentioned involved transfers
from abroad to the Spanish banking system,
which were reflected in an increase in the posi-
tion of the Banco de España vis-à-vis the other
members of the Eurosystem, on whose ac-
counts it credited the funds paid in euro to the
national banking system.
9. Items in course of settlement
Totalling EUR 4.81 million, they correspond
basically to bills and documents in the process
of being cleared.
10. Tangible and intangible fixed assets
Totalling EUR 223.50 million at end-1999, of
which EUR 388.05 million corresponded to their
cost and EUR 164.55 to accumulated deprecia-
tion.
The two tables below show this item broken
down into its components, together with their
cost or valuation and accumulated depreciation.
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Position of the Banco de España vis-à-vis the
Eurosystem national central banks
and the ECB at end-1999 (a)
(EUR millions)
Belgium 2,096.80
Germany 853.32
France 14,686.73
Ireland 1,284.79
Italy 1,351.62
Luxembourg 1,445.66
Netherlands 2,596.63
Austria 3,761.58
Portugal 2,957.00
Finland 2,160.42
Total NCBs 29,746.13 3,448.42
ECB 1,632.69
TOTAL 31,378.82 3,448.42 27,930.40
( a ) The Eurosystem came into existence on 1.1.1999, so that no
comparative data are shown for the previous year. However it should be
noted that the position vis-à-vis the Eurosystem NCBs in correspondent
accounts at end-1998 was insignificant.
Eurosystem
members
Net asset
position
Liabilities with
the Eurosystem
Claims with the
Eurosystem
1 January 1999 231.49 73.66 1.74 76.50 383.39
Change during
the year 0.17 -0.49 2.70 2.28 4.66
31 December
1999 231.66 73.17 4.44 78.78 388.05
Cost or valuation
Property
and
facilities
Furniture
and
equipment
Fixed assets
u n d e r
c o n s t r u c t i o n
Other
fixed
assets
Total
(EUR millions)
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The Bank’s holdings of silver, valued at EUR
28.3 million, are included under «Other fixed
assets» and were unchanged from end-1998.
11. Other financial assets
Of the total amount of this item, 99 % corre-
sponds to the portfolio of book-entry debt, in which
the Banco de España has EUR 3,534.50 million
invested, EUR 152.7 million less than a year earli-
er. This decline is basically due to the unrealised
losses arising from rising interest rates.
12. Off-balance-sheet instruments
revaluation differences
See note 24.
13. Accruals and deferred expenditure
Of the total balance of this group of accounts
(EUR 738.97 million), the main components are
interest accrued but not yet received on securi-
ties denominated in foreign currency (EUR
325.67 million), interest accrued but not yet re-
ceived on State book-entry debt (EUR 167.89
million) and interest accrued on the claims
equivalent to the transfer of foreign reserves
(EUR 102.87 million).
14. Sundry
The most significant component of this item,
representing 92.3 % of the total, is the transfer
made to the Treasury on 29.11.1999, in respect
of the Bank’s recorded profits accrued to 30
September 1999, which totalled EUR 1,905.85
million.
15. Banknotes in circulation
The breakdown of banknotes in circulation
by denomination at 31.12.1999 is shown in the
table below:
The stock of banknotes in circulation was
11.7 % up on end-1998. However, if average
daily stock data are compared for 1999 and
1998, the increase is reduced to 4.2 %. This is
because a significant part of the rise at end-
1999 was temporary in nature, being related to
the so-called «year-2000 problem», as a result
of which the public held more banknotes than
usual at end-1999.
16. Lliabilities to euro area financial
sector counterparties denominated
in euro
The overall balance of the different types of
deposit held by credit institutions with the Ban-
co de España totalled EUR 12,490.92 million at
end-1999. The large increase with respect the
previous year was concentrated in current ac-
counts (covering the minimum reserve system),
which rose from EUR 6,431.34 million at
31.12.1998 to 12,462.00 million at 31.12.999.
Like the increase in the public’s demand for
banknotes mentioned above, this increase was
basically related to the decision of the credit in-
stitutions to cover themselves for possible risks
arising from the so-called «year-2000 problem».
This explains why, although the increase over
1998 in the average daily balance on these ac-
counts was 26 %, the increase resulting from a
comparison of the end-year data rises to almost
94 %. For its part, the increase in the average
daily balance (EUR 8,174.54 million in 1999,
against EUR 6,474.90 million in 1998) was a
consequence of the increase in the eligible lia-
bilities of the institutions subject to minimum re-
serve requirements.
17. Debt certificates issued
This item, totalling EUR 3,301.82 million, in-
cludes fixed-term certificates issued by the Ban-
co de España to absorb liquidity from the finan-
cial system, pursuant to the Ministerial Order of
21 February 1990, whereby the reserve require-
ments for financial intermediaries were altered.
Such certificates have specified repayment
schedules, which are due to be completed in
September 2000.
1 January 1999 82.09 58.96 — 12.84 153.89
Change during
the year 8.74 0.79 — 1.13 10.66
31 December
1999 90.83 59.75 — 13.97 164.55
Acumulated
depreciation
Property
and
facilities
Furniture
and
equipment
Fixed assets
u n d e r
c o n s t r u c t i o n
Other
fixed
assets
Total
(EUR millions)
1,000 PTA 1,574.21 1,481.39
2,000 PTA 3,164.23 2,608.19
5,000 PTA 20,734.52 19,269.57
10,000 PTA 33,471.71 29,372.10
Held by other ESCB banks –33.51 0.00
TOTAL 58,911.16 52,731.25
Denomination 1999 1998
(EUR millions)
In 1999, the balance of this item fell by EUR
3,043.99 million, as a result of the repayments
made during the year.
18. Liabilities to other euro area residents
denominated in euro. General
government
This item includes the deposits held by gen-
eral government with the Banco de España.
These deposits are remunerated on the terms
specified in Note 2 on the profit and loss ac-
count. The outstanding balance at year-and
was EUR 20,947.66 million, which breaks down
as follows:
The large increase in the balance of this sub-
item (EUR 20,947.66 million at end-1999, com-
pared with EUR 12,846.15 million at end-1998)
was basically due to the increase in the current
account of the Treasury, which rose from EUR
10,295.98 million to EUR 14,869.97 million, and
to the increase in the balance of the accounts of
the Social Security System, which rose from
EUR 1,101.87 million to EUR 3,915.51 million.
19. Liabilities to other euro area residents
denominated in euro. Other liabilities
Included here are the current accounts of fi-
nancial institutions other than credit institutions,
such as the Deposit Insurance Funds, other fi-
nancial intermediaries associated with securi-
ties markets settlement, other intermediaries in
the debt book-entry market, etc., as well as the
current accounts of employees and pensioners
and other accounts of legal persons classified
in the other resident non-financial sectors. The
balance at end-1999 was EUR 1,135 million, an
increase of EUR 106.33 million on end-1998,
basically due to the increase in the balance of
the current accounts of the agents included in
this item.
20. Liabilities to non-euro area residents
denominated in euro
The main component of this item is the cred-
it balance with the EU national central banks
that do not belong to the Eurosystem, arising
from transactions carried out through TARGET
(EUR 429.75 million of the total of EUR 451.07
million). The change on a year earlier (EUR
402.70 million) was due to the transfers of
funds made through the aforementioned pay-
ment system.
21. Liabilities to non-euro area residents
denominated in foreign currency.
Deposits, balances and other
liabilities
These liabilities, totalling EUR 548.38 mil-
lion, basically correspond to debts arising under
repurchase agreements relating to the manage-
ment of the foreign-currency reserves of the
Banco de España (87 % of the total). The bal-
ance of this group of accounts increased by
EUR 547.85 million, of which EUR 475.50 mil-
lion corresponded to such repurchase agree-
ments.
22. Counterpart of special drawing rights
allocated by the IMF
This item, totalling EUR 407.86 million, in-
cludes the counterpart of the special drawing
rights allocated to Spain in proportion to its IMF
quota. Of the EUR 47.96 million change, 45.73
million correspond to the revaluation of this lia-
bility owing to exchange rate movements.
23. Items in course of settlement
From the total balance of this group of ac-
counts (EUR 260.81 million), EUR 258.92 cor-
responds to transfers ordered by credit institu-
tions pending payment at year-end, which also
account for almost the whole of the change with
respect to 1998 (EUR 248.28 million).
24. Other liabilities. Off-balance-sheet
instruments revaluation differences
Included here is the amount of the net posi-
tion under foreign-exchange forward transac-
tions and swaps, as well as their related ex-
change rate adjustment accounts. The end-
1999 balance was EUR 1.22 million, while the
end-1998 balance was a debit amount of
767.12 million.
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Central government
(State) 16,866.33 11,669.87
Treasury–current
account 14,869.97 10,295.98
Other central government
agencies and similar
bodies 1,996.36 1,373.89
Territorial government 165.82 74.41
Regional (autonomous)
governments, administrative
agencies and similar bodies 162.54 72.22
Local government 3.28 2.19
Social security
funds 3,915.51 1,101.87
TOTAL 20,947.66 12,846.15
1999 1998
(EUR millions)
25. Other liabilities. Accruals and deferred
income
The most significant components of this
sub-group of accounts, the total amount of
which was EUR 125.25 million, correspond to
interest accrued but not yet due on certifi-
cates of deposit issued (EUR 50.34 million)
and interest accrued on remunerated current
accounts. Among the latter, those of the So-
cial Security System (EUR 50.65 million) and
the Treasury (EUR 10.22 mill ion) were no-
t a b l e .
26. Other liabilities. Sundry
The most important components of this
sub-group of accounts are those relating to
contributions payable to the Banco de España
employee social welfare scheme ( M u t u a l i d a d
de empleados), which amounted to EUR
396.03 million, representing the current value
of the debt acknowledged by the Banco de Es-
paña in favour of the scheme arising from
commitments made thereto, this amount being
reduced by EUR 14.90 million during the year,
and to settled credit interest pending allocation
– suspense accounts (corresponding to a loan
to the Social Security System, referred to in
note 7), the balance of which at year-end
amounted to EUR 250.95 million, down 50.19
million on the previous year. The sum of the
balances on these two accounts represents 85
% of the total amount of this sub-group of ac-
c o u n t s .
Also appearing in this subgroup are the tax-
es pending payment, to the value of EUR 4.97
million, of which EUR 4.91 correspond to with-
holdings on the wages and salaries paid to em-
ployees.
27. Provisions
With the exception of country-risk provisions,
which are presented in the balance sheet in the
form of adjustments to the values of the assets
concerned, provisions are recorded under this
item, with the breakdown shown in the table
above.
The most important provision, unchanged
during the year, relates to pre-system exchange
rate risks. It was created by a resolution of the
Executive Commission of 26 January 1999 to
cover future exchange rate risks affecting the
external reserves of the Banco de España and
possible contingencies in respect of unrealised
losses on reserves transferred to the European
Central Bank.
The changes in this item are due to the cre-
ation of new provisions to cover the losses of
the ECB in 1999, as detailed in note 7 on the
profit and loss account, and to the fact that
those relating to the collective agreement with
employees, which was applied in 1999, were no
longer needed.
28. Revaluation accounts
These accounts represent revaluation re-
serves arising from unrealised gains on assets
and liabilities. Their breakdown is as follows:
The balances, in respect of unrealised gains,
on revaluation accounts at end-1998, before the
start of Stage Three of EMU, are called pre-sys-
tem revaluation accounts. These balances de-
clined in 1999 for two reasons: a) due to the re-
alisation of unrealised capital gains, as a conse-
quence of sale and redemption of the assets
concerned, and b) due to netting against unre-
alised losses in the end-1999 revaluation of
those securities that remained in the Bank’s
portfolio throughout the year. The amount of the
decline was EUR 2,224.84 million, with the fol-
lowing breakdown:
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For liabilities and charges 4.18 22.18
For exchange rate risks–
Pre-system account 3,767.58 3,767.58
For ECB losses covered
by monetary income 3.94 N/A (a)
For ECB losses covered
by additional contributions 20.81 N/A (a)
For other risks 0.30 0.30
TOTAL 3,796.81 3,790.06
(a) Not applicable.
1999 1998
(EUR millions)
Pre-system revaluation
accounts 4,763.33 6.988.17
For exchange rate
differences 1,729.83 2,591.52
For price differences 3,033.50 4,396.65
Gold 2,565.79 2,978.78
Securities denominated in
foreign currencies 96.09 877.71
Book-entry public debt 371.62 540.16
Ordinary revaluation
accounts 4,878.04 N/A
For exchange rate differences 4,151.58 N/A
For price differences 726.46 N/A
Gold 726.22 N/A
Securities denominated in
foreing currencies 0.24 N/A
Book-entry public debt 0.00 N/A
TOTAL 9,641.37 6,988.17
1999Type of account 1998
(EUR millions)
Of the unrealised capital gains due to ex-
change rate movements that were realised dur-
ing the year (EUR 861.69 million), EUR 251.48
million arose from the transfer of foreign re-
serve assets in the form of US dollars and
Japanese yen to the ECB at the beginning of
the year and the rest from ordinary transactions
carried out during the year.
As regards the realisation of pre-system un-
realised gains due to price movements (EUR
800.69 million), almost all those relating to gold
(EUR 412.7 5 million) were a consequence of
the transfer of this asset to the ECB, as were
EUR 69.35 million of the EUR 373.13 million
obtained from the sale of securities. Finally,
from the sale and redemption of State book-en-
try debt, pre-system unrealised gains of EUR
14.58 million were realised.
With respect to the reduction in the pre-sys-
tem revaluation accounts by netting against un-
realised losses at 31.12.1999 (EUR 562.46 mil-
lion), the majority (EUR 408.50 million) corre-
sponded to foreign securities, and the rest
(153.96 million) to book-entry debt, as a conse-
quence of the rise in euro and dollar interest
rates during this period.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the
large revaluation of the US dollar entailed an in-
crease in the so-called «ordinary» revaluation
accounts (to distinguish them from the pre-sys-
tem ones) of EUR 4,151.58 million due to ex-
change rate movements and of EUR 726.22
million due to the higher price of gold with re-
spect to end-1998.
29. Capital
The capital of the Banco de España, consti-
tuted in accordance with the provisions of Royal
Legislative Decree 18/1962 of 7 June 1962, to-
tal led EUR 1.38 mill ion and remained un-
changed during the year.
30. Reserves
Included in this item, which remained un-
changed during the year, is the amount of capi-
tal, reserves and profits arising from member-
ship in 1973 of the former Spanish Foreign Cur-
rency Institute in the Banco de España.
31. Profit for the year
The net profit for the year, having deducted
the transfer to the Beneficent-Social Fund (EUR
8.14 million), totalled EUR 4,063.83 million,
37.2 % down on 1998. Of this amount, EUR
1,905.85 million, as indicated in note 14 above,
was paid to the Treasury on 29.11.1999, in ac-
cordance with Royal Decree 1746/1999 of 19
November 1999.
The following amounts corresponding to
1998 profits were also paid to the Treasury dur-
ing the year.
a) On 1.2.1999, EUR 3,564.8 million, equiva-
lent to 90 % of the profit for 1998 (EUR
6,468.46 million).
b) On 31.8.1999, the balance sheet and profit
loss account for the year 1998 having been
approved by the Council of Ministers, EUR
646.85 million, representing the rest of the
profit for 1998.
The details of the various components of the
profit for 1999 are given in the following notes
on the profit and loss account.
III.3. NOTES ON THE PROFIT AND LOSS
ACCOUNT
1 Interest income
This item includes income from interest ac-
crued on the main assets of the Banco de Es-
paña.
It was made up, in 1998 and 1999, as fol-
lows:
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For exchange rate differences 861.69 — 861.69
For price differences 800.69 562.46 1,363.15
Gold 412.98 — 412.98
Securities denominated in
foreign currencies 373.13 408.50 781.63
Book-entry public debt 14.58 153.96 168.54
TOTAL 1,662.38 562.46 2,224.84
Pre-system revaluation accounts
Reasons for the change
in 1999
Due to the
realisation
of capital
gains in
sales and
redemptions
Due to
netting
against
unrealised
capital
losses
Total
(EUR millions)
Securities 1,737.74 3,044.15 138.19 285.07 1,875.93 3,329.22
Other assets 65.76 158.09 1,150.15 984.48 1,215.91 1,142.57
TOTAL 1,803.50  3,202.24   1,288.34  1,269.55   3,091.84  4,471.79
Foreign currency
1999 1998 1998 1999 1998
Euro Total
(EUR millions)
1999
Of the total of EUR 1,803.50 million, corre-
sponding to interest on foreign-currency de-
nominated investments in 1999, the interest on
US-dollar-denominated fixed-income security
investments totalled EUR 1,698.70 million
(94.2 %), with much lower amounts correspond-
ing to the interest on SDRs, Canadian dollars,
gold, etc.
The average level of such US-dollar invest-
ments was EUR 35,481 million, with an average
yield of 4.9 %.
The interest on euro-denominated invest-
ments (EUR 1,288.34 million) arose, in short,
from the following assets:
A comparative analysis with the previous
year shows the notable reduction in total inter-
est obtained (EUR 4,471.79 million in 1998,
as against EUR 3,091.84 million in 1999), ba-
sically due to the divestment of external as-
sets with yields of around 5 % (the average
level of US-dollar investments fell by USD
16,339.67 million), and a corresponding in-
crease in euro-denominated assets (the aver-
age level of these investments increased by
EUR 19,670.38 million), with yields of around
2.7 %. Another reason for this reduction was
the lower average yield obtained in 1999, both
on foreign-currency-denominated assets
(down from 5.9 % in 1998, to 4.9 %) and on
euro-denominated assets (down from 4.2 % to
2.7 %).
2. Interest expense
This item includes expenditure on the inter-
est accruing on liabilities, which breaks down as
follows:
The reduction in the expense compared with
the previous year was primarily due to the de-
cline in the balance of the accounts of the Trea-
sury and in the stock of outstanding debt certifi-
cates. This decline was partly offset by the de-
posits of institutions to cover their reserve re-
quirements, which began to be remunerated in
1999.
In addition, it should be noted that as re-
gards the balance in favour of the Treasury, on-
ly that part which exceeds the amount of the
special loans granted to the Treasury (assets of
the Bank) is remunerated.
3. Realised gains/and losses arising from
financial operations
This item includes the profits and losses
arising from the sale and purchase of financial
assets. In 1999, there was a net realised gain of
EUR 2,304.78 million, which basically arose
from the following sources:
— Foreign exchange gains upon the sale of
foreign currency totalling EUR 1,728.68 mil-
lion, of which EUR 861.69 million corre-
sponded to the realisation of unrealised
gains already existing at 31.12.1998 and the
rest, EUR 866.99 million, to the realisation
of those arising in 1999.
Of the total of EUR 1,728.68 million, EUR
1,558.01 million (90.1 %) arose from the net
daily sale (daily LIFO) of US dollars which,
including the transfer of reserves to the
ECB, totalled USD 12,800 million in 1999.
The other gains related to the net sale of
Japanese yen (EUR 19.40 million), SDRs
(EUR 139.20 million) and other foreign cur-
rencies.
— Gains from the sale of gold, almost all of
which arose from the transfer of reserves to
the ECB, amounted to EUR 413.04 million,
of which EUR 412.98 million corresponded
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Loans to institutions
under monetary policy
operations 13,644.20 382.82 2.77 %
Net position with European
Union central
b a n k s 24,171.62 658.66 2.68 %
Claims equivalent to the
transfer of foreign
reserves 4,405.27 102.87 2.30 % (a)
Book-entry debt portfolio
and other 3,833.82 143.99 3.70 %
TOTAL 46,054.91 1,288.34 2.76 %
(a) The claims equivalent to the transfer of foreign reserves are remu-
nerated at 85 % of the marginal rate in main refinancing operations.
Average
investmentAssets Amount
A v e r a g e
y i e l d
i n 1999
(EUR millions and %)
Certificates issued by the
Banco de España 4,822.20 289.05 464.59 6.00 %
Remuneration of minimum
reserves 8,174.54 223.24 — 2.69 %
Deposits of general
government 5,409.93 149.15 436.04 2.76 %
Oher euro-denominated liabilities 268.38 7.74 14.69 2.84 %
Liabilities denominated in
foreign currencies 744.55 30.56 21.44 4.10 %
TOTAL 19,419.60   699.74       936.76 3.60 %
Average
financing Interest expense
1999 1998
Average
cost
in 1999
(EUR millions and %)
to the realisation upon such transfer of unre-
alised gains already existing at 31.12.1998.
— The net gains arising from price movements,
on the sale of foreign securities, amounted
to EUR 160.59 million, basically correspond-
ing to the sale and transfer to the ECB of
US-dollar denominated securities, to the val-
ue of USD 54,890 million.
Two countervailing factors were present in
the results of these sales of securities. While
there was a profit of EUR 373.13 million from
the realisation of unrealised gains existing at
31.12.1998, at the same time there were cur-
rent losses of EUR 212.54 million during the
year, as a consequence of the rise in interest
rates.
4. Write-downs on financial assets and
positions
This item includes that part of the loss aris-
ing from exchange rate depreciation in the for-
eign currency position at end-1999, as well as
from the fall in the price of gold and of securities
denominated in foreign currency, that cannot be
netted against unrealised gains arising from
previous years.
The loss recorded in 1999 basically corre-
sponds to the fall in value of securities denomi-
nated in foreign currency. The resulting unre-
alised losses charged to the profit and loss ac-
count at the end of the year were EUR 806.7
million. These were partially netted against un-
realised gains recorded at 31.12.1998 to the
value of EUR 408.5 million (see note 28 on the
balance sheet), so that the net effect on the
profit and loss account was a loss of EUR
398.21 million.
5. Net income from fees and commissions
This basically includes income and expens-
es arising from fees for banking services and
the like (transfers, negotiation of cheques, cus-
tody and administration of securities, telephone
service for securities transactions, etc.).
It may be broken down as follows:
The increase in income in 1999 from com-
missions on external operations is notable, the
Banco de España having secured a loan grant-
ed by the Bank for International Settlements to
Brazil.
The reduction in income from domestic oper-
ations is also notable, owing to the lower com-
missions received in relation to the Telephone
Service.
6. Income from equity shares and
participating interests
This includes the dividends paid on the par-
ticipating interest of the Banco de España in the
capital of the Bank for International Settle-
ments.
7. Net result of pooling of monetary
income
According to Article 32.5 of the Statute of the
ESCB/ECB, the monetary income of the nation-
al central banks, accruing in the performance of
the ESCB’s monetary policy function, shall be
allocated to such banks in proportion to their
paid-up shares in the capital of the ECB. The
Governing Council of the ECB, in its meeting of
3 November 1998, decided to calculate mone-
tary income by the application of a reference
rate to the liability base, defined for this purpose
as all the central bank’s deposit liabilities to
credit institutions, without including banknotes.
The reference rate used is the latest available
two-week repo rate and is applied on a daily ba-
sis to the liability base of each national central
bank.
At the same time, pursuant to Article 33.2 of
the Statute of the ESCB and to the decision of
the Governing Council of the ECB of 15 De-
cember 1999, a loss incurred by the ECB dur-
ing the years 1999 to 2001 shall be transferred
in the following order:
a) The shortfall may be offset against the gen-
eral reserve fund of the ECB;
b) Following a decision by the Governing
Council, any remaining loss may be offset
against the monetary income for the rele-
vant financial year in proportion to and up
to the amounts allocated to the NCBs in ac-
cordance with Article 32.5 of the Statute of
the ESCB;
c) Provided that such shortfall cannot be off-
set in accordance with Article 33.2 of the
Statute, then:
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External operations 23.93 1.45 –1.15 –1.57
Domestic operations 12.01 22.73 –0.17 –0.01
TOTAL 35.94 24.18 –1.32 –1.58
Income
1999 1998 1999 1998
Expenses
(EUR millions)
1) Any remaining loss will be offset in the
first instance, by waiving a part of the
original value of the ECB’s liabilities
equivalent to the transfer of foreign re-
serves in the balance sheet of the
ECB. The maximum waiver may not
exceed:
—the amount of unrealised losses
which arise on the foreign currency
and gold positions;
—an amount that would reduce the
aforesaid claims to below 80 % of
their original value;
2 ) Any remaining shortfall will be offset
against a direct charge on income, ap-
portioned in accordance with the ECB’s
capital key, accruing to participating
NCBs from national banknotes in circu-
lation, subject to the limitation that such
a direct charge on any one NCB shall
not exceed its own income on national
banknotes.
The table below shows the breakdown of the
net result for the Banco de España of the pool-
ing of monetary income and the coverage of
ECB losses for 1999.
As there were no unrealised losses in the
foreign reserves of the ECB, neither the proce-
dure envisaged in paragraph (c) (1) above nor
the provision made by the Banco de España to
cover this risk were used.
8. Other income
This includes the profits arising on book-en-
try public debt, as well as other diverse income
of an exceptional nature.
It may be broken down as in the table below.
Under the extraordinary profit, of particular
note were the tax rebate (EUR 47.57 million),
the interest withheld from the Social Security
System to pay its debt (EUR 50.19 million) and
the recovery of provisions and other amounts
as a result of the State’s assumption of debts of
the Dominican Republic and Equatorial Guinea
(EUR 25.7 million). The sharp decline with re-
spect to 1998 was due to the fact that net prof-
its of EUR 2,273 million were credited to the
profit and loss account that year, in respect of
already realised gains; EUR 141 million, due to
the payment to the Bank of withholdings made
on the returns on its book-entry portfolio and
others of smaller amounts.
9 Staff cost
This item, which amounts to EUR 170.35
million, includes the salaries and other emolu-
ments of the Bank’s staff (EUR 124.01 million),
which were 3 % higher than in 1998; Social Se-
curity contributions (EUR 29.49 million), 3.9 %
higher; expenses of a social nature (EUR 14.74
million) and contributions to the pension
scheme (EUR 2.11 million).
On 31 December 1999 the Bank employed
3,148 staff. 69 additional staff were employed
during the period and 93 members of staff left
the service of the Bank.
10. Other administrative expenses (4)
This item includes expenditure arising from
the purchase of current assets, as well as di-
verse services received during the year. The
most important were office expenses (including
IT costs), which amounted to EUR 24.72 million,
and costs relating to premises (especially main-
tenance), which amounted to EUR 12 million.
It breaks down as follows:
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Contributions of monetary income
to the Eurosystem –1.80
Reallocation of monetary income
to the Banco de España 3.94
Contribution by the Banco de España
to the ECB’s losses –24.75
Using monetary income –3.94
Additional contributions –20.81
Net result of pooling of
monetary income –22.61
Items December 1999
(EUR millions)
Profit on the sale of book-entry
public debt –0.95 23.22
Profit on pre-system book-entry
public debt 14.58 0.00
Extraordinary profit 124.66 2,502.85
Sundry 0.88 0.99
TOTAL 139.17 2,527.06
Description 1999 1998
(EUR millions)
(4) Given that there is no explicit provision for taxes in
the harmonised ESCB profit and loss account format, these
are included in this item.
Office expenses –24.72 –16.64
Property expenses –12.00 –12.47
Transport and communications –4.42 –4.19
Security –4.83 –4.92
Training and grants –1.14 –0.87
Sundry operating expenses –6.22 –5.83
Taxes –0.75 –0.74
TOTAL –54.08 –45.66
Description 1999 1998
(EUR millions)
11. Depreciation of fixed assets
Included here is the cost of the estimated
depreciation of the Bank’s fixed assets, which
breaks down as follows:
12. Banknote production services
This amount (EUR 56.41 million) corre-
sponds to payments made by the Banco de Es-
paña to purchase banknotes from the National
Mint. The increase (EUR 12.46 million; 28.4 %)
was basically attributable to the increase in the
unit price of banknotes and to the increase in
the production and storage of peseta ban-
knotes, so that the Mint can devote more re-
sources in the coming years to the production
of euro bank notes.
13. Other expenses
These were as follows:
14. Transfers and additions to other funds
and provisions
These totalled EUR 89.70 million and in-
cluded that part of the unrealised losses in the
book-entry public debt portfolio at year-end that
was not netted against unrealised gains exist-
ing at 31.12.1998 (EUR -39.48 million), ex-
penses arising from payment commitments to
the Banco de España employee social welfare
scheme (EUR -45.20 million), the transfer to
the Beneficent-Social Fund (EUR –8.14 million)
and the partial recovery of provisions made in
previous years to cover country risk (EUR 3.24
m i l l i o n ) .
15. Profit for the year
As detailed and explained in the preceding
notes, the net profit for 1999 amounted to EUR
4,063.83 million, 37.2 % down on the previous
year.
As detailed in the table below, of this
amount, pursuant to Royal Decree 1746/99,
EUR 1,751.60 million was paid to the Treasury
on 1.2.2000. This was the amount necessary,
taking into account the advance payment made
on 29.11.1999 of EUR 1,905.85 mill ion, to
make a total payment of 90 % of the Bank’s
profit for the period ending 31.12.1999.
IV. SPECIFIC INFORMATION REQUIRED
BY ARTICLE 4 OF THE LAW
OF AUTONOMY OF THE BANCO
DE ESPAÑA
1. Contributions made by the Bank to the
Deposit Insurance Funds (Article 4.2 of
the Law of Autonomy of the Banco de
España of 1 June 1994)
The contribution of the Banco de España
to the Deposit Insurance Funds for 1999 is
regulated by Article 3 of Royal Decree
18/1982, according to the wording established
by additional provision seven of Royal Leg-
islative Decree 12/1995 of 28 December 1995
and Royal Decree 2606/1996 of 20 December
1996, which implemented the legal regime for
such funds.
The latter Royal Decree established that the
Deposit Insurance Funds may only exceptional-
ly be supplemented by contributions from the
Banco de España, the amount of which shall be
fixed by Law. In 1999 the Banco de España
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Depreciation of property –9.05 –9.13
Depreciation of transport equipment –0.08 –0.06
Depreciation of furniture and office
equipment –5.88 –5.72
Depreciation of computer applications –0.98 –0.62
Other depreciable expenses –0.23 0.0
TOTAL –16.22 –15.53
Description 1999 1998
Fund conveyance expenses –0.63 –0.55
Coin and banknote packaging
material expenses –0.22 –0.21
TOTAL –0.85 –0.76
Description 1999 1998
(EUR millions)
(EUR millions)
1. Profit fot the year 1999 4,063.83
2. Payments to the Treasury:
— on 29.11.1999, 70 % of profit
for the year ending 30.9.1999 1,905.85
— on 1.2.2000, the difference
between the above amount
and 90 % of the profit for the
year ending 31.12.1999 1,751.60 3,657.45
3. Profit pending payment
to the Treasury (5) 406.38
TOTAL (2 + 3) 4,063.83
(EUR millions)
5 The remaining amount due shall be paid to the Trea-
sury when the annual accounts for 1999 have been ap-
proved by the Government.
made no contributions whatsoever to the De-
posit Insurance Funds.
2. Loss of profit
The table below shows the loans outstand-
ing in 1999 with interest rates below the refer-
ence rates used, in order to estimate the loss of
profit for the year pursuant to the provisions of
Article 4.2 of Law 13/1994 of 1 June 1994 of
autonomy of the Banco de España.
Included under the heading «net State debt»
is the average balance during the year, on a
daily basis, of the special loans granted to the
State before 1994 and the deposits held by the
Treasury with the Banco de España, when
there is a net balance in favour of the latter. The
fact that the amount shown under this heading
is larger than in 1998, despite the fact that the
average balance of the deposits of the Treasury
was higher in 1999 as a whole, is a conse-
quence of the greater variability of the latter in
1999, which means that they were below the
outstanding balance of the aforementioned spe-
cial loans granted to the State on more occa-
sions and by a larger amount.
As regards the loans to the Social Security
System, transitional provision six of Law 41/99
of 30 December 1994 on the 1995 State bud-
get, when establishing the conditions for repay-
ment of certain loans to the Social Security Sys-
tem, provided that no interest shall accrue on
such loans as from 1 January 1995.
Finally, housing loans and advances to em-
ployees correspond to those granted under the
collective agreement signed by the Banco de
España with them.
The reference rate used to estimate the loss
of profit is the monthly average of the interest
rate on main refinancing operations during the
year, the same as used to calculate the monthly
interest accruing to the Treasury on the net bal-
ance of its account, on the terms established in
the agreement with the Banco de España.
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Average balances on loans outstanding in 1999
with interest rates below
the reference rates
Net State debt 1,083.93 0.00 % 2.71 % 29.37
Loans to the Social
Security System 1,840.06 0.00 % 2.71 % 49.87
Housing loans and 
repayable advances to
employees 127.32 1.97 % 2.71 % 0.95
Housing loans 109.35 2.29 % 2.71 % 0.46
Repayable advances 17.97 0.00 % 2.71 % 0.49
TOTALS 3,051.31 80.19
Estimated
average
balance
in 1999
Title
Interest
rate
received
Reference
interest
rate
Estimated
loss
of profit
(EUR millions and %)
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